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Abstract 
Authentication mechanisms provide the cornerstone for security for many distributed 
systems, especially for increasingly popular online applications. For decades, widely used, 
traditional authentication methods included passwords and PINs that are now inadequate to 
protect online users and organizations from ever more sophisticated attacks.  
This study proposes an improvement to traditional authentication mechanisms. The 
solution introduced here includes a one-time-password (OTP) and incorporates the concept 
of multiple levels and multiple channels – features that are much more successful than 
traditional authentication mechanisms in protecting users' online accounts from being 
compromised. 
This research study reviews and evaluates current authentication classes and mechanisms 
and proposes an authentication mechanism that uses a variety of techniques, including 
multiple channels, to resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used 
mechanisms. Three aspects of the mechanism were evaluated: 
1. The security of multi-channel authentication (MCA) was evaluated in theoretical terms, 
using a widely accepted methodology. 
2. The usability was evaluated by carrying out a user study. 
3. Finally, the acceptability thereof was evaluated by asking the participants in study (2) 
specific questions which aligned with the technology acceptance model (TAM). 
The study’s analysis of the data, gathered from online questionnaires and application log 
tables, showed that most participants found the MCA mechanism superior to other 
available authentication mechanisms and clearly supported the proposed MCA mechanism 
and the benefits that it provides. 
The research presents guidelines on how to implement the proposed mechanism, provides 
a detailed analysis of its effectiveness in protecting users' online accounts against specific, 
commonly deployed attacks, and reports on its usability and acceptability. It represents a 
significant step forward in the evolution of authentication mechanisms meeting the security 
needs of online users while maintaining usability. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Advances in Internet technologies have created many opportunities for offering consumers 
different electronic services online. Some of these services support communication 
between people while others offer online market places where people can choose products 
and services while they remain at home. The Web, as one service provided by the Internet, 
is a remarkable network with huge potentialities that can be accessed from almost all 
countries around the globe [1].  This network offers online business players a wider 
domain of consumers that is not restricted by geographical areas and a new arena of 
competition. On the other hand, it offers customers a virtual market place with a variety of 
products and services from different businesses around the world that are, otherwise, hard 
to bring together in one physical place. 
Banks, as one of the fast growing online businesses, utilize the Web as a marketing and 
delivery medium, which offers them an open market with equal opportunities to compete 
with other banking players. For online banking customers, the Web offers an online market 
place with a wide range of services that are just a click away [2].    However, there is a 
huge volume of communication traffic between banks and customers, full of threats and 
anonymous users with financial gain or subversive goals in mind. It is important to prevent 
such users from gaining unauthorized access to other users’ online accounts. This is 
especially important for financial firms, such as banks, that need to identify and 
authenticate their customers reliably before granting them access to their services. 
Most of the online businesses that maintain users’ accounts today make use of passwords 
to authorize their customers to permit access their online accounts. This authentication 
mechanism, however, is most effective when used as an access credential for accessing 
standalone computers, not connected to any network. Today, almost all computers are 
Internet-ready machines and many of them are already connected to at least one network, 
whether that is a home network, an office network, and/or the Web. This technological 
advancement has brought many electronic services to users’ computers and mobile phones. 
Many of these services require passwords for authentication. Users often reuse the same 
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password, write passwords down, or ask the browser to remember them [3]. Such 
behaviours put the users’ accounts in danger. Even if we trust the user, the fact that these 
computers connect to a global network is, in itself, a reason for not relying on passwords as 
a sole authentication factor for authorizing critical transactions. As a consequence, many 
alternative authentication mechanisms were proposed in the past few years in order to 
provide stronger alternatives to the traditional password. 
This study focuses upon Sultanate of Oman, a developing country where online banking is 
less widely adopted and used by bank customers than in developed countries such as UK. 
There are few published studies [4, 5] exploring online banking adoption and 
authentication techniques to date. Until May 2009, only four out of a total of 7 local banks 
in Oman offered online banking services to their customers [6]. Some of the current 
existing online banking systems implemented by banks, including the major leading bank 
[7], offer only limited functionality such as account statements and payment history with 
payment transfers between customer accounts and bill payments. This made Oman an 
interesting place to explore in the context of online banking adoption using novel 
authentication techniques.  
This study proposes a solution that offers online banking users a more secure 
authentication mechanism while maintaining usability. The solution is based on a 
multilevel authentication approach where services are classified into informational and 
transactional services. Each level must be independent from the other and the user must 
always be authenticated when moving to a higher level. To obtain maximum benefit, 
secrets or keys used to authorize transactional services must be delivered via an 
independent channel other than the primary channel used to authorize users to access 
informational services. This authentication mechanism is based on previous research [8] 
and extends the study by means of theoretical and practical evaluations. The study first 
evaluates the security of the proposed solution theoretically, using threat-modelling 
techniques, and then uses an online experiment to evaluate, in practical terms, usability and 
acceptability of the proposed solution. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
Objective 1. Review the most commonly used authentication classes, authentication 
mechanisms, and authentication attacks (Chapter 2). 
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Objective 2. Review the usability and acceptability aspects of authentication mechanisms 
and the evaluation techniques used to assess them for new information 
technologies. 
Objective 3. With respect to online banking, discuss some of the currently used 
authentication mechanisms and identify their weaknesses, showing how 
they fail to protect customers’ accounts against different attacks identified 
in objective 1 (Chapter 4).  
Objective 4. Propose an authentication mechanism solution that addresses the security 
and usability problems identified and listed in objective 2. Theoretically 
evaluate the security of this solution and identify all features needed for 
implementation (Chapter 5).  
Objective 5. Empirically evaluate the new proposed mechanism with respect to usability 
and acceptability (Chapter 7).    
1.2 Hypothesis and Thesis Statement 
The thesis statement is: 
It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple channels to 
resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used mechanisms. Furthermore, 
such a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to users in Oman. 
The first part of the thesis statement is addressed theoretically using threat-modelling 
analysis in Chapter 5. The second part of the statement is practically evaluated in Chapter 7 
where usability and acceptability aspects are thoroughly addressed.  The practical 
evaluation of usability and acceptability in this study involved testing the following 
hypotheses in order to support the second part of the thesis statement: 
H1a. Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1b. Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1c. Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1d. Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1e. Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1f. Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1g. Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1h. Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use of OB 
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H2a. Multi-channel authentication is effective 
H2b. Multi-channel authentication is efficient 
H2c. Multi-channel authentication is satisfactory 
H2d. Multi-channel authentication is acceptable to users 
 
The hypotheses are split into two categories: H1 and H2 hypotheses.  The H1 hypotheses 
are concerned with the factors influencing the adoption (acceptance) of online banking in 
Oman.  H2 hypotheses, however, address the usability and acceptability of multi-channel 
authentication, proposed in Chapter 5, to Omani users. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The dissertation is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter 2 Background and Related Work:  this chapter presents a thorough literature 
review on authentication, its types, and implementation mechanisms found in 
the literature. The chapter also covers attack methods used to target these 
authentication mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 Usability and Acceptability:  this chapter reviews usability and acceptability of 
authentication mechanisms. It also discusses the importance of evaluating 
usability and acceptability of new information technologies in information 
system and how they can be evaluated in practical terms. 
Chapter 4 Online Banking and Mobile Communication:  this chapter discusses 
authentication mechanisms implemented in online banking applications. It also 
covers the important role of mobile communication as a usable and secure 
complementary authentication channel. 
Chapter 5 Proposed Solution: this chapter proposes the multi-channel authentication 
(MCA) mechanism and discusses how it overcomes the security and usability 
issues of other alternatives. It also presents a widely accepted threat evaluation 
technique, suggested by Microsoft, to test the security level offered by MCA 
against most known forms of attack. 
Chapter 6 Design and Implementation:  this chapter covers MCA design options and 
implementation. It reviews the prototype application and explains how users 
will go about testing it in the data-gathering phase. 
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Chapter 7 Evaluation:  this chapter presents the results of the evaluation of the data 
gathered from users who tested the prototype application. The study bases its 
evaluation on questionnaire results and data gathered from log tables.  
Chapter 8 Conclusion:  this final chapter concludes the study by giving an overview of all 
chapters discussed in this thesis. It also summarizes the main results and lists 
future research paths. 
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Chapter 2  
Background and Related Work 
2.1 Introduction 
When personal home computers started to appear in the 1970s, they were mainly used for 
basic computational tasks or to store data. The most powerful selling tool at that time was 
entertainment software. However, after the development of electronic mail (e-mail) a few 
years later and the introduction of the Web service in the 1980s, there was a shift of users’ 
interests towards using personal computers mainly for communications [9].  This change 
led to interconnected computers in a network, the Internet, replacing the previous era when 
computers were solely standalone machines. According to [10], there were almost 1.73 
billion Internet users worldwide in September 2009, with an increase of 18% since the 
previous year. The e-mail users (81% of the total Internet users) sent around 90 trillion e-
mails in 2009 alone.  
From a business perspective, the Internet (which offers e-mail and Web services) has also 
become the most convenient and cost-effective environment for businesses around the 
globe [1].  It is a place where people with different cultural backgrounds and from different 
geographical places connect as if they are in one physical place, sharing and 
communicating with each other in different electronic forms. For business organizations, 
the web offers an open market with equal opportunities to compete regardless of business 
size or geographical location. For consumers, it offers an online market place with a wide 
variety of products from different suppliers with different prices [2].  Thus, anyone can 
start a business online and compete with other business players. Statistics show e-
commerce or online retailing is one of the fastest growing markets in Europe with online 
sales totalling approximately 4.7% of retail marketplace sales in 2009 (expected to increase 
to 5.5% in 2010) [11]. 
The afore-mentioned trends have made personal computers an integral part of our lives. 
However, this change soon led to security problems. From the users’ side, such problems 
appear in the form of malicious programs, loss of privacy, and floods of unwanted 
advertisement and spam [9].  From the businesses’ side, it is less important to know 
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whether you can do business than to know how to deploy this business in the online market 
[12] and how to maintain the business presence [1] in such an open, networked market full 
of threats and ambiguous users who are connected, along the way, with subversive goals in 
mind. 
According to CERT statistics, the total vulnerabilities reported jumped from 171 to 2,437 
to 7,236 in 1995, 2001, and 2008 respectively [13].  This increase requires that close 
attention be given to security, which itself progresses in parallel with the technological 
advances of computers and the Internet. Before the development of computers, security 
meant a means to secure assets physically, with traditional access controls such as keys, 
guards, walls, and fences. However, after the invention of computers, the science of 
encryption and cryptography offered practical controls for information assets. These have 
improved very quickly over time.   Nevertheless, since the introduction of the Internet and 
the tremendous growth of Internet users and e-commerce web applications, user 
identification and authentication have become major research areas charged with keeping 
pace and withstanding networking changes and increasing numbers of information security 
threats and attacks, evolving over time. These attacks use various technologies and 
techniques, and exploit various vulnerabilities; they have the potential to damage any of 
the three key elements involved in an online communication model. These three key 
elements are: the source, the transmission system, and the destination [14].  In this 
research, source and destination are referred to as end user (EU) and online service 
provider (OSP), respectively. The transmission system is referred to as the communication 
channel (CC). 
Figure 2-1 shows the applicable known attacks on each of the key elements of the online 
communication model. These attacks are discussed in more detail later in section 2.4 of 
this chapter.  
In this chapter, section 2.2 defines authentication and lists the major classes of 
authentication commonly used by information technology systems. Section 2.3 explains 
how these authentication classes are being implemented and discusses the different types 
of authentication mechanisms that are proposed in the literature or that are currently 
implemented in different online applications. Following the authentication classes and 
implementation mechanisms, section 2.4 pinpoints the various attacks on these 
mechanisms. This section covers most known attacks that target each of the three core 
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communication elements: end user (EU), communication channel (CC), and online service 
provider (OSP). 
 
Figure 2-1:  Applicable attacks on the main three communication elements 
2.2 The Need for Authentication 
With the rapid progress of technologies related to networking facilities, more computers 
than ever before are now connected with each other. Unlike local limited networks, most 
computers are now connected to a larger global network to communicate and exchange 
resources electronically [15].  With this networking progress, there is a need to offer 
security that will help protect connected users’ resources and services from other users. 
Yang and Shieh [15] described network security in terms of two basic requirements: 
secrecy and authentication. The former protects sensitive data against eavesdropping and 
modification, ensuring privacy and integrity of the electronic data available or exchanged 
within the network. The latter prevents forgery and unauthorized access to the network’s 
resources, ensuring the authenticity of the user. The authentication process was described 
by Renaud’s model as three phases: identification, authentication, and authorization [16]. 
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1. User identification is the process in which users are identified to a system in terms of 
who they are. The user supplies an identification code or name to the system, which 
accordingly, looks into the database for a matching record. Online user identification is 
insufficient by itself and it is typically necessary to proceed to the user authentication 
phase to verify the identity [17]. 
2. User authentication is the process of confirming the user identification supplied in the 
previous phase. Usually the user must supply a secret factor in this phase, which should 
match the one assigned to the user’s record identified in the previous phase. Like user 
identification, user authentication is insufficient by itself and is a prerequisite for the 
user authorization phase. 
3. If both user identification and authentication phases are successful, user authorization 
follows. This phase specifies the user’s access and usage privileges on the system. This 
phase usually is maintained and it remains live as long as the user session is active. 
This is to ensure that the user is accessing only information he/she is authenticated to 
access. 
Computer systems and online applications use different authentication mechanisms. Some 
choose to use basic authentication mechanisms such as username and password while 
others invest resources to implement suitable authentication mechanisms such as biometric 
recognition hardware and software to protect their reputations and enhance their presence 
in the (online) market. While it is difficult to pin down how much an attack costs an 
organization in terms of damage and recovery, some security and research organizations 
have been running surveys to estimate the costs of attacks and computer security breaches. 
In 2003, viruses (i.e., considered as malware that attack computers) alone cost businesses 
$55 billion, almost double the damage they inflicted in 2002 [18].   
Sometimes, security breaches come from the employees within the organization and not 
from outsiders. In a 2009 survey of American companies and government agencies 
conducted by the Computer Security Institute, 25% of respondents indicated that more than 
60% of financial losses came from accidental breaches by insiders, not external hacks, and 
16.1% said 81 to 100% of all losses came from accidental breaches [19]. One should also 
note that many organizations, especially financial firms, are very reluctant to report hacker-
related break-ins as this could affect customers’ and stakeholders’ impression of their 
security [18] and might, therefore, affect the organization stocks in the stock market [20]. 
Authentication is not only implemented in information technology, but rather is seen and 
dealt with everywhere. The amount of proof a user is required to provide increases or 
 10 
 
decreases based on the amount of risk associated with the services or resources delivered. 
This is referred to as risk-based authentication [21]. 
A restaurant receptionist requests a customer’s name to verify which table is booked for 
that customer, for example. A college student is asked by the registration office for 
information regarding full name, date of birth, and student identification number (ID) to 
receive a transcript. A bank customer calling a credit card department by phone is asked 
for full name, full address, date of birth, and maybe details of recent transactions on the 
account or a special online personal identification number (PIN) to verify his or her 
identity.   
The verification process in our daily life is related to the risk associated with the service or 
resources to be acquired. In the restaurant case, for example, there is very little or no risk at 
all if the customer who just entered the restaurant has impersonated another customer who 
booked a table by phone. If the legitimate customer shows up anytime, he or she can be 
offered another table or, in the worst case, the restaurant manager can request that the other 
customer leave the place in favour of the legitimate customer who booked that table by 
phone. 
In the college student case, transcript details are usually confidential and only a legitimate 
student can request a copy from the registration office. However, the risk associated with 
the student grades being compromised is very low. Students sometimes share their grade 
scores with each other and a copy of the transcript is often attached to every job application 
made after graduation. Therefore, the verification process implemented by the registration 
office is limited only to information that could easily be known by other students like the 
student’s name, date of birth, and student ID. 
Unlike the restaurant customer and the college student, the bank customer has to provide 
more details that identify him or her more clearly (e.g., date of birth, full address) as well 
as information that is treated as confidential and is not known to anyone else (e.g., last 
transaction details, PIN). This is important due to the high risk associated with the 
customer’s bank account. If someone were able to impersonate a bank customer when 
phoning the credit card department, he or she could request payment transactions that 
might be of a criminal nature, affecting the bank and the customer at the same time. 
Hastings and Dodson [22] described the authentication process in terms of claimants, 
relying parties, and verifiers.  A claimant is the individual claiming to be a legitimate user 
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to receive services and resources. A relying party is the provider of the services and 
resources the user needs. A verifier is another individual or an automated system, which 
verifies the claimant’s legitimacy to authorize delivery of services and resources provided 
by the relying party. The verification process is usually based on authentication factors like 
facts, characteristics, behaviours, or knowledge known only to both the claimant and the 
verifier. Based on these authentication factors, the researchers have classified 
authentication in information technology into three classes: knowledge-based (KBA), 
token-based (TBA), and biometrics based (BBA). 
This section discusses these three classes and the possible implementation strengths and 
weaknesses of each in detail. Examples of some implementations of these classes proposed 
in the literature are also presented. 
2.2.1 Knowledge-based Authentication (KBA) 
KBA is also called something the user knows and it refers to the method of verifying a 
user’s identity by matching one or more pieces of “secret” information supplied by an 
individual (claimant) against information sources associated with the claimant [23].  KBA 
is the most common authentication approach used in most distributed systems today [24].  
This is due to many factors including simple implementation requirements, low 
implementation and administration costs [25], and a high level of user acceptance. 
The authentication method used in KBA usually involves two factors: shared knowledge 
and secret knowledge. Shared knowledge is a piece of information that describes the user 
and people who interact with the user sometimes know the information. Examples of such 
shared factors include the user date of birth, living address, social security number, city of 
birth, and the name of a best friend. Secret knowledge, on the other hand, is considered 
secret and only the user usually knows it. This includes fixed passwords, passphrases, and 
PINs.   
A fixed password (see Figure 2-2) as an authentication factor is the most widely used KBA 
mechanism [15, 16, 25]; it acts as the first line of defence against unauthorized access [26].  
Most of the time, a user is requested to enter a username as well as an identification name. 
Following that, the user enters a secure password. The system will then consult a database 
or a data file to locate a matching record. If it finds one, then the password entered by the 
user will be compared against the password in the record. If they match, then the user 
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receives access permission. Sometimes passwords are encrypted in the database so the 
comparison process is only done after the entered password is encrypted using the same 
encryption algorithms. This encryption sometimes uses a one-way function. A one-way 
encryption function is a computational process that encrypts a given string (password) so it 
is computationally infeasible to decrypt it afterwards [27].  This function is used to protect 
users’ passwords from being compromised if an attacker were to gain access to the 
database file.  
 
Figure 2-2: Username and password are common shared and secret knowledge factors used in KBA 
Despite the fact that passwords are the most commonly used KBA, it is clear that they still 
have several weaknesses and are vulnerable to different attacks, especially if their database 
is available offline [28, 29] or is attacked by an insider.  Passwords in most systems are 
user defined and users tend to use memorable weak passwords. Such passwords are highly 
susceptible to observation and guessing [30] and can be intercepted and replayed [25] if 
communication channels are not properly encrypted and secured.  Statistics show that there 
is a significant growth of Internet services offered to online users [31] and users are now 
required to manage many different accounts online.  Accordingly, the number of 
passwords needed to secure these accounts per person has increased. However, users tend 
to reuse their passwords across these accounts, which makes the case even worse because 
compromising one account allows the attacker to take over several accounts [3]. 
In order to overcome these weaknesses, some organizations have made use of system-
generated passwords. This could be counter-productive as system generated passwords 
tend to be very complex, and therefore, hard to remember. Consequently, users might write 
these passwords down and degrade the overall security of the system. The same goes for 
organizations that set password policies that include rules requiring user-defined passwords 
to be very complex (i.e., force the use of special characters, combination of small and 
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capital letters, and numbers). As a result, passwords become more secure, yet hard to 
remember, and therefore, the whole system may be compromised by the written records. 
Thus, a very long password is actually as bad as a weak one. 
One of the most common security mechanisms applied to password authentication is to 
restrict the allowed number of invalid retries. This usually locks down the account for a 
period of time if invalid passwords are submitted several times (i.e., usually three). 
Another common mechanism is to force the user to change the password regularly. Online 
organizations, especially financial firms, do this to ensure that their customers do not use 
the same password among their other accounts that they may access frequently, such as e-
mails, social networking, and instant messaging accounts. All these mechanisms 
apparently help protect the users’ accounts in some ways but there is always a usability 
cost. For example, modern browsers and Internet applications keep users logged in and 
request them to verify their passwords only to re-login to their accounts. However, users 
sometimes forget to disable the caps-lock key or use multi-language keyboards and define 
their passwords in languages other than the language they used when they created them. 
When they enter their passwords in the wrong case or language, they find it difficult to 
understand the reason for the authentication failure due to routine password obfuscation. 
For these reasons, an account could accidently be locked and access denied to a legitimate 
user for a period of time. 
Making passwords complex, and therefore, hard to guess does not prevent other types of 
attacks like Trojans and sniffing (discussed in more detail in section 2.4). Even a strong 
password can easily be captured if a key-logger is used. Key-loggers usually come in 
different techniques. Some are software that are installed into the system (Spector Pro, 
eBlaster, SpyAgent, SpyBuddy) and some are  used to reprogram the BIOS memory 
(memory responsible for the computer firmware, which controls devices like the 
keyboard).  Other types of key-loggers come as hardware such as a circuit with an internal 
memory, which is attached somewhere between the I/O port and the keyboard. Other 
hardware key-loggers do not need to be connected, having wireless sniffing ability to 
capture wireless keyboards’ signals/waves. All these types of key-loggers (software or 
hardware) have the ability to capture the keystrokes, which sometimes represent the user 
identification and secret factors of the user.  
Despite the security and usability issues related to the use of passwords as an 
authentication factor, most systems today are still using passwords as the only secret for 
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user authentication. Even systems that implement a high level of security and utilize other 
forms of authentication are still using password authentication as a complementary 
authentication at some point.  
2.2.2 Token-based Authentication (TBA) 
Token-based authentication (TBA), sometimes referred to as something you hold, is an 
authentication class based on tokens possessed by the user. The authentication principle 
does not rely on user’s memory but rather on the ability of the user to prove the ownership 
of a token. In real life, these tokens are usually used to identify the user who carries them 
(e.g., ID card, hospital card, social security card) while in information technology, these 
tokens are used and processed as part of the authentication mechanism. Such tokens 
include an ATM card, smart card, and the one-time hash calculator.   
Several technologies have been used for authentication based on tokens. These include 
magnetic strip card, proximity card, and smart cards. 
 
Figure 2-3: Magnetic strip cards 
A magnetic strip card (see Figure 2-3) is a token card with a magnetic band capable of 
storing data (e.g., ATM card, credit card, and transport card). They are widely used as a 
substitute for cash by financial firms as well as to carry out financial transactions. Other 
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companies also use this type of token as a substitute for physical access keys (i.e., 
accessing a hotel room), while others use them to control access and payment of time 
controlled services such as car parking area. A set of standards such as ISO 7810, 7811, 
7813 [32-34] and ISO 4909 [35] have been issued to define the physical characteristics and 
the magnetic track data structure of these cards. 
Magnetic strip cards are easy to carry and cheap to replace. However, they are also cheap 
to duplicate. There are commercial devices that are capable of reading the magnetic strip to 
duplicate its contents onto another template card. Thus, some authentication mechanisms 
implemented by organizations like banks also request their customers to provide another 
authentication factor on top of the token. If a token has been stolen or duplicated, they 
should be useless without the other authentication factor associated with the token; a PIN is 
commonly used as a second authentication factor. 
A proximity card (see Figure 2-4a), also known as a contactless smart card, is another form 
of token used for authentication. Unlike a magnetic strip card, a proximity card does not 
require physical contact with a reading device to read its contents. It transmits its data to a 
monitoring device wirelessly, which makes it more practical than the magnetic strip. 
However, the use of proximity cards introduces another major security issue as the signals 
sent by this type of token can be read by a remote receiver located within the transmission 
range of the proximity card [36].  For this reason, the implementation of this type of token 
focuses mainly on access control and identification systems rather than on serving as an 
authentication token. 
 
Figure 2-4: (a) Proximity card, (b) Smart card 
The smart cards (see Figure 2-4b), also known as challenge/response cards, are cards with 
a built-in chip used as memory and/or as a microprocessor. The development of smart 
 16 
 
cards dates back to the 1970s when patents were filed by France, Germany, and Japan [37].  
They are capable of performing computational algorithms and are able to store passwords 
and certificates. There are many applications where smart cards are used, either as 
identification tokens of their owners or as authentication factors. In computer systems, 
smart cards are used to allow single sign-ons and as an encryption factor to encrypt the file 
system. In financial firms, smart cards are used as ATM cards, credit/debit cards, fuel 
cards, SIM cards, and electronic wallets. Electronic wallets can be loaded with cash 
(electronically) that can later be transferred or used to pay for products. 
The smart cards are governed by ISO 7816 (parts 1, 2, & 3) [38], which defines their 
physical/communication characteristics and application identifiers.  In terms of security, 
smart cards use public key infrastructure (PKI) where the private key is stored in the card 
and cannot be copied. Usually it utilizes a two-factor authentication protocol where the 
token itself is considered one factor and a PIN the other. It limits the number of invalid 
trials before the card becomes inactive. Nevertheless, as for other token-based 
authentication, smart cards are prone to theft, and therefore, can be compromised, 
especially if the PIN number is written down on the card itself or is captured by covert user 
surveillance, such as over-shoulder sniffing or surveillance spy cameras. It has been 
estimated that around 25% of ATM card owners write down their PIN numbers on their 
cards [39]. 
 
Figure 2-5:  Different types of tokens used to generate one-time pin (OTP) numbers 
Other types of tokens also exist (see Figure 2-5). These include USB drives, key fobs, and 
one-time pin (OTP) calculators. Overall, token-based authentication offers better security 
than the traditional knowledge-based authentication and protects online users from 
guessing, interception, social engineering, and brute-force attacks. However, the tokens 
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used to authenticate users can be shared or duplicated [40], and therefore, can be used 
illegally by people other than the legitimate user.  Token-based authentication is more 
expensive to deploy and maintain than knowledge-based authentication, especially when 
implemented on a large-scale. Moreover, some token-based technologies suffer from the 
same problems as traditional KBA because they still rely on memory in addition to 
remembering to carry the token. 
2.2.3 Biometric-based Authentication (BBA) 
Biometric authentication refers to the use of physiological and behavioural biometrics to 
authenticate users [41].  No secrets are used to authenticate a user. This type of 
authentication relies on matching patterns of user characteristics or behaviours that are 
unique and distinguished [42] and assumes that similarities of these characteristics or 
behaviours cannot be found in two or more users (see Figure 2-6). 
 
Figure 2-6:  Biometrics: A) ear, B) face, C) facial themogram, D) hand thermogram, E) hand vein, 
F) hand geometry, G) fingerprint, H) iris, I) retina, J) signature, and K) voice 
Photo source: http://www.instrumentalanalysis.com/images/biometrics.jpg 
Biometric authentication overcomes the drawbacks of other authentication classes (i.e., 
users tend to forget passwords and lose tokens). Unlike conventional passwords and 
tokens, biometrics cannot easily be shared or duplicated. They always accompany the user 
and they cannot be forgotten. However, not all people are willing to put part of their body 
in a machine or to accept a laser beam directed into their eye for retinal scans. In addition, 
some people are disabled (e.g., lost fingers or eyes) and cannot utilize the biometrics 
authentication class due to the nature of their limited abilities. 
Biometric authentication’s underlying technology is even more expensive than 
authentication technology involving tokens due to the high tech infrastructure required to 
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process authentication data, especially if implemented on a large scale [43].  Furthermore, 
there are accuracy issues related to what is known as false negative and false positive rates. 
False negatives occur when the biometric recognition device denies access to an authentic 
user while false positive errors happen when it allows access to an unauthorized user. This 
usually happens because matching captured patterns against stored templates will never 
result in an exact match, unlike other authentication classes where authentication is only 
processed if there is a 100% match between the stored factor and the entered value by the 
user. Exact matches in biometrics authentication cannot be achieved due to the noise 
usually associated with the biometrics sensors [44] such as sensing device, humidity and 
biometric position.   
Despite the high security offered by biometrics, they are not impossible to break. Contact 
lenses and sticky residue can be used to capture iris data and fingerprints, respectively [43].  
A behavioural pattern can be captured in the browser or by manipulating the scanner [45] 
before it’s sent online. Besides, biometrics are very hard to change or replace; therefore, if 
an attacker intercepts a biometric pattern, the pattern will often match that of the user and it 
can then be replayed to compromise the user’s account [46]. 
2.2.4 Others 
The three afore-mentioned authentication classes are considered the core authentication 
techniques that have formed the basis for most of the authentication mechanisms 
implemented in the industry. However, new authentication technologies have been 
introduced recently to form extra authentication classes: relationship-based, process-
based, and location-based authentication technologies. 
2.2.4.1 Relationship-based authentication (RBA) 
Relationship-based authentication (referred to as social network authentication by [47]) or 
the somebody you know authentication class was first introduced by [48].  It is an 
authentication protocol based on the classic human social relationship. The study classifies 
authentication into two categories: primary and emergency. The primary authentication 
occurs where a user is usually authenticated to a system using token-based authentication 
(TBA) (i.e., the study takes RSA SecureID as an example of TBA). The latter occurs when 
the primary authentication factor (the token) is not available, and therefore, other 
alternative means should be available to authenticate the user. The RSA Security Inc. 
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SecureID is a one-time code calculator/generator that usually comes in forms like cards or 
key fobs. These generate what is called a tokencode or a passcode every given period (i.e. 
usually 60 seconds). This time-based tokencode is calculated based on time and other user 
details like PIN. This setup assumes that the account owner must provide a username, PIN, 
and the tokencode generated by the SecureID to authenticate into a system successfully. 
The fourth authentication factor comes when the SecureID is not in working order or is not 
available for some reason (i.e., lost, stolen, or maybe the user has forgotten the device at 
home or work). RSA [48] illustrates how the proposed fourth authentication factor should 
work in the following scenario.  The authentication is done collectively between two 
people; one of them is the account owner (identified as asker) and the other one is a trusted 
party (identified as helper) who was enrolled in the system to help authenticate the asker. 
The helper has no other roles or privileges to access the asker account and the only role 
assigned is to request a vouch code - a server generated code that substitutes the tokencode 
usually generated by the RSA SecureID - from the server. The helper then passes the code 
on to the asker. This is illustrated by Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7: Vouching authentication mechanism [48] 
When the asker’s token is not available, it is not possible to acquire a tokencode to initiate 
an authentication procedure. Therefore, the asker contacts the associated helper (this 
association is first identified at the enrolment time based on certain policies defined by the 
online service provider) in a way that the helper would be able to confirm the identity of 
the asker (i.e., by a phone call or a direct face-to-face contact). Once the helper confirms 
the identity of the asker, and after the user requests help, the helper connects to the service 
provider’s server and through a specific vouching system page where a two-factor 
authentication mechanism is implemented, the helper is able to login. Once successfully 
logged-in, the helper has to specify the person’s identity and the system will check if there 
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is a valid association between the helper and the given asker in the database. If a record is 
found, the system will generate a vouchcode and a session that are both valid for a given 
period (i.e., defined by the service provider’s policies). The helper then passes the system-
generated vouchcode to the user using a secure channel. The study suggests that the 
exchange of vouchcodes must not be carried out by e-mail and only exchanged by other 
more secure means like phone or face-to-face. 
The asker, at this point, has a time-based (i.e., something between 1 to 2 days) vouchcode 
which can be used along with the username and PIN number, known to the asker, as 
authentication factors to access a given page on the service provider’s system to generate a 
time-based password of the asker’s choice. This step is important, as the user-defined 
passwords are easier to remember than the system-generated vouchcodes. The username, 
PIN, and the newly created password can then be used to authenticate the asker to the 
system for a restricted period. The process can be repeated for as long as the token used to 
generate the tokencode is out of order. 
This authentication method is unsuitable for day-to-day authentication tasks and can only 
be used in situations when a password reset is needed by the account owner. The 
implementation proposed by Brainard has usability issues.  For instance, the helper must 
have an Internet connection when the account owner requests a vouchcode.  Without an 
Internet connection, the helper will not be able to request a vouchcode for the asker.  This 
could also affect the relationship between the helper and the asker if the helper is usually 
unable to offer the asker a vouchcode.    
Nevertheless, the potential of this authentication technology as a secondary authentication 
method is very high. It is a cost-effective alternative option to call centres and help-desk 
services when a password reset is needed. A better implementation design (discussed in 
Chapter 7) can overcome all the usability issues discussed above. 
2.2.4.2 Process-based authentication (PBA) 
Also known as something you process class of authentication. This type of authentication 
method is based on human ability to process things. That is, instead of requesting the user 
to enter a password into a machine, the system will rather ask the user to perform 
mathematical or logical operations based on secrets known to the user combined with 
variable inputs provided by the system. The output of such a process should form an 
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authentication pass that will construct an authenticated session between the user and the 
system.   
An example of this authentication methodology was presented by [49].  The user is 
requested to do a mathematical operation (+, -, *) based on a formula (password) and 
numbers assigned to letters randomly that appear on the screen (see Figure 2-8). Here, the 
user is not asked to enter the password for authentication, the system will rather ask the 
user to recall the formula, which is actually the password, and process it based on a given 
set of letters/numbers. The result of the calculations should form a one-time password that 
allows the user to login to the system successfully.  
 
Figure 2-8:  PBA class by [49] 
This system involves more than one activity: recalling the formula and performing 
mathematical calculations at the primary level of the authentication process. The main 
reason behind introducing this type of authentication method is to protect users from 
attacks like shoulder surfing, brute-force, guessing, dictionary, and social engineering 
attacks. It actually further helps users from more sophisticated attacks like man-in-the-
middle and phishing. A user never needs to enter the password into a machine, and 
therefore, capturing the password on the fly or while it is being entered into the system is 
not possible. The answer or authentication factor entered by the user, which is the result of 
the computational process, changes every time the system requests the user to enter a 
password. This is because the formula the user uses to process the answer depends mainly 
on the random figures appearing on the screen, which change every time the user needs to 
login. 
This system, however, is time consuming and cognitively demanding, far more than other 
conventional KBA mechanisms. As mentioned above, the primary phase of authentication 
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is split into two phases: recalling and processing. The latter will take extra time and users 
might consider using pen and note to do the calculations if their formula is somehow 
complex or long. This poses a severe security issue, as these notes are prone to theft. 
2.2.4.3 Location-based authentication (LBA) 
Location-based authentication is about authenticating a user based on his or her presence at 
a distinct location. Implementation of location-based authentication is currently limited in 
online systems, unlike the wide range of its implementation in the physical world. 
Applications like buildings’ automatic doors are common systems that use LBA to operate. 
In the literature, Denning and MacDoran [46] were the first to propose location-based 
authentication for computer systems.  They claimed that LBA was a new authentication 
class by itself and formed a new dimension to user authentication and access control. They 
proposed the use of a location signature (LS), which defines the unique physical location 
of a particular user or network terminal at a given time, and is created by a location 
signature sensor (LSS). The implementation of this proposal is based on the microwave 
signals transmitted by satellites that are part of the global positioning system (GPS). An 
independent device can be used to determine the geodetric location - latitude, longitude, 
and height in a precisely defined geocentric coordinate reference system.   
A patent was recently registered by [50] which utilizes the location-based authentication 
approach for online banking and other financial firms’ transactions using mobile devices.  
The invention suggests the use of a location-based system to check if a mobile device, such 
as a cellular telephone, is proximate to the computer being used by the customer in the 
transaction. Based on the result, the system can decide whether to accept or reject the 
requested transaction. An assessment risk should define the level at which this proposal 
should be implemented. For example, systems that present information of low-risk after the 
user logs in can implement this approach at the transactional level only, while systems 
posing high-risk information after the user log-in should implement it right at the 
beginning. 
The implementation of location-based authentication in general offers many advantages 
over other authentication classes. The use of open proxy servers has become a major 
source for launching online attacks [51].  IBM reported in 2009 that the number of online 
proxies have tripled in the past two years [52].  The main reason for using proxy servers is 
the anonymity they offer for the attackers to hide their online behaviours. It becomes 
infeasible for a victim to trace the original source of such attacks. Therefore, restricting 
 23 
 
online account access to specific locations defined by the user (e.g., office, home, and 
mobile device) could be the best possible solution to protect user accounts against 
anonymous attacks. 
LBA also offers a solution to session hijacking attacks. Sometimes users leave their session 
open without logging out on a terminal they are using to connect to different online 
accounts. Any other user who uses that terminal can utilize the opened sessions to 
impersonate the legitimate user. This is most common on online applications that allow a 
long period before an idle session is automatically destroyed. LBA can solve this by 
authenticating the user’s mobile device location continuously. If the user connects to the 
account from a terminal, a session can be built based on the location of devices, the 
terminal used, and the user’s mobile device. This session should remain active as long as 
the user did not logout and both locations are identical (with enough location error margin 
based on the accuracy of the geodetric location system). If either of these two conditions 
changes, the application should automatically destroy the session. This feature makes LBA 
a good authentication method to implement in conjunction with single sign-ons [46]. 
Despite the advantages of LBA mentioned above, there are a few limitations. Since GPS 
signals are used to authenticate users based on their locations, its performance in certain 
environments and for some applications can be quite limited [53].  This is mainly due to 
the GPS signal that cannot penetrate water, soil, walls, and other obstacles. In addition, the 
accuracy of the location has an error rate of a few meters sometimes and cannot guarantee 
the exact location point. Moreover, there are privacy concerns about LBA. The system 
could be used to track an individual’s location, especially when continuous authentication 
is active. Therefore, access to, and dissemination of, users’ location information that has 
been collected for authentication purposes should be strictly limited [46]. 
2.2.5 Summary 
Table 2-1 presents a summary of different authentication classes covered in the literature 
along with some examples currently implemented in the market. 
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Class Examples Advantages Disadvantages 
Knowledge-based 
(KBA) 
• Secret questions 
• User ID and password 
• PIN 
• High user-acceptance 
• Easy to implement and 
administer 
• Cheap to deploy and 
maintain 
• Can be shared 
• Users tend to re-use 
• Subject to guessing 
and reply attacks 
• Prone to 
eavesdropping 
• Can be forgotten 
Token-based (TBA) • Magnetic stripe cards 
• Contactless cards 
• Smart cards 
• Badges 
• USB drives 
• Mobile software 
• Keys 
• Ease of use and 
management 
• Cheap to implement 
• Better accountability 
as tokens are tangible 
• Matured and 
widespread 
• High user acceptance 
• Can be shared 
• Can be duplicated 
• Susceptible to loss and 
damage 
• Can be stolen and re-
used 
• Requires hardware to 
replace 
• Limited lifetime 
Biometrics based 
(BBA) 
• Fingerprint 
• Face Iris 
• Voice print 
• Difficult to share or 
duplicate 
• Repudiation unlikely 
• Forging difficult 
• Cannot be lost or 
stolen 
• Expensive on wide-
scale 
• Availability issues 
• Low user-acceptance 
• Accuracy issues 
• Reliability issues 
under abnormal 
conditions 
• Patterns can be 
captured and replayed 
 
Relationship-based 
(RBA) 
• Vouchcode • Cost-effective • Social relationship 
issues 
• Availability 
Process-based (PBA) • Mathematical 
calculation 
• Secret in not involved 
in authentication 
process 
• One-time factor 
 
 
• Time consumption 
• Limited audience 
 
 
 
 
Location-based (LBA) • Location signature via 
GPS 
• Cannot spoof 
• Easy to trace attacks 
• Continuous 
authentication 
• Protect against session 
hijacking 
• No secret to store or 
manipulate 
• Users privacy 
• Location accuracy 
error rate 
• GPS limited signal 
coverage 
Table 2-1: Summary table of different authentication classes 
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2.3 Authentication Implementation 
The previous section reviewed and discussed different authentication classes proposed in 
the literature. Many arguments, however, also exist in the literature and in industry about 
how these classes should be implemented in real applications. This section discusses 
different authentication mechanisms based on the classes covered by the previous section. 
These mechanisms are single-factor, multi-factor, multilevel, and multi-channel 
authentication mechanisms. 
2.3.1 Single-factor Authentication 
This is the most basic and widely implemented authentication mechanism in information 
technology. Knowledge-based factors (e.g., password, passphrase, and PIN) are the most 
commonly used factors (discussed in section 2.2.1) and users accept this authentication 
mechanism as the most usable. 
 
Figure 2-9:  Single-factor authentication mechanism 
Single-factor, in terms of security, is the weakest authentication mechanism among all 
other mechanisms. The fact that this mechanism utilizes only a single factor (e.g., 
password), which is passed to the other end using a single channel, makes it prone to many 
different attacks covered in section 2.4 (see Figure 2-9).   
2.3.2 Multi-factor Authentication 
Some organizations propose the use of multi-factor authentication to counter the 
weaknesses of the single-factor mechanism. This is implemented by adding extra 
authentication factors to the process of authenticating a user into a system (see Figure 
2-10). For instance, an online banking application requests the customer to enter the bank 
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card number. After the application verifies the card number (i.e., a unique number 
identifies the customer record in the bank database), the customer is asked to enter a secret 
answer to one of the questions this customer has previously answered at enrolment time. If 
the customer answers correctly, the application finally requests a password to allow the 
customer access to his or her account (a similar real case is discussed in detail in section 
4.1.3.3). 
In terms of security, multi-factor authentication offers better protection against several 
attacks such as guessing, brute-force, and phishing (discussed in section 2.4). However, the 
one channel used in this mechanism is the weakest part because, if the channel is 
compromised, all factors exchanged between the end-user and the system can be captured 
accordingly. 
 
Figure 2-10:  Multi-factor authentication mechanism 
2.3.3 Multilevel Authentication 
Some businesses have implemented multilevel authentication mechanisms [26].  This can 
be achieved by allowing users limited access to the system resources after their initial 
login. The user is requested to submit a secondary secret factor (e.g., password, passphrase, 
or PIN) to access other restricted resources (see Figure 2-11). The main reason behind this 
upgrade was to secure the critical transactions within the system from attacks such as 
eavesdropping, social engineering, phishing, and others if the first authentication factor 
was compromised. A good example of such a mechanism can be found in most of the 
current online banking applications (OBAs). These OBAs allow bank customers to login to 
their online banking account using a password. However, to pay utility bills, or to transfer 
money, the customer has to provide another password or passphrase to authorize the 
transaction (i.e., known as multilevel authentication). 
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Figure 2-11:  Multilevel authentication mechanism 
2.3.4 Multilevel, Multi-channel Authentication 
Although the multilevel authentication mechanism has improved overall security, it has not 
eliminated the fear of the kinds of attacks that could compromise all security levels (e.g., 
real-time phishing/pharming (RTP/P), and malware [27]).  An attack like man-in-the-
browser (MITB) can simply alter transaction details before they are sent to the OBA 
without the user knowing that such an alteration has occurred. The customer, therefore, 
authorizes the transaction (e.g., payment or money transfer) by entering the second 
authentication factor whenever the OBA requests it for final check.  
 
Figure 2-12:  Multilevel, multi-channel authentication mechanism 
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To overcome such multilevel weaknesses, some organizations, especially financial firms, 
which comprise the sector most affected by online attacks (see section 2.4.3.5), have 
improved the way multilevel authentication is implemented in online banking by 
integrating the multi-channel authentication (MCA) approach (Figure 2-12). MCA works 
just like multilevel authentication but uses independent channels (e.g., web channel 
combined with mobile network channel). For instance, the primary authentication factor is 
delivered using the web channel while the secondary authentication factor is delivered to 
the customer via an SMS using the mobile network infrastructure (see Figure 2-13).  
 
Figure 2-13: Multilevel, single channel approach vs. multilevel, multi-channel approach 
Figure 2-13 illustrates the difference between multilevel, single channel and multilevel, 
multi-channel authentication mechanisms. In multilevel, single channel authentication, 
only one channel is used to deliver and receive authentication factors for different OBA 
levels. If that channel is compromised, all exchanged factors can be compromised 
accordingly, whether the communication channel is encrypted or not. Attacks, such as 
MITB, are able to capture exchanged factors at end-user’s browser level even before these 
factors are encrypted and sent to the other side (MITB attacks are covered in Section 
2.4.3.8). 
Multilevel, multi-channel authentication (referred to as multi-channel authentication or 
MCA in this thesis), as a protocol, has been implemented by different systems for 
increased security. The most commonly used channels for authentication along with the 
Internet channel are the telephone and cellular networks. For instance, a patent filed by 
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Goldthawite [54] suggests the use of mobile devices to authorize card payments.  Another 
by Yates [55] also suggests the use of mobile devices to authorize payments for vending 
machines. The proposed scenario suggests that the user enters the transaction details as 
well as the mobile phone number into the vending machine. The machine establishes a 
connection with a service provider, which in turn, contacts the user through the mobile 
network and requests a one-time pin number as an answer to an automated call or by 
entering them directly into the vending machine along with a PIN number known only to 
the user [55]. 
There are also many commercial products and services, such as Identrica [56], SAINTlogin 
[57] and Lloyds TSB [58], which offer multi-channel authentication services using 
telephone and mobile networks.  Identrica requests the user to enter the access login details 
along with the mobile number into a login page. Then, to complete the login process, the 
user has to call a given number of the company. The company’s system does not answer 
the call but checks the caller number to verify if it matches the customer’s phone number 
who just submitted login credentials. If it matches, the user is allowed full access to the 
system. 
SAINTlogin offers the same multi-factor, multi-channel authentication mechanism. 
However, here the system provides the user a random phone number, which will only be 
allocated for single login sessions. The user has to call that number to be granted access to 
the system. 
Lloyds TSB, on the other hand, offers the same multi-factor, multi-channel authentication 
mechanism but the bank is the caller in this case. The customer initially must register 
different phone numbers with the bank. After registration, the user can create new 
beneficiary accounts or standing orders online that cannot be activated without answering a 
phone call from the bank and entering a one-time pin number shown in the screen. 
MCA is currently offered by different commercial applications in a number of different 
ways. It is vital for any business to carry out a risk analysis and verify the need for MCA 
before implementing it. The following section discusses the flexibility of MCA in meeting 
the different requirements of many types of online applications while maintaining security 
and usability.  
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2.4 Authentication Attack Methods 
Improving security and hardening authentication protocols is the ultimate need for every 
organization around the world. This ranges from physical access controls to biometrics 
authentication. To some extent, everyone in this chain requires security to thwart possible 
illegal break-ins or attacks to their systems. Security measures have evolved over time and 
there is a great deal of work being done in this area. However, no matter how secure the 
system is, there will always be a chance for someone to break it [59].  So hardening 
authentication tokens provides only limited and temporary security until an attacker 
discovers a new way to break the encryption. 
This section presents a discussion of attack methods, categorizing attacks based on each of 
the following core Internet communication elements: online service provider (OSP), the 
communication channel (CC), and the end user (EU). 
2.4.1 Attacks on Online Service Provider (OSP) 
An Online Service Provider (OSP) is any organization that provides an electronic service 
for users via the Internet. This includes online banking services provided by banks, 
electronic mail services provided by companies like Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo!, and 
other online services that are owned and managed by individuals and are hosted by 
different data centres around the world (e.g., Internet relay chat (IRC), social community 
forums, hosting services, online file sharing, blogging, and online gaming). 
There are many reasons why attackers target OSPs. Some aim to utilize the OSP resources 
for illicit materials [60]; they might store hacking tools and pornography and set the server 
to be part of a DDoS attack (more information about DDoS is available in section 2.4.1.1).  
Others attack OSPs to steal services or valuable files, to spy on friends and family 
members, or to build reputations, especially if attacking well-known high profile or 
secured organizations where there are clashes of interests related to politics and religion 
(e.g., [61, 62]). 
The following sub-sections discuss the types of attacks that target OSPs. 
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2.4.1.1 Denial-of-Service Attack (DoS) 
This type of attack aims at making the OSP’s online services unavailable or unreachable to 
users, turning services down. Denial-of-Service (DoS) is about involving only one source 
(i.e., a single person or a group of people) to exhaust OSP resources, such as network 
bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data structures, and to limit or stop 
completely the delivery of services to end users. However, the DoS has been improved to a 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS). DDoS involves many different sources on the net 
(known as zombies or bots after they are successfully compromised by the attacker [63]) to 
form botnets (see Figure 2-14a).  Botnets are usually controlled by one attacker and aim at 
initiating DDoS attacks or spreading spam and phishing e-mails [64].   
DDoS attacks one target, usually by overloading the server offering the services with 
heavy traffic initiated by zombies (infected computers) so it becomes slow and unable to 
process further requests by legitimate users.   
 
Figure 2-14:  Botnets: a) DDoS, b) DRDoS attacks [65] 
Another sophisticated version of DDoS has more recently been introduced. This improved 
version is called the distributed reflection denial-of-service attack (DRDoS). Unlike DDoS, 
the DRDoS involves another layer of computers in the attack. These computers are not 
actually infected or compromised (not zombies) and their users do not really know that 
they are involved in a DRDoS attack. This usually happens when an attacker compromises 
different computers on the Internet, which in turn, try to infect other uninfected computers. 
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However, the source address of these connections is altered to reflect the victim's OSP IP 
address. The uninfected computers think that the OSP is trying to establish a connection 
with them and they cumulatively send heavy traffic back to the OSP server as replies to the 
fake requests received by zombie machines (see Figure 2-14b). 
The first known attack using DoS was recorded when Panix, the New York area's oldest 
and largest Online service provider, was attacked from unknown sources on September 6th, 
1996 [66].  However, Spanish police caught the biggest DDoS attack ever known in 2010 
when three people were controlling nearly 13 million zombie personal computers from 190 
different countries [67].  This included computers inside more than 1000 companies and 40 
major banks around the world. 
2.4.1.2 Website/application Manipulation 
Website/application attacks are considered the most common attacks targeting OSPs with 
49% of total known OSP attacks [52].  Unlike DDoS, which normally causes temporary 
denial of service, manipulation of website site contents or the web application database can 
be very harmful and destructive in nature if recovery plans are not properly set by the OSP 
management. For example, an SQL injection type of attack, where database SQL 
statements are injected into the URL as a query string because of poorly designed web 
application, can allow the attacker to gain administrative privileges for a security-policy 
maintained web application. The attacker can also wipe all database records, and if there 
were no proper frequent backup rules set in place, especially for an interactive web 
application, updated frequently by the OSP and customers, this can cause severe 
implications for the OSP’s reputation and its online business.  
There are many types of website/application manipulation attacks; the most common ones 
are the SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS). The latter is usually used to hijack 
users’ cookies or sessions. XSS comes in two forms: non-persistent and persistent. Non-
persistent attacks cannot be carried out unless the attacker is able to contact the victim user 
by e-mail or other means to pass a crafted link with a malicious code. Once the user clicks 
on the link, it opens a legitimate website the user visits that may have an account that is 
authenticated by a cookie stored in the user’s machine. The malicious code injected in the 
link will be executed by the user’s browser after it is rendered by the website the user 
visits. Depending on the code functions, it can copy the user’s cookie or session and pass it 
on to the attacker (see Figure 2-15a). 
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Figure 2-15:  (a) Non-persistent XSS attack; (b) Persistent XSS attack 
Persistent XSS attacks are more dangerous and can affect more than one user at a time. 
This usually happens on web applications like message boards and blogs where the 
attacker can inject the malicious code in the page itself and then access all users’ sessions 
(see Figure 2-15b).  
 
Figure 2-16:  Web-application vulnerability disclosures by attack categories 2004 – 2009 (adapted 
from [52]) 
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SQL and XSS injections as well as other website/applications manipulations usually attack 
web applications with poorly written validation controls. Figure 2-16 presents web-
application vulnerability disclosures by attack categories between 2008 and 2009.  It also 
shows how the number of Cross-Site Scripting surpassed SQL Injection disclosures in 
2009, putting it back as the web-application top vulnerability for the year 2009 [52]. 
2.4.1.3 Brute-force Attack 
This type of attack aims at compromising users' accounts at the server level by randomly 
checking the validity of usernames and passwords with infected zombie personal 
computers. Usually this happens in a distributed manner as discussed in DoS attacks. The 
response of the OSP is recorded and passed back to the original attacker. This can be either 
an invalid username and password or a valid session establishment, which normally means 
a valid username and password. 
2.4.1.4 OSP Security Policy Violation 
The study [68] identified security policy (SP) violation as one of the factors that could 
result in a successful online banking attack. An employee may cause an internal security 
incident and expose customers’ information if violating the OSP’s security policies while 
there are weak access controls and logging mechanisms. This also could lead to 
unauthorized access to the OSP’s servers. 
Unauthorized access showed a dramatic increase and replaced denial of service as 
the second most significant contributor to computer crime losses, accounting for 24 
percent of overall reported losses and showing a significant increase in average 
dollar loss. 
10th CSI/FBI survey (2005) [69] 
In the digital world, improper definition of a web application’s SP or violations to SPs 
could result in an attacker being able to acquire administrative privileges by attacking an 
employee’s machine. This usually happens when an employee, who has administrative 
privileges to access the OSP’s servers, is accessing the OSP local network while, at the 
same time, is connected to other public web services like e-mail, chatting, and social 
networking sites from the same machine. The computer here is the weakest link because 
personal computers are usually prone to attacks like viruses, worms, Trojans, and other 
common malware (see Figure 2-17). A good security policy would strictly disallow 
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employees to connect one machine to the local network and to the Internet at the same 
time. 
 
Figure 2-17:  Security policy violation 
2.4.2 Attacks on Communication Channels (CC) 
This type of attack focuses on communication channels between the EU and OSPs. It could 
be limited to a local area network LAN (e.g., home or office networks) but could have a 
more far-reaching effect if an attacker is able to attack wide area networks (WAN) (e.g., 
telecommunication companies that provide Internet services to others). This section 
discusses three common attacks targeting CC: sniffing, man-in-the-middle (MITM), and 
session hijacking. 
2.4.2.1 Sniffing 
Sniffing is a type of attack that compromises the communication channel between the end-
user and the OSP. The attacker uses sniffing to listen to and interpret the data exchanged 
between the parties, and therefore, is able to capture factors sent by the user for 
authentication and authorization. This kind of attacks is passive and does not alter the data 
exchanged between the communicating parties. 
2.4.2.2 Man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) 
This type of attack allows an attacker to intercept the data exchanged between the EU and 
the OSP. Unlike a sniffing attack, man-in-the-middle is a real-time attack and has the 
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ability to alter captured packets and to capture sensitive information about other websites 
directly from the user’s machine (see Figure 2-18). 
 
Figure 2-18:  Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack 
A whitepaper by IBM [52] categorizes MITM attacks into passive and active attacks. 
Passive MITMs are those attacks that only listen, capture, and/or modify data transmitted 
between the EU and the OSP. However, active MITMs are more dangerous and are able to 
compromise the user’s access credentials to websites that the user did not visit. This can be 
achieved by [70]: 
1. Stealing the victim's session cookies for any other site. 
2. Overriding Same Origin Policy for any other site, (this has the same impact as XSS). 
3. Stealing the browser's saved passwords for any other site. 
4. Poisoning the browser cache for any other site, (this will make the attack persistent). 
Usually an active MITM depends first on the passive attack. They rely on HTML elements 
such as inline frame, also known as IFRAME.  An IFRAME allows web authors to display 
multiple documents in one window [71]. This allows designers to keep one document 
visible while scrolling or replacing another. Among the many attributes an IFRAME has is 
the “src” attribute that allows the designer to include any web-document, internal or 
external, in an IFRAME. The HTML codes in Figure 2-19 show how an IFRAME can be 
used to include an external web-document/file into an existing web-document. 
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<HTML> 
<HEAD> 
<TITLE>IFRAME Element</TITLE> 
</HEAD> 
<BODY> 
This is the main document body.  Next an inline frame displays an 
external document from example.com<br /> 
  <IFRAME src="http://www.example.com/foo.html" width="40" height="50" 
             scrolling="auto" frameborder="1"> 
  Here is the external IFRAME document’s body 
  </IFRAME> 
</BODY> 
</HTML> 
Figure 2-19: IFRAME element within HTML web-document 
A user could be browsing a news website. The attacker injects a hidden IFRAME element 
in the contents coming from the OSP as a reply to a user request. This IFRAME will load 
another website of interest to the attacker where the user has an online account that can be 
accessed using a stored cookie file in the user’s machine. The attacker will then use a 
passive attack again to capture the cookie’s sessions that are loaded in the injected 
IFRAME, and therefore, will initiate a session hijack attack to impersonate the user and get 
access to the user account. 
The success or failure of MITM attacks is not based on bugs or un-patched software 
residing on the EU’s machine nor does it depend on what users are browsing at the time 
when the attack is launched. It is solely a matter of whether the network the user is 
connected to is secured and trusted or not. Public networks (especially those which provide 
a Wifi connection feature) are always unsafe networks, no matter what website the user is 
intending to visit [70]. 
2.4.2.3 Session hijacking 
Session hijacking is usually a result of other attacks like sniffing, phishing and pharming 
(see Section 2.4.3), and MITM attacks; it utilizes the user’s connection session ID to spoof 
the user's identity. 
2.4.3 Attacks on End Users (EU) 
Users remain the weakest link in security [72]. Online businesses’ current attention is 
focused on the advances of attacks targeting OSPs and CCs [73] while neglecting the end 
users who are the only element that cannot be technically controlled [74, 75]. Schneier said 
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in [76]: “Security is only as good as it’s weakest link, and people are the weakest link in 
the chain”. 
Some studies (e.g., [77, 78]) refer the weaknesses of users to the fact that people receive 
conflicting demands or do not receive proper support and training.  Others (e.g., [64, 79, 
80]) claim that users behaviour often appears to be the main factor behind security 
breaches, and therefore, users are considered an essential part of prevention and reduction 
of security incidents. 
In this section, attacks that target end users to compromise their systems or online accounts 
are discussed in more details. In terms of methods used, these attacks by far outnumber the 
other, previously discussed attacks used to target other Internet communication parts (e.g., 
OSP and CC). 
2.4.3.1 User surveillance 
User surveillance is the use of hardware devices to monitor or record users' input to 
computers or teller machines (ATMs). It is electronic, over-shoulder surfing. This attack 
can capture user passwords/PINs used in the authentication process. 
2.4.3.2 Token/notes theft 
We mentioned earlier in section 2.2.1 that some OSPs implement system-generated 
passwords to overcome password guessing. On the other hand, making passwords hard to 
guess makes them hard to remember for legitimate users. Users tend to write their 
passwords down in a note when they cannot remember them [81].  Sometimes this also 
happens when a bank sets complex password polices to achieve hard-to-guess passwords 
and forces the user to select one that matches all the rules. 
Token theft is another type of attack where users’ tokens, like ATM bank cards, smart 
cards, mobile phones, OTP calculators, and other authentication tokens, are stolen. 
Although some of these tokens will not fully authenticate the attacker unless another form 
of authentication (e.g., PIN for ATM cards) is used, others do not need further 
authentication to be of benefit to the attacker. Examples of the latter tokens include those 
used for access control (i.e., key fob or contactless card used for accessing a building or a 
car park area) and older versions of ATM cards, which are still used by some banks in 
different countries, that allow swiping the card into a card reader without the need to verify 
further by PIN number. 
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2.4.3.3 Malware infection 
This is considered the most common type of attack that targets users. A recent survey by 
CSI Computer Crime and Security [19] found that 64.3% of respondents cited malware 
infection as an incident they encountered in 2009.  This was the highest rate among other 
attacks examined in the survey. 
Malware could be a virus, a worm, a mobile code, a backdoor, a Trojan, or a rootkit. The 
installation of any such malware/malicious software can be used for different purposes 
(e.g., files corruption, controlling, storage, and turning to act as a zombie). However, all 
have the ability to capture authentication factors once they are installed in a victim’s 
machine. Depending on how the malware is designed, it can pass these credentials to the 
attacker via e-mail or in an online form or it can allow the attacker to connect to the user’s 
machine to collect these details. Other types of malware are programmed to carry out 
changes to the details transferred from/to the user machine where no further interaction by 
the attacker is required, (some examples of this type of malware are described in detail in 
section 2.4.3.8). 
2.4.3.4 Social engineering 
Social engineering attacks usually aim at stealing authentication factors by fooling the 
access credential holders. This type of attacks takes two forms: technical and non-
technical. The credential holders may be the customers who are the account holders or 
even the support help desk people who have administrative privileges to access and reset 
customer credentials. 
Non-technical social engineering attacks aim at deceiving users by means of convincing 
and trust building. For example, an attacker introduces himself/herself to the user as a 
banker or a technician and requests the user’s credentials for help and support purposes. 
Another attacker calls the help centre, impersonates a legitimate user, and requests a 
password reset to the account. This kind of conversation takes place through a call or e-
mail most of the time, as it is very hard or dangerous for the attacker to impersonate 
someone else and deceive a user or a help desk face-to-face. 
Technical social engineering, on the other hand, involves other types of attacks such as 
phishing (see section 2.4.3.5) and pharming (see section 2.4.3.6). These require the 
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attacker to have technical or web development skills, usually to masquerade the OSP’s web 
presence to capture users’ access credentials. 
2.4.3.5 Phishing 
Phishing is an example of technical, social engineering where the attacker designs and 
hosts a fake page or website, which has the same look and feel of a legitimate website. 
Then the attacker invites people to submit log-in credentials using e-mails or instant 
messaging (IM) that claim to be from a legitimate source but contain links to the fake 
spoofed page or website. Figure 2-20 displays an example phishing e-mail message which 
introduces itself as if it comes from a legitimate HSBC source and asking the client to 
identify him/herself to the bank website using a misleading web link.  That link displays a 
real valid link to hsbc.co.uk but the source (which is usually hidden) directs the client to a 
fake website hosted by another domain name. 
 
Figure 2-20: Phishing attack via e-mail 
According to an Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), financial and payment services 
are the industry sectors most targeted by phishing attacks with almost 72% of total attacks 
in the 4th quarter of the year 2009 [82]. A Gartner consulting firm study [83] recorded an 
increase in phishing attacks by 40% in 2008, where only 56%  of the victims  have 
recovered their losses (i.e., 56% of 5 million who lost money in the US as of September 
2008). 
 
 
xx 
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2.4.3.6 Pharming 
Pharming is yet another social engineering attack that targets end-users. Pharming and 
phishing implement the same techniques to capture end-users’ access credentials. 
However, they use different strategies to complete this task. Unlike phishing, pharming 
attacks first compromise the user’s machine to alter the host’s file before the user is 
deceived and taken to a fake website. The host’s file is a file residing in personal 
computers and used to speed up domain name resolution. When a user tries to access a 
domain name, if that domain name is not defined in the host’s file, the machine will try to 
contact a domain name server (DNS) to resolve the IP address associated with the domain 
name. If it is defined in the local machine host’s file, then there is no need to contact a 
DNS server.  
This is more sophisticated than phishing techniques as it involves the altering of a file in 
the user’s machine. It has a better impact than phishing as users will probably not notice 
that they are visiting a counterfeit website; the user is not required to click on a misleading 
link received by e-mail or found in a website because, whenever the user tries to access the 
actual website using its domain, the local hosts file will redirect the user to the fake 
website automatically. 
 
Figure 2-21: DNS spoofing attack [84] 
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More sophisticated and dangerous pharming techniques exist at network or communication 
channel (CC) levels. This happens when DNS tables of routers and servers are attacked 
and altered so they will redirect DNS resolution requests on a mass scale. This is known as 
DNS spoofing and is illustrated in Figure 2-21. 
In the above figure, the attacker first attacks a DNS server and alters or adds an entry for 
www.mybank.com website so it will point to the different IP address of the attacker’s fake 
website. Any customer requests for DNS resolution of www.mybank.com from the 
attacked DNS server will be redirected to the fake website rather than to the actual 
www.mybank.com site. 
2.4.3.7 Clickjacking 
Clickjacking, also known as user-interface (UI) redressing, is an attack technique based on 
HTML codes being used to hide a layer on top of the displayed contents to perform 
unexpected actions after the user clicks on it. This exploit was officially released to the 
public in 2008 but it has existed for many years [85].  It can be used in different ways. For 
example, an attacker can send an e-mail to a victim with an embedded video clip. The 
video clip has a play button, which, if clicked, installs malicious software into the user’s 
machine (i.e., malware infection attack). This is achieved by placing an invisible layer on 
top of that button to run such an unexpected action. 
A clickjacking attack has the ability to allow an attacker to completely control the victim’s 
desktop; thus, it hijacks the victim’s active sessions or captures the authentication factors 
exchanged with other sites. 
2.4.3.8 Man-in-the-browser attacks (MITB) 
A man-in-the-browser attack is one of the recently developed attacks that target users’ 
machines (specifically users’ browser software). It is a malware type of attack that installs 
itself in the user browser and has the ability to intercept and modify transmitted details 
before they are sent out to the OSP (see Figure 2-22). It also intercepts replied details from 
the OSP and is able to modify them before they are displayed in the user’s browser. All of 
these alterations are performed in real-time and the user will find it difficult to identify the 
changes carried out by the MITB. 
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Figure 2-22:  Man-in-the-browser (MITB) attack 
MTIB is one of the most advanced attacks affecting organizations from around the world 
today [86].  It is considered a global threat and it mainly targets users for economic gain. 
According to RSA [86], one of the financial institutions in the UK reported a loss of 
£600,000 because of MTIB attacks. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter covered the importance of authentication in distributed systems. It discussed 
different authentication classes found in literature and defined how they compare to each 
other. It then categorized the implementation of these authentication classes into four 
mechanisms: single-factor, multi-factor, multilevel, and multilevel multi-factor 
authentication mechanism. Finally, the chapter presented the most known attacks that 
target these authentication mechanisms. These attacks were classified, based on the 
communication node they target, into three categories: attacks on Online Service Providers 
(OSP), attacks on Communication Channels (CC), and attacks on End Users (EU).   
The next chapter discusses usability and acceptability of information technologies. These 
two topics are vital to evaluate, in practical terms, whether any new technology proposed 
for implementation is usable and acceptable by customers or not. The next chapter forms 
the basis for the formulation of the hypotheses that will be tested and evaluated later in 
Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 3  
Usability and Acceptability 
3.1 Introduction 
The increasing amount of interaction between users and Internet services, such as the Web, 
instant messaging and social networks, poses new and emerging security issues [87]. 
Despite the advanced new security solutions proposed by practitioners and academics, user 
perceptions of these new technologies are often ignored. These security technologies are 
designed to protect the users, but users are not usually consulted about their needs [88], or 
their perspectives of imposed usage considered. 
End users of distributed systems perceive security and usability differently depending on 
context. For example, people’s perception of security is more positive in the financial 
domain while more negative in other areas [89]. People tend to perceive usability more 
than security until they realize the importance of security after falling victim to an online 
attack that compromises their privacy or assets. Ignoring user perceptions of new 
technologies might result in dissatisfaction, leading users to abandon the service and look 
for alternative service providers. On average, one dissatisfied user will tell 13 other people 
about his or her experiences with the system [90]. Even worse, for every 30 users having 
problems with a system, only one user, on average, will call customer support. According 
to the same source, usually users do not complain to the company about usability issues 
and do not report them to the service provider.  They usually prefer to abandon the service 
when they are disatisified. 
Because of this, online organizations, especially banks and other financial sectors, must 
take care when implementing new security technologies.  These particular technologies can 
affect users’ overall acceptance if the organization does not research their attitudes as well 
as the technology’s usability [91, 92]. 
In this chapter, section 3.2 defines usability history and its relationship with software 
quality.  Within this section, subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 cover usability attributes and 
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usability of authentication mechanisms. Next, section 3.3 pinpoints the various metrics 
used to evaluate usability in general and in online banking in particular.  Section 3.4 
discusses acceptability and its application to the adoption of information technology 
acceptance. Finally, section 3.5 lists the important variables from literature that are used to 
evaluate acceptability and information technology acceptance in the context of online 
banking. 
3.2 Usability 
The term “usability” first appeared in the 1960s [93] to define the ease with which people, 
other than software designers, can use a program. It was later introduced in early 1980s as 
a replacement for the term ‘user-friendly’ [94] and was defined as “the user’s view of 
software quality”. The quality itself is a multifaceted concept [95] and includes five 
different views (based on Garvin [96]): the transcendental-based view, the product-based 
view, the manufacturing-based view, the economics-based view, and the user-based view. 
These views are also relevant to usability and have helped to shape a standard definition of 
usability with multiple attributes, as discussed in the following section. 
3.2.1 Usability Attributes 
Different researchers define usability based on a list of attributes or dimensions. It is not a 
single concept but rather a multi-dimensional property of a user interface that has multiple 
components [97]. For example, Nielsen identifies the following five usability attributes 
[98]: 
• Learnability: measured by how easy the system can be learned so the users can start 
using it at minimum time expected. 
• Efficiency: another usability attribute that measures the time users need to accomplish 
tasks after they have learned how to utilize the system. 
• Memorability: measures how easy to remember the system if the user used it again 
after he or she has to leave it for a period of time. 
• Errors: an attribute that measures the rate of errors that the users make during their use 
of the system. These errors, if exist, have to be minimal and easy to recover from. They 
must not be of a catastrophic nature. 
• Satisfaction: measures the users’ satisfaction how much did they like using the system. 
 46 
 
Whitney Quesenbery [99] also defined usability based on five dimensions (called the 5Es): 
• Effective: how complete and accurate the work is to accomplish. 
• Efficient: how quickly the work can be completed. 
• Engaging: how pleasant and satisfying the product interface is to use. 
• Error tolerant: how good the product is in preventing errors and how it can help the 
user to recover from mistakes. 
• Easy to learn: how well the product supports learning throughout its lifetime of use. 
A more formal and widely accepted definition of usability [100] is the one by The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Their definition reduced the number 
of the usability dimensions to three: effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. The ISO 
defines usability of a product or service as “the extent to which the product can be used by 
specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in 
a specified context of use [101].” 
The following bullet points explain the three usability attributes identified by the ISO: 
• Effectiveness: means that the users can do the tasks without making mistakes. This 
suggests that the user is not likely to request help. 
• Efficiency: this attribute suggests that the users can complete the tasks in a reasonable 
time and effort. 
• Satisfaction: the most important attribute which reflects the desirability of a product. It 
determines the extent to which the user finds the product to be effective and efficient.  
Table 3-1 provides an overview of usability definitions by Nielsen, Quesenbery and other 
usability metrics by Schneiderman and matches their usability dimensions to these of the 
ISO. 
ISO 9241-11 [101] Schneiderman [102]  Nielsen [98] Quenesbery [99] 
Efficiency 
Speed of performance Efficiency Efficient 
Time to learn Learnability Ease to learn 
Effectiveness 
Retention over time 
Rate of errors by users 
Memorability 
Errors/Safety 
Effective 
Error tolerant 
Satisfaction Subjective satisfaction Satisfaction Engaging 
Table 3-1: Overview of Usability dimensions (adapted from [103]) 
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3.2.2 Usability of Authentication Mechanisms 
More people now need to utilize networked devices, especially to connect to online 
resources and communicate with others using the Internet. The variety of online services 
offered has attracted people from different backgrounds (e.g. cultures, education levels, 
age, geographical areas) to communicate and utilize them. Along with other factors, such 
as availability of Internet and communication services, even the average citizen who is 
barely computer literate is now communicating and interacting, on daily basis, with many 
online services. 
Online users are also encouraged to carry out critical online transactions, such as money 
transfer. Such online services are crucial and pose greater damage to customers and 
organizations than do other online services. That is why companies that offer online 
services, especially financial firms, allocate more money every year for security 
technologies and products in order to protect their assets against security breaches. 
According to Forrester Research, IT security spending has increased dramatically from 
8.2% in 2007 to 14% in 2010 out of the total IT spending in North America and European 
enterprises [104]. 
Despite this increase in security spending, the number of security breaches still show rapid 
increase over time [105] and usually affect not only the organization’s image and services, 
but also its customers as a whole. In October 2011, Sony had to shut down almost 93,000 
users’ accounts after a security breach to its online gaming and entertainment networks 
[106]. According to Liebowitz [107], the first 6 months of year 2011 have been the worst 
in terms of the number of security breaches in a decade. He listed different major 
companies that were victims of security breaches in 2011.  Among these companies were 
Sony, RSA, Lockhead Martin, Epsilon, the Fox broadcast network, NASA, FBS, FBI, 
Citigroup and French treasuries. 
Unfortunately, hardening computer systems by implementing firewall rules and hard-to-
compromise authentication mechanisms does not always lead to more secure systems and 
therefore lessen the security breaches. The problem, as suggested by many studies [77, 
108-111], is that these security techniques and authentication mechanisms are only 
effective when used correctly. Many of the implemented security controls are either 
inconvenient or hard to use. Therefore, online users sometimes turn them off or try to 
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circumvent them [109]. It was found that users tend to circumvent security controls that 
they find cumbersome [92]. 
Authentication mechanisms, in particular, such as strong passwords, multi-level systems, 
graphical and multi-factor authentication cannot protect assets if users do not use them 
properly. For example, forcing users to use complex and hard to remember passwords 
might will encourage them to write these passwords down or store them electronically in 
plain text so they can copy and paste them every time they login. Also they could include 
an incrementing digit if the system forces them to change their passwords regularly. For 
example, a user could use the password “john6(usa” as a replacement for his old password 
“john5(usa” after the system forces him to change it. Such behaviours render the best 
technical security controls ineffective. 
Although security awareness is among the solutions that online service providers provide 
to users to ensure proper use of the newly implemented authentication mechanisms, it is 
only effective to a minimal extent and does not fill the gap between security and the 
mentioned users’ behaviours [112]. Customers usually do not like to be trained or 
instructed on how to use online services and reject security advices. This is not because 
they are not intelligent, but because security advice is rather a daily burden that offers users 
a poor cost-benefit tradeoff. They prefer to look for alternative service providers who have 
minimal requirements and instructions [112]. Cost, time and support are factors associated 
with every new security mechanism the end-users have to use. These factors could, in the 
end, overcome the expected benefits of any new technological solution [113]. 
Overall, these conflicts exist because of the unbalanced attention given to security and 
usability in the authentication technologies. In literature, among many success factors for 
authentication technology identified by researchers, security and usability appear at the top 
of the list [1, 114-116]. However, Braz [115] stated that most of the primary research done 
on usable security did not cover user authentication. Therefore, most of these systems 
neglect usability and focus on security. The relationship between security and usability 
does not always have to be negative or inversely proportional as has been viewed in the 
past, it also can be positive [95]. Authentication, in particular, is only successful when 
security and usability are aligned. Authentication is the most important goal when security 
is implemented [117] and the most challenging part of any application’s usability. 
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To overcome these conflicts, the usability of authentication mechanisms can be considered 
to be as important as their security and among the main drivers for final acceptance of an 
online system by end-users. 
“Usability becomes a strategic issue in the establishment of user authentication 
methods” [115] 
“Security only works if the secure way also happens to be the easy way” [118] 
There is a growing need for secured yet usable online systems. Security experts demand 
secured applications while usability experts demand easy-to-access and user friendly 
applications. With proper implementation, a secured and usable application can be 
achieved [119]. To achieve this, it is important to evaluate usability while implementing 
security technologies. The next section covers usability evaluation in more detail. 
3.3 Usability Evaluation 
The usability of given software cannot be measured in isolation because usability is an 
extrinsic property of a system software. One can only measure usability by explicitly 
associating the context of use. This can only be achieved by evaluating users carrying out 
tasks on a software system (see Figure 3-1). 
 
Figure 3-1: Evaluating usability by associating the context of use (adapted from [95]) 
As per the ISO definition, “usability is considered a context-dependent agreement of the 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with which specific users should be able to 
perform tasks” [95]. 
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Although effectiveness and efficiency are, to some extent, measured by the user’s 
perceptions of these qualities, the satisfaction attribute has no quantitative specification 
and is the only metric that is measured as a whole based on the user experience with the 
system. It can be measured by subjective rating on scales such as liking or acceptability 
when carrying out different tasks. Thus, the technology is considered as satisfactory only if 
the user considers it to be so [95, 120]. 
3.3.1 Assessing Usability of Online Banking Systems’ Authentication 
The majority of security-related usability studies focus on specific measures, such as 
password selection and user behaviours, rather than looking at usability of a system or 
service as a whole [92]. Although several publications discuss the relationship between 
usability and security, few studies provide empirical data in this area. 
For example, Piazzalunga [121] compared three different token-based authentication 
methods for email protection. The usability metrics used in this study were set according to 
the ISO 9126 standard for evaluation of software products. The usability attributes used 
were: learnability, operability and attractiveness. 
A more comprehensive study by Weir [122] reported results on the evaluation of usability 
and user preferences for authentication methods in online banking in the UK. The usability 
evaluation was based on the ISO definition of usability incorporating the three usability 
attributes of effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. The study compared three online 
banking authentication mechanisms: one-factor authentication, two-factor token-based 
authentication using a OTP generator device and another two-factor multi-channel 
authentication via SMS messages to a mobile phone device. The study aimed to determine 
the levels of experience, user acceptance and adoption of these technologies and 
investigated how online banking users affected user attitudes towards usability and 
acceptability of these authentication techniques. 
This experiment categorized the participants into two groups: novice and experienced 
users. It also classified users who participated in the study into three types of participants 
in terms of their level of experience of online banking: 
1. Migrants: the current users of the service (online banking users) who were familiar 
with the single-factor authentication mechanisms and might be potential migrants to 
the new two-factor authentication mechanisms studied. 
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2. Adopters: these are the novice banking users who had never used online banking 
services before and were unfamiliar with the alternative authentication mechanism 
being studied. 
3. Switchers: experienced users (online banking users) were aware of similar two-factor 
authentication mechanisms, but had no specific knowledge of the methods being 
compared in the experiment. 
Interestingly, one outcome of this study suggests that the relationship between security and 
usability can be positive. Weir found that participants considered the two-factor (via SMS) 
authentication mechanism to be less secure and less usable than the two-factor (via device) 
authentication mechanism. As shown in Figure 3-2, usability and security decreased 
together when participants used mobiles for authentication. This contradicts the 
commonly-held assumption of an inversely proportional relationship (increased security 
leads to poorer usability and vise versa). The reason for these attitudes, as mentioned by 
Weir, is related to technological problems such as network coverage, mobile battery life, 
cost associated with SMSs. Other issues raised by participants were related to the fact that 
some did not own or want to own a mobile; others did not want to share their mobile 
number. However, delivery delays of SMS messages experienced by some mobile users 
were considered unreliable for online banking authentication. 
 
Figure 3-2: Relationship between usability, quality, convenience, and security [122]  
Another outcome of the study also provided empirical evidence of the trade-off between 
usability and security when comparing one-factor with two-factor authentication (see 
Figure 3-2). Although participants choose two-factor authentication via SMS to be the least 
preferable authentication method, the results did show that mobile authentication was more 
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usable than one-factor authentication mechanism. Weir attributed this to awareness and 
other technical issues related to the mobile service. She argued that the participants did not 
understand how OTP methods worked, which resulted in rating security without this key 
information. On the other hand, these participants were more familiar with knowledge-
based authentication mechanisms and did not widely appreciate security advancements 
associated with OTP authentication mechanisms. 
Another study by Gunson [92] investigated usability by describing an empirical evaluation 
of two different methods for user authentication: single-factor and two-factor. The study 
aimed to measure usability (using a range of usability metrics), quality and preferences of 
each. The participants were real-life UK bank customers. The experiment was based on an 
automated telephone banking system. 
Gunson provided empirical evidence of a negative relationship between usability and 
security in authentication systems. She found significant evidence that the single-factor 
knowledge-based authentication mechanism was more usable than the two-factor 
knowledge-based and token-based authentication mechanism. In contrast, the latter scored 
significantly higher only on the issue of security. This also conforms to the mentioned 
results of Weir’s study between single-factor and two-factor authentication mechanisms. 
Overall, usability evaluation is an important research area which helps to understand how a 
security technology can be implemented properly. Finding out whether an improving 
security affects the usability, either in a positive or negative way, would greatly help to 
optimize the implementation process to achieve the best of both.   
Acceptability of security technology (i.e. the level of user acceptance of the technology), 
on other hand, is known as the perceived usability. Unlike usability, acceptability is 
measurable based on user perceptions, attitudes, and intentions towards different aspects of 
the technology [123] and is subjective. The next section covers acceptability and these 
aspects in detail.  
3.4 Acceptability 
Acceptability is defined as a measurement that depends on "whether the system is good 
enough to satisfy all the needs and requirements of the users and other potential 
stakeholders” [98]. Usability and acceptability share the same exclusive target: humans.  
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However, the goals are different. “The goal of usability is to characterize the extent to 
which a software system can be used ” [95] while the goal of acceptability is to ensure that 
the system supports the daily business and user scenarios in a sufficient, i.e. capable of 
meeting users’ needs, and in a correct way [124].  
Jacob Nielsen [98] categorized usability as a subset of overall system acceptability (see 
Figure 3-3). It was also pointed out, using empirical studies, that usability plays a key role 
in user acceptance [125]. 
 
Figure 3-3:  A model of the attributes of system acceptability [98] 
3.4.1 Information Technology Acceptance 
Although usability is an important factor deriving appropriate design targets, it does not 
fully predict actual system use. A system might be well designed and meet all functional 
requirements but still fail to earn the acceptance of users. In other words, usability alone is 
an insufficient determinant of use [126, 127]. 
According to Thomas [123], to determine actual use of a technology, usability should be 
measured both objectively and subjectively. Objective measures of usability include user 
performance, error rates, or time taken to complete tasks. Subjective measures, on the other 
hand, include user perceptions of ease-of-use and impression of satisfaction, enjoyment 
and usefulness of the technology. While the objective measures are based on usability 
attributes defined by ISO, such as effectiveness and efficiency, an acceptance model is 
required to explain the behavioural intention of using the technology within a given system 
(the objective measures of usability).  
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Technology acceptance is one of the research areas that has been studied and modelled to 
suit different fields, each with a different set of acceptance determinants [128].  The 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) by Davis [129] is one of the most utilized and 
widely accepted models among the information system researchers [130-133].  TAM 
proposes perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEU) as two primary 
elements in determining user attitude towards adopting new technologies. According to 
Davis, PU is “the extent to which a person believes that using the system will enhance his 
or her job performance”. He also defines PEU as “the extent to which a person believes 
that using the system will be free of effort”. PU and PEU affect user’s attitude, which 
relates to intention, towards using the information system. In literature, TAM is considered 
one of the most influential extensions of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) by 
Fishbein [134].  TRA is a widely studied model from social psychology and is used to 
explain users’ performance behaviour [135].  According to TRA, someone’s performance 
behaviour is determined by his or her behavioural intention (BI), which is in turn 
determined by his or her attitude (AT) and subjective norm (SN) concerning the behaviour 
being studied [136]. 
 
Figure 3-4:  Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [136] 
Besides PU and PEU, TAM incorporates three other distinct factors (see Figure 3-4): 
• Attitudes towards use (AT): is defined as “the user’s desirability of his or her using the 
system” [136] and is determined by PU and PEU. 
• Behavioural Intention to Use (BI): is determined by users’ attitudes toward using a 
system. 
• Actual System Use: is the adoption of the system, which is determined by BI. 
Despite the frequent use of TAM model and the validity and reliability of its instruments 
[137], it has been criticised. According to Bagozzi [138], TAM focuses on how an 
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individual (user) perceives usefulness and ignores group and social aspects. Wang [131] 
empirically validated TAM using different populations of users and different software 
choices. Based on 88 published papers, King [139] statistically confirmed these results 
using meta-analysis of TAM based on different context of use. The context of use included 
type of user, such as students, professionals and general users, as well as type of usage, 
such as job-related, office and task applications. The results proved that TAM is powerful, 
highly reliable, valid and robust predictive model for different context of information 
technology acceptance. 
 
Figure 3-5:  Critical success factors of online banking [140] 
While the basic constructs of TAM, PU and PEU, have been considered as primary 
determinants of individual’s acceptance of technology, it was found that TAM has 
limitations in some cases such as involving students as the empirical sample, examining 
office automation software or system development applications, and self-reported usage 
[137]. Many researchers, therefore, have suggested that including new variables as 
extensions to the original TAM can improve its applicability and explanatory ability as 
well as its predictive power in various aspects of IS [141-144].  
 56 
 
Venkatesh [128] extended TAM to what he called Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use 
of Technology (UTAUT).  He proposed this model as complete model for understanding 
the acceptance and the adoption of information technologies. The UTAUT model shows 
that the four elements namely performance expectance, effort expectance, social influence 
and facilitating conditions play a significant role towards user acceptance and usage 
behaviour. 
Renaud [145] used demographic variables, social influence, and personal factors as 
external variables to develop a Senior Technology Acceptance Model (STAM) to model 
the acceptance process as driven by the factors that influence mobile phone adoption in the 
context of the elderly mobile phone user.  In the context of online banking, Gefen [132] 
and Nor [146] found that trust has a significant effect on attitude towards using online 
banking. Al-Somali [147] added demographic variables as well as other variables like 
security, trust, quality of the Internet connection, and awareness of service and its benefits 
as external variables to TAM to model and analyse the factors that affect customers’ 
attitudes towards Internet banking acceptance. A more recent study by Al-Somali [133] 
also added resistance to change, social influence and self-efficacy to the model. The 
studies by Khalfan [5] and Al-Sabbagh [4] both examined variables such as trust, security, 
and ease of access as factors influencing adoption of online banking in Oman. 
Furthermore, Hosein [140] developed 9 different factors that he categorized into external 
(Internet experience, computer knowledge, Internet usage, incentives, and security privacy) 
and bank (trust in online banking, website navigation, support training, and in-person 
banking) factors (see Figure 3-5) to examine how these factors affect online banking 
adoption. 
Information technology acceptance, therefore, is an important research area to study and 
understand how users accept and use technologies. In literature, TAM is found to be the 
most commonly used theory by researchers to model user acceptance of a technology. It 
also suggests different factors that influence the users’ decision on how and when they will 
use it. Despite Bagozzi’s criticism, this process can reasonably be considered a solitary 
activity and therefore TAM can be considered to be an appropriate model for this research. 
The research being reported here needs to evaluate acceptability in the context of a single 
user, using personal computer, performing tasks to complete personal online banking 
transactions. The next section covers the modelling and identifying the factors found in the 
literature that are known to influence users’ acceptance of online banking systems using 
TAM. 
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3.5 Assessing Acceptability of Online Banking Systems 
The previous section looked at acceptability of security technologies and introduced 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) in general. This section considers how 
acceptability of security technologies, particularly in online banking systems, is assessed. 
This includes looking at how TAM can be tailored to reflect acceptance factors for these 
systems. 
The majority of acceptability studies utilize evaluation models such as TAM to measure 
specific variables.  These variables range from demographic characteristics, such as 
gender, marital status, age group, monthly income group, and education level, to internal 
variables within the evaluation TAM model. Other external variables found in the literature 
also exist for different models based on different requirements and cultural backgrounds.  
For example, factors such as ease of access, trust and relationship and security were found 
to be among major factors influencing the adoption of online technologies, such as online 
banking, in Oman and other developing countries in the middle east [4, 5, 133, 147].  
These factors and other internal and external TAM variables are discussed in the following 
sub-sections. 
3.5.1 Demographic characteristics 
Many studies [147-150] have investigated the effects of users’ demographic characteristics 
on their adoption of online banking technology. One study [147] presented the relationship 
between the demographic profile of people in Saudi Arabia (a developing country bordered 
by Oman on the southeast) and their attitude towards adoption of online banking. The 
outcome revealed that only education level had a significant relationship with acceptance 
and adoption of online banking. Other demographic variables such as age, income, and 
gender were not confirmed to have effects on online banking adoption. 
Jaruwachirathanakul [149] investigated the attitudinal factors that encourage online 
banking adoption in Thailand. The study found that moderating factors such as gender, 
educational level, income, and Internet banking experience were significant factors 
influencing adoption. Age was confirmed not to be significant in this study. 
The empirical results of Chang [150] showed that gender, age, and marital status were 
characteristics that influenced the adoption of online banking. 
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3.5.2 Internal and external variables 
Internal and external TAM variables were the factors, other than the demographic 
characteristics, that were found to influence customers’ decisions to adopt online banking. 
The internal variables were the primary determinants found in the original TAM by Davis 
[151]: perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEU). Many studies have 
found that customers have accepted online banking as a technology that improves 
performance, increases productivity, and enhances effectiveness [129, 141, 152].  
The external variables, on the other hand, are suggested by the literature, all of which were 
found to influence customers’ adoption. Previous studies [153, 154] grouped these 
variables into five components: trust and relationship, ease of access, security, 
convenience, and ease of use.  This grouping process was based on what is known as 
‘Factor Analysis’. Factor analysis is a statistical approach that looks into the variables and 
identifies their interrelationships with each other [154].  It looks into a large set of 
variables and tries to condense or summarize them into smaller sets of factors or 
components. This is done by looking for groups among the intercorrelations of a set of 
variables [155].  
While convenience and ease of use represent the same primary constructs (internal 
variables) PU and PEU respectively, the other three components namely trust and 
relationship, ease of access, and security are discussed below. 
3.5.2.1 Trust and relationship 
Trust and relationship are two factors that play an important role in financial sector. Some 
researchers have argued that customer confidence in online banking transactions is an 
essential determinate of adoption of online banking [156].  According to Stewart [157], 
customers’ lack of trust in electronic channels is one of the major factors that contributes 
towards failures in adopting online banking. 
Trust and relationship are inter-related factors in the sense that the customer’s relationship 
with the online banking providers is more efficient in face-to-face communication than 
online. Some studies found significant relationships between proximity and personal 
relations [158, 159].  This lack of relationship in the online context can be alleviated by 
trust, which is more important online as opposed to face-to-face banking [160]. Parties 
involved in financial transactions usually exchange sensitive information and therefore 
 59 
 
they are more concerned about privacy and security of these information while they are 
exchanged over the Internet, not the case in offline banking. According to 
Rotchanakitumnuai [161], reliability of the service is one of three reasons of customers’ 
distrust of Internet technology. However, for customers whose relationship is primarily 
based on efficiency of services, online banking is an attractive alternative [153].  In this 
matter, Tomiuk [162] stated that ‘richness’ and ‘sound presence’ of the online banking 
environment affects the ability of a bank to create a trusting relationship between its 
employees and customers. 
3.5.2.2 Ease of access 
Internet ease of access is one of the important predictors for adoption of online banking. 
Many studies [133, 140, 147, 158, 163] stated that without a reliable and high quality 
Internet connection, customers are unlikely to consider using online banking.  
According to [153], “provision of infrastructural facilities is another factor that could lead 
to quicker diffusion of innovation”. There is a significant correlation between download 
speed of a website and its users’ satisfaction [164]. Al-Somali [133] stated that there is a 
positive relationship between connection speed and the adoption of online banking.  She 
found that the current lack of infrastructure in Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in limiting 
adoption rates of online banking by Saudi customers. These results confirmed the study by 
Almogbil [165] who found that about 63% of the customers in Saudi Arabia access the 
Internet through dial up services. 
3.5.2.3 Security 
Security perception has been widely recognized as one of the main issues inhibiting online 
banking adoption [4, 166, 167].  Despite the advancements of security in Internet 
communication such as cryptography, digital signature and certificates, and multi-
factor/level authentication methods, online customers are still concerned about security 
especially when monetary transactions are involved [168]. 
There are many studies concerning the importance of security to the acceptance of online 
banking [140, 147, 154, 158, 169, 170]. Sathye [158] found that almost 3 quarters of all 
customers decided not to adopt online banking because they were concerned about the 
safety and security of the transactions over the Internet. Another paper by Howcroft [171] 
argued that “although customers’ confidence in their bank is strong, their confidence in 
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technology is weak”. The empirical results by Cheng [170] showed that perceived web 
security has a direct effect on the intention.  This results confirms earlier empirical results 
by Salisbury [172]. 
3.5.3 Summary 
In conclusion, aspects such as ease of access, trust and relationship, and security are 
important factors to be included in acceptability testing of authentication in online banking. 
Along with other internal factors, an extended technology acceptance model can be formed 
and tested to identify which of these factors influence the customers’ adoption of the 
technology. 
3.6 Usability and Acceptability Measurement 
Usability and acceptability testing is carried out to evaluate the usability and acceptability 
of a technology in the context of a single user performing a task to achieve a goal [173]. In 
the context of online banking, usability and acceptability are evaluated by asking 
participants to perform tasks (e.g. logging in, creating beneficiary account) to achieve a 
goal such as money transfer. Different tools can be used to capture users’ input and 
feedback. Among many techniques available, this study uses questionnaires to capture 
users’ feedback. This technique is widely used and implemented by researchers to evaluate 
usability and acceptability of security technologies. For example, Weir [122] used three 
questionnaires throughout her study to collect usability comments from the participants. 
She also used a pre-questionnaire to collect users’ demographics such as age, gender, use 
of online banking, locations of use and mobile phone ownership. The usability 
questionnaires were based on set of positive and negative statements on a 7-point agree-
disagree Likert scale. 
Another study by Gunson [92] used questionnaires to measure participants’ attitudes 
towards three different security technologies. She used agree-disagree Likert scale type of 
questions in the form of stimulus statements for each usability attribute. According to 
Coolican [174], participants preference of Likert scaling technique is due to its natural way 
to complete. It also has been shown to have a high degree of validity and reliability. 
Furthermore, it has been shown to be effective in measuring changes over time.  
 61 
 
User action logging is another recognized technique, and is used to capture the measures of 
users’ specific interaction with the system. These variables include the time users spend on 
each task, the sequence of pages users follow in order to complete these tasks, and the exit 
pages for those who leave the system without completing all tasks. The quantifiable data 
collected from this technique usually used to evaluate the quantitative side of usability, 
which includes effectiveness and efficiency covered in section 3.3. For example, Weir in 
another study [91] used time logs to measure efficiency. She also used completion time 
logs to measure the effectiveness of three different security technologies. 
Similar survey and data collection techniques were also used to measure the mentioned 
quantitative attributes of usability as well as the subjective side of usability (e.g. 
satisfaction) and acceptability (e.g. TAM internal and external variables) of the online 
banking. The use of these survey techniques in this research is detailed in Chapter 7. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the importance of evaluating usability and acceptability of new 
information technologies in information system. It first defined usability and listed 
different usability attributes found in literature. It then discussed usability evaluation in the 
context of online authentication mechanisms. 
The second half of the chapter covered acceptability and information technology 
acceptance models found in the literature. The history of TAM and different studies 
undertaken to validate TAM were presented and an argument made for the suitability of 
TAM for this research. Finally, the chapter presented different external variables used in 
the literature to assess how they affected the adoption of online banking and explained how 
they can be incorporated into TAM for the purposes of this research.   
The next chapter will discusse online banking and mobile communication. These two 
topics are essential to promote a better understanding of how authentication is 
implemented in online, distributed systems and to foster a better appreciation of why there 
is a need to improve the existing single and two factor authentication mechanisms. 
  
 62 
 
Chapter 4  
Online Banking and Mobile 
Communication 
4.1 Online Banking 
Banking and telecommunication sectors are two major business players in today’s market; 
their services have become necessities to many people around the globe. The high level of 
user-acceptance and the technological advances of security [169] have led the banking 
sector to introduce online banking, or what is known as branchless or virtual banking.  This 
refers to the use of the Internet as a remote delivery channel for banking services. This 
delivery channel includes traditional services, such as opening a deposit account or 
transferring funds among different accounts, and new banking services, such as electronic 
bill disbursement and payment (allowing customers to receive and pay bills via a bank’s 
website). 
Internet banking refers to the deployment over the Internet of retail and wholesale 
banking services. It involves individual and corporate clients, and includes bank 
transfers, payments and settlements, documentary collections and credits, 
corporate and household lending, card business and some others [175]. 
Although the infrastructure of banking systems is based on information technology, which 
places the systems among those most easily shifted online, they are also among the most 
critical applications that need to be secured online. An effective and reliable authentication 
method must accompany any form of engagement in online banking.  
This section provides a discussion of the main factors influencing the adoption of online 
banking, followed by a detailed summary of the status of online banking and the 
authentication mechanisms implemented by different real, online, banking applications. 
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4.1.1 Factors Influencing the Adoption of Online Banking 
Online banking has become one of the core technology advancements [176] of the Internet 
and is considered one of the most successful business-to-consumer applications in 
electronic commerce [177].  For banks, cost reduction, market share increase, and 
competition [164, 178] are the main factors driving online banking adoption.  They can 
also now provide more diversified, convenient and flexible services than before [179]. 
From the customer’s point of view, low fees, accessibility, and availability are the main 
advantages of online banking services [159, 169].  That is, bank services are now cheap to 
access, accessible from any Internet connection point (i.e., home, work, or even mobiles), 
and available 24 hours a day, 7 days of the week. 
On the other hand, some customers still refuse to adopt online banking services. Kusima 
[180] identified several barriers affecting online banking adoption. The functional barriers 
are categorized into usage barriers, such as the absence of concrete elements provided by 
ATM machines, and value barriers such as perceived insecurity and inefficiency. Some 
customers are used to the ATM machines and find them more convenient than the Web. 
Others trust them more than online banking. They believe it is more secure to have a bar-
code reader reading code off the bill than keying it manually from a keyboard [180].  Other 
studies found that perceived risks in general are the most prominent barriers to online 
banking adoption [160, 181-183]. 
The following points will further discuss the incentives and risks for banks as well as for 
customers that influence them to respond to online banking positively or negatively. 
4.1.1.1 Incentives 
Many incentives make online banking an essential service for banks and customers. Here 
follows a list of incentives that banks would consider when deciding to offer online 
banking services: 
• Accuracy: humans directly affect the reliability of transactions, especially when the 
transactions occur in a face-to-face manner. There is always a possibility of errors 
originating from either the employees or customers. Human error accounts for three-
quarters of negative transaction incidents, mainly because of policy violations [184].  
However, building a computerized application fully interactive with the customers 
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reduces human error, and hence, improves the reliability and accuracy of a higher 
percentage of bank transactions. 
• Service: the Web offers equal opportunities to all competitors. Banks do not have to 
worry about approaching customers in different geographical areas but rather have only 
to concentrate on providing a central web presence approachable from everywhere. 
This gives the bank focused management as well as zero-delay service quality to offer 
to customers. 
• Market share:  offering new competitive services for customers is known to be the 
driving force behind the introduction of online banking [185].  That is, offering 
competitive services retains existing customers, increases their loyalty, and attracts new 
clients to maintain and increase the market share. 
• Profit: is among the most attractive incentives for any commercial organization. For 
banks, online banking has emerged as one of the most profitable products over the past 
decade [186].  This is likely a direct result of cost reduction in labour, building 
construction and maintenance, and service and transaction provision. For example, 
Figure 4-1 shows that online banking has a transaction cost of almost 1 cent compared 
to $1.07 for a transaction carried out on-site [187]. 
 
Figure 4-1: Cost per transaction for each banking channel 
From customers’ perspectives, online banking offers many advantages over retail banking. 
These advantages result from the overall quality of service offered by online banking, and 
can be categorized into convenience, user experience and control, and transaction speed. 
• Convenience: this involves accessibility and availability of the service to customers. A 
customer does not have to drive to a nearby ATM machine or bank branch to carry out 
banking transactions, but can use online banking from any Internet access point.  
 65 
 
Customers do not have to wait for branch working hours and can utilize the banking 
services and carry out transactions any time. Moreover, some banks offer a variety of 
services online (e.g., long dated payment history and outstanding orders 
setup/cancellation), which are not usually offered by other electronic banking channels 
such as ATMs, tele-banking, and mobile banking. 
• User experience and control:  online banking usually offers customers clear and easy-
to-follow instructions. All the tasks are equipped with verification mechanisms that 
make customers feel in control. 
• Transaction speed: customers are sometimes involved in long queues in bank branches 
to request transactions. Online banking has eliminated the need for the delay and 
customers are able to process their transactions as soon as they click on the 
confirmation button.  
4.1.1.2 Risks 
Despite the benefits of online banking to both banks and customers, there are always risks 
involved that affect both parties’ decisions to adopt online banking services.  
For banks, just like other organizations that do business on the Web, online attacks are the 
major threats to their online presence. These attacks, when successful, cost the businesses a 
considerable amount of money. In 2008, online attacks on the Pentagon cost almost $100 
million [188] for computer equipment, contractors, and manpower to clean up.  In the 
banking sector, information related to cyber attacks is usually kept confidential as it might 
affect the bank’s image and their customers’ trust. However, some figures leak to the press 
and other survey firms because other parties involved in the attacks on bank accounts 
reveal the customers as victims. Banks do not always compensate their customers 
(especially those who hold commercial accounts [189]) for losses due to attacks, and some 
victims file lawsuits against them, at which time this information becomes public and 
accessible. 
According to [190], “a Texas manufacturing firm filed a counter lawsuit against 
PlainsCapital bank of Lubbock in connection with the cyber theft of some $800,000 from 
its online banking account” on February 2010.  This case involved an online wire-transfer 
of the mentioned amount to an overseas account in 2009. The bank was later able to 
recover only 75% of the total amount, refusing to compensate the firm for the other 25%. 
The bank claimed that it processed the transaction because the thief used valid access 
credentials of the firm when placing the transaction request. 
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A similar case in late 2009 involved a Michigan-based firm that filed a lawsuit against 
Comerica Bank after a series of 107 unauthorized online wire-transfers and transfer-of-
funds requests were carried out on their behalf that resulted in a transfer of more than half 
a million U.S. dollars to different accounts in Russia, Estonia, Scotland, Finland, China, 
and the U.S. [191].  In this case, the thieves acquired the firm’s bank account access 
credentials from one of the firm’s employees in response to a man-in-the-middle phishing 
e-mail that purported to come from the bank (more details about e-mail phishing and man-
in-the-middle attacks are found in sections 2.4.3.5 and 2.4.3.6 respectively). 
Although Comerica Bank was utilizing a two-factor authentication procedure at the time of 
the incident, it did not protect the Michigan firm from real-time phishing attacks. 
Computer scams targeting small businesses cost U.S. companies $25 million in the 
third quarter of 2009 [192]  
The ability of the bank to provide an authentication mechanism that is able to protect 
customers from all known attacks is the only way to withstand the risks of adopting online 
banking services. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
released guidelines for banking and financial services in 2005, titled “Authentication in an 
Internet Banking Environment”, which addressed overhauling security in the Internet-
based environment and suggested that banks upgrade their authentication mechanisms 
from single-factor authentication to stronger two-factor authentication mechanisms by the 
end of 2006 [193].  However, currently, even multi-factor authentication does not 
withstand the new attacks, which have appeared since 2005 (e.g., man-in-the-browser 
attack in section 2.4.3.8). 
From the customer’s perspective, five dimensions of perceived risks have been identified 
[194]: security/privacy, financial, social, time/convenience, and performance risks. The 
following explanations and real stories show how these risks are related to the adoption of 
online banking and provide some examples that prove the reality of these perceived risks 
1. Security/privacy risks: these can be identified as the risks caused by compromising 
users accounts by means of hacking (details of hacking and attacking methods were 
covered in section 2.4). The effects of such attacks can lead to money loss and identity 
theft, both of which have a big impact on users’ decisions to adopt online banking. 
Researchers at security firm Finjan [195] reported a new Trojan horse called 
“URLzone bank Trojan” in 2009 that does not steal user’s online bank account 
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credentials but rather steals money once the user is logged into the online account.  
Once this Trojan installs itself onto the victim’s machine, it remains inactive until the 
victim logs into an online bank account. At that point, the Trojan initiates its attack 
against the user’s account by checking the available balance and deciding on the 
amount to transfer from the victim’s account. This decision is based on defined 
formulas that will ensure the stolen amount will not reach a limit that would trigger the 
antifraud online bank system. The transaction is very transparent and is invisible to the 
victim. All communications happen behind the scene. Moreover, the Trojan hides the 
history of these transactions and manipulates the information received from the bank so 
it displays a fake balance on the user’s screen. The report stated that this Trojan was 
able to steal about €300,000 from German bank accounts during its first 22 days. 
2. Financial risks:  these are identified as the risks related to transaction errors or account 
misuse. A story published by Olsen [196] about an online banking customer in Norway 
who was trying to transfer a large sum of money (about $100,000) electronically using 
an online banking service. She mistyped the account number, which resulted in 
transferring the money to another bank customer who thought the money was the result 
of a lottery win, and therefore, spent much of it gambling before police were able to 
recover it.   
3. Social risks:  adopting a service or product can have an impact on someone’s status 
among other social group members. It depends on one’s social group’s view (i.e., 
favourable or unfavourable) towards online banking but either view can affect peer 
opinion of its adopters [186]. 
4. Time/convenience risks: these refer to the time gaps between the submission of 
transactions and the actual time the bank processes them, especially in cases where 
payments are involved. On 30th of December 2009, this researcher bought an Apple 
laptop online and had to process the payment transaction before getting to the year 
2010 as taxes in the UK were officially to increase from 15% to 17.5%. There was not 
enough cash to pay for the laptop using the credit card as the available limit was less 
than the price of the laptop by almost £500. To overcome this issue, the researcher 
thought of paying previous credit card bills by transferring an amount of £500 from his 
savings account to the credit card account so he would be able to pay Apple Inc. for the 
new laptop. However, after transferring the money online, a message popped-up 
saying, “Please allow 3 working days to process your payment!” After calling the bank, 
they confirmed that online credit card bill settlements required 3 working days while 
paying off the bills in person updates the records instantly. If Apple Inc. had not finally 
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accept another form of payment, the researcher could have paid an extra 2.5% of the 
laptop price because of the delays involved in online payment transactions. 
5. Performance risks:  these are related to the losses incurred when the website or online 
banking application is not able to process user requests properly due to bad design or 
malfunction. A similar story to the one just mentioned could occur if the bank online 
application were to go down at the time of payment. 
4.1.2 Current Status 
With the growth of Internet services and the increased level of user acceptance of online 
business transactions, more financial institutions (i.e. banks) have found that shifting their 
services online is very competitive [164].  Therefore, online banking, or e-banking, has 
experienced strong and sustained growth in the past few years.  
Figure 4-2 shows a 10% average increase of online banking users in addition to other 
banking channels (e.g., call centres, branches, and ATMs) in the U.S. between 2006 and 
2010. 
 
Figure 4-2: USA banking delivery transactions by channel (2006-2010) 
CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate 
Source: http://www.towergroup.com/research/content/page.jsp?pageId=1522 
Traditionally, bankers request customers’ signatures or fingerprints to authenticate them 
for payment and other banking transactions. However, with the introduction of electronic 
banking channels, customer identification for transaction authorization has become one of 
the biggest challenges for banks [197].  In the early days, banks used the Web only for 
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marketing purposes. They published only informational websites to market their products 
and services that could be utilized by visiting their branches in person [169].   
The current implementation of Online Banking Applications (OBA), online services and 
levels of authentication can be categorized into three dimensions: informational, local-
transactional, and transactional online banking applications.  
4.1.2.1 Informational OBA 
The basic level of OBA is informational. Banks adopt these applications with only online 
marketing strategies in mind. They are not willing to deliver transactional services online 
and their electronic presence is focused only on information about their services and 
products.   
Customers, on the other hand, may be offered only basic informational services such as 
balance inquiry, transactions history, and other value-added services. The risk is relatively 
low, as the customers have no ability to write/modify access to their accounts in the 
database. This means the customers and the transactional database can be physically 
separated from the database feeding this kind of OBA, or the connections can have limited 
privileges with no ability to alter the records (see Figure 4-3a). 
 
Figure 4-3:  Types of online banking applications (OBA):  (a) Informational OBA,  (b) Local-
transactional OBA,  (c) Transactional OBA 
Authentication, if customers are allowed access to their accounts, is usually accomplished 
by means of a traditional username and password. This type of authentication mechanism 
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does not protect the customer from most of the attacks that target the end-user (EU) such as 
user surveillance, notes theft, brute-force, and social engineering (more details in section 
2.4.3). 
Privacy and identity theft are the main security threats to the Informational OBAs. Since an 
attacker can gain access to the customer account using different attack methods, user 
details (i.e., name, account balance, payment history, and other private details such as 
passwords) can be disclosed; if the user is using a password that he or she uses for other 
web accounts, the attacker may be able to compromise those accounts as well. 
4.1.2.2 Local-transactional OBA 
The local-transactional OBA is more interactional than the informational OBA. It offers 
customer services that involve record alteration in the database such as money transfer 
from one account to another and paying utility bills (see Figure 4-3b). The risk is higher to 
the system, and therefore, most local-transactional OBAs require more advanced 
authentication than username and password only. 
For example, customers in some banks that offer local-transactional OBA are required to 
submit more than one authentication factor to gain full access to online banking services. 
Some banks allow customers to submit one factor (e.g. a password) to login and check 
balance statements, while another factor (e.g. passphrase or password) is required to 
authorize transactions such as online bill payments and fund transfers between the 
customer’s own accounts.   
Usually this type of OBA does not allow customers to exchange funds between different 
customers’ accounts or to transfer money to a foreign bank account (i.e., hence the name 
local-transactional). These OBAs are not willing to afford such high risk, given the 
limitations of the use of single channel authentication mechanisms that are usually prone to 
various attacks such as user surveillance, notes theft, malware infection, and social 
engineering. 
Threats concerning local-transactional OBAs are not limited to privacy and identity theft, 
but extend to include financial, social, and time threats. An attacker can transfer money 
from the victim’s account to another even if the beneficiary account does not belong to the 
attacker. This can negatively affect both the victim and the bank. The victim will have to 
report the incident and wait for long investigation procedures to recover the money. The 
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time interval between the time the attack was initiated and the time the money is recovered 
fully can result in bad debits on the victim’s account where regular direct debit transfers or 
bill payment orders to third parties might be set up (financial and time threats). The bank, 
on the other side, might have to recover the losses of such incidents and cover all expenses 
needed for the investigation. In addition, the bank’s reputation may be damaged, which can 
have a major effect on its customers (financial and social threats). 
4.1.2.3 Transactional OBA 
This type of OBA offers a transactional level of service that can empower local and foreign 
international banking servers. That is, the customers can transfer money between different 
accounts within the same bank, the same country, or even belonging to two customers 
across different banks in different countries (see Figure 4-3c). These applications pose the 
highest possible risk to online banking and a large number of online authentication 
mechanisms and controls have to be implemented in order to assure the integrity and 
legitimacy of transactions. That is, controls must ensure that legitimate bank customers 
have initiated all online transactions and that the details have been received by the OBA 
without modifications. 
Some banks use multi-factor authentication through different channels to secure this OBA. 
This uses the same authentication techniques as local-transactional OBA; however, some 
factors are not fixed knowledge selectable by the customers, but are rather a one-time 
authentication factor sent to the customer through a secondary channel other than the 
primary web channel (e.g., mobile network as an SMS). This factor has to be confirmed by 
the customer to carry out advance critical transactions involving money transfer from one 
account to another.   
Although this approach seems to be the most secure, unfortunately it still fails to protect 
against man-in-the-middle/browser attacks. Threats are more dangerous since a path to 
external OBAs exists. The chance of recovering transferred-away money by an attacker is 
low, especially if money is transferred internationally. 
4.1.3 Authentication Mechanisms in Online Banking 
As discussed in previous sections, there are a variety of authentication techniques and 
methods ranging from single-factor authentication mechanisms (i.e. passwords and 
personal identification numbers (PINs)) to more complicated multi-factor authentication 
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mechanisms (i.e. one-time-passwords (OTPs) combined with the use of voice biometric 
recognition). However, for any financial institution to facilitate online banking services, 
the implementation of a suitable authentication mechanism should depend upon the results 
of the financial institution’s risk-assessment process. The risk-assessment process usually 
involves the identification of the customer type (e.g. personal or corporation), the level of 
services offered online (e.g., informational, local-transactional, or transactional), the 
usability of the system, and the volume of transactions [41]. 
In the following section, some online banking applications currently offered by real 
financial institutions are discussed. More focus is given to the authentication methods 
implemented and the types of services offered. The icon “ ” will be used in all figures 
to identify that the field is requesting a secret factor to be entered or identified by the 
online banking customer. A discussion will follow each case to cover the advantages of the 
methods implemented as well as to describe what attack methods are applicable and how 
they can successfully attack the implemented security measures. 
4.1.3.1 Case 1: Multi-level Authentication 
One bank makes use of multi-level authentication. This bank provides limited online 
services such as account balances, inter-account transfers, mobile top-ups, and bill 
payments. It also provides speed transfer to India, which is the only foreign transfer 
provided by the bank. Other applications (i.e. new chequebook requests, demand draft 
requests) and reporting (i.e. lost ATM cards reporting) services are also available (see 
Figure 4-4). 
 
Figure 4-4:  Online services page 
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The bank requests users to provide a username and password (both defined by the 
customers at enrolment) for account login. After login, the user is redirected to the home 
page, which lists all personal accounts with their balances (see Figure 4-5). 
 
Figure 4-5: (a) Login screen, (b) Home page screen 
At this point in the application, users have only read access where they can neither transfer 
money between their own accounts nor utilize other services offered by this online banking 
application. However, these services can be accessed and confirmed by a secondary secret 
(e.g., passphrase) defined at enrolment. This secondary passphrase is required only to 
authorize transactions. However, both password and passphrase are sent to the system 
using the web channel and both can be intercepted by an attacker. 
Discussion 
The services provided by this bank are very limited. The transfer option is only allowed 
between accounts linked to the customer and other top-up service and utilities bill 
payments are restricted to certain local companies. A customer is not allowed to add any 
account or utility company apart from the ones provided and supported by the OBA of this 
bank. However, there is a foreign transfer option available to one foreign country (India). 
This makes it a transactional OBA. 
In terms of authentication methods, although this bank is using a multi-level authentication 
approach, it uses only one class of factor for both levels (the password and passphrase are 
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both considered examples of something the user knows). This means that both 
authentication levels have the same security drawbacks as traditional authentication 
mechanisms and they can be compromised by different attacks. These attacks include 
social engineering, pharming, brute-force, guessing, user surveillance, and note theft [43]. 
If both authentication factors (e.g. the password and passphrase) are captured by an 
attacker, they can be used to utilize fully all services in the customer’s online bank 
account. The bank has not enforced any password policies such as password length or 
special character requirements, and does not notify customers of any transactions being 
activated or processed unless the amount of money involved in the transaction is higher 
than a given figure amount of about £180. 
Finally, the OBA offered by this bank is transactional (since it offers international transfer 
to banks in India). However, the authentication mechanisms do not match transactional 
OBAs’ risks; they are more suitable for lower-risk types of OBAs, such as local-
transactional OBAs. 
4.1.3.2 Case 2: Multi-level, Multi-channel Authentication 
A second bank offers more services through its OBA. It allows customers to do inter-
account transfers, international telex transfers, and local third party transfers. The latter 
allows customers to transfer money from their accounts to any other national bank account. 
However, the way this OBA works is different from the one discussed in the previous 
section. Here, the customer has to create what is called a “beneficiary account”. This 
beneficiary account is the intended account to which the customer would like to transfer 
money. Once all the details of the beneficiary account are provided, the system sends a 
one-time pin number to the customer’s registered mobile number (i.e., appears on the 
screen) by SMS (see Figure 4-6).   
 
Figure 4-6:  Creation of a beneficiary account 
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A request code (i.e., made of 5 digits) is sent along with the OTP to help the customer trace 
which OTP should be entered in the screen if more than one SMS message with different 
OTPs have arrived on the customer’s mobile device (see Figure 4-7). 
 
Figure 4-7: Authentication code via SMS 
Once the customer confirms the OTP as received via SMS, the beneficiary account 
becomes activated and only then can the customer transfer money to it. The bank also 
implements this feature for the international telex transfer service where customers are 
allowed to transfer money to an account in a foreign country. 
Discussion 
This bank also implements a multi-level authentication mechanism. The customers are 
required only to provide a username and password to login to their online banking account. 
The password is chosen by the customer but it has to follow a password policy 
implemented by the bank. The implemented password policy suggests that a password 
should contain a minimum of 1 numeric character, a minimum of 1 alphabetic character (a-
z/A-Z), and a minimum of 1 special character. The system allows only balance statements 
and other information (i.e. payments history) after a customer authenticates successfully.   
The authentication method implemented at the transactional level, however, is more secure 
and utilizes more than one communication channel to authenticate new beneficiary 
accounts. It also uses one-time PIN (OTP) as authorization code to authenticate the 
beneficiaries. 
Although this setup protects customers from most known attacks (e.g., user surveillance, 
phishing, and pharming attacks), this multi-channel authentication implementation has one 
major flaw. Attacks like man-in-the-middle (MITM) and man-in-the-browser (MITB) are 
still possible. For example, if a customer logs in and requests to add a new beneficiary 
account, he or she will input the beneficiary details in the form and submit. At this stage, a 
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MITM or MITB could alter the details entered in the form before they leave the customer 
browser to be transmitted to the bank server (e.g. alter beneficiary account number from 
1111 to 2222). The bank server receives the beneficiary details and processes them 
immediately. It creates a valid request code and an OTP for the activation. These details 
are sent to the customer by SMS and the customer activates the beneficiary account by 
entering the received OTP via the webpage. The customer believes that he or she is 
activating the account number 1111 entered in the beneficiary account form, and the bank 
believes that the customer has added a new beneficiary account number 2222 (since the 
attacker altered the details). There is no way for the legitimate customer, nor the bank, to 
know that the beneficiary account details have been intercepted and altered, even after the 
customer confirms the addition of the new beneficiary account, because only the nickname 
the customer selected for that beneficiary account, the bank name, and the request code of 
the transaction appear in the beneficiaries list (see Figure 4-8). The beneficiary account 
number has been modified but does not appear in the beneficiary accounts list (i.e., if we 
assume that the altered account number 2222 and the original account number 1111 
entered by the customer belong to the same bank). Although the account number will 
appear in the transfer page along with other details, it is not usually something a customer 
checks since the OBA has already advised the customer that the beneficiary account has 
been activated. 
 
Figure 4-8: Details of beneficiary accounts after activation 
The results of attacks based on such insecure implementation can be problematic. Neither 
the customer nor the bank is able to prove that the information submitted by the customer 
was altered, and the attacker receives payments (e.g. intended to be transferred to a 
different account number) from the legitimate customer without worrying about being 
caught, as the legitimate customer has approved the payments. 
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4.1.3.3 Case 3: Multi-factor, Multi-level Authentication 
A third bank operates in Kuwait offers its customers a different experience of 
authentication. Instead of using only one method to authenticate users at login (i.e., 
username and password), it offers quadruple authentication methods consecutively. First, 
the user has to provide his or her bankcard number. Second, a random security question 
from five different security questions associated with the bank account is displayed and the 
user is requested to provide a valid answer. This answer should act as a secret factor 
known by the user. Third, an image and secret phrase, which have been selected by the 
user at an earlier stage, are displayed on the screen. The customer has to verify that these 
are the image and the phrase selected at enrolment time (i.e. only one image and one 
phrase is registered for each customer).   
 
Figure 4-9: The quadruple login authentication process 
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Finally, if the customer has successfully validated all previous phases, the OBA requests 
the account password to complete the login process (see Figure 4-9). 
This bank provides many online services. These services include money transfers to credit 
and benefit cards, bill payments, and money transfers to other local and international 
accounts. However, an additional authentication level is required to complete these 
transactions. For example, to transfer money to a local bank account, the customer has to 
add the new account as a beneficiary account (the same technique as discussed in the 
previous case). 
To authenticate the new local bank beneficiary account, the application requests that the 
customer provide three digits from different places within the customer registered civil ID, 
corporate number, passport number or military ID, which has been registered at the time of 
enrolment (see Figure 4-10). 
 
Figure 4-10: Add local beneficiary account authentication method 
After the activation of the new beneficiary account, the customer is authorized to transfer 
money to it anytime without further authentication. 
For international transfers, the application adds yet another authentication layer where the 
customer is required to validate the process of adding an international beneficiary account 
using authentication (in Figure 4-10) and a predefined PIN number known by the customer 
only. 
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Discussion 
The authentication method used by this bank is different from the other traditional 
authentication mechanisms. The authentication at login is carried out at four different 
levels: the request of the customer bankcard number, the secret question, the image and 
phrase verifications, and finally, the online banking account password. Although the card 
number and the answers to the secret questions cannot be considered highly secret details, 
they work perfectly against attackers who are not in direct contact or relationship with the 
bank customer. 
The image and phrase verification process is meant to fight phishing attacks. If a bank 
customer is directed to a fake bank website, which requests his or her authentication 
details, that website will not be able to display the image and phrase the user selected at 
enrolment time since these details do not require user input; rather they are retrieved from 
the bank database. The implementation of this method is proposed in the literature by 
Dhamija and Tygar [198]; they called it “Security Skin”.  However, this only works 
perfectly in non-targeted first time phishing attacks, where the attacker has not previously 
intended to attack a specific customer. If an attacker has launched a targeted phishing 
attack against one customer, the attacker will be able to gain knowledge of the type of 
image and phrase the user has selected at enrolment time, especially if the customer has 
repeatedly answered secret questions from the second authentication phase after the 
attacker has captured the first factor (the card number); this allows the collection of the 
different secret questions from the original OBA to inject them into the fake website. 
At the transactional level, the bank implements another authentication method for creating 
beneficiary accounts (e.g. local and international). It requests customers to input certain 
digits of their registered civil ID, corporate number, passport number, or military ID. 
From a security point of view, all authentication methods used at login and transactional 
level phases are sent using the web channel. If an attacker is able to compromise this 
channel, any or all details can be captured and changed. Although the image and phrase 
verification at login, as well as the input of certain digits of the customer ID, protect the 
customer from a single non-targeted attack, all authentication factors can be captured in 
targeted attacks after the customer logs in and makes several transactions, repeatedly 
entering different digits of the ID as requested by the application. 
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Moreover, attacks like man-in-the-middle and man-in-the-browser are able to compromise 
the authentication methods implemented by this bank from the very first attempt. This is 
possible by altering the transaction details the customer enters to create beneficiary 
accounts. 
4.2 Mobile Communication 
Although mobile devices are increasingly becoming susceptible to many threats, as we will 
see in the review covered in this section, the security properties offered by mobile devices 
can achieve the best possible protection for online authentication if combined with other 
independent authentication mechanisms such as the conventional username and password. 
This section presents a review and discussion of the mobile network and mobile devices, in 
terms of usability and security.   
4.2.1 Usability of mobile devices and network 
Mobile calls and SMS (Short Messaging Services) messages are globally accepted wireless 
services that enable the transmission of voice and alphanumeric messages between mobile 
subscribers. These services were first introduced by the European standard for digital 
wireless (now known as the Global System for Mobile Communications or GSM) in 1991 
in Europe.   
Mobile phones, unlike other personal belongings, are considered to be the most personal 
devices (linked to one person) [35]. Compared to other tokens such as bank cards, they are 
faster to notice if lost or stolen [199], and therefore, many researchers and current online 
applications are using them as authentication factors for business transactions. Moreover, 
almost every mobile user, who has a contract, is known and registered by the mobile 
service provider, which in turn, acts as a trusted third party in any business transaction. 
Mobile phones have become tools that are carried and used by people everywhere and their 
services are not limited to a geographical area (i.e., the roaming service has made it 
possible for someone to utilize the mobile phone connection without having to change the 
mobile service provider when travelling abroad). 
In the past few years, mobile phones have become the most widely used personal devices 
ever among users. Statistics show that there were approximately 60 people out of 100 
 81 
 
using mobile phones in the world in 2008 (see Figure 4-11). People use mobile phones to 
make and send more than a billion calls and text messages every day [200]. 
 
Figure 4-11:  Internet and Mobile User Stats from 1998 to 2008 [201, 202] 
Unlike other services provided by mobile networks, SMS is the most convenient and most 
realistic and achievable approach [203].  It has become the most popular service for the 
following reasons [204]: 
• Globally accepted wireless service 
• Enables the transmission of alphanumeric messages between mobile phones 
• Uses store and forward asynchronous delivery method; messages are stored and 
delivered whenever end-user becomes available. 
• Supports notification of delivery 
• Supports multi-languages 
These SMS features have encouraged different businesses to implement and utilize SMS 
messages in various ways. Some examples of these implementations are listed below 
[205]. 
• Marketing: many organizations use SMS messages for advertisement purposes. They 
send information about their products and offers to all mobile subscribers (who opt-in) 
for a relatively lower cost compared to other advertising media like TV programs and 
newspapers. 
0%	  
5%	  
10%	  
15%	  
20%	  
25%	  
30%	  
35%	  
40%	  
45%	  
50%	  
55%	  
60%	  
1998	   1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	  
Internet	   Mobile	  
 82 
 
• Authentication: some businesses are using SMS messages to authenticate transactions 
by delivering PIN numbers to/from mobile users. Sometimes SMS authentication 
works together with other authentication methods for better security. 
• Collection of payments: several companies like Paybox and Paypal have implemented 
payments via SMS successfully. Mobile users can pay for products and services if they 
are registered customers of these companies. There are also other forms of payment 
that utilize a derivative protocol from SMS called premium-rate SMS (PSMS). This 
protocol allows organizations to subscribe for special numbers, which charge 
subscribers’ SMS messages a premium rate higher than the standard SMS rate set by 
the mobile operator. This is commonly seen on TV and SMS guessing contests.  
• Couponing and ticketing: just another two forms of payment collections that are mainly 
used to cut the operation cost of issuing coupons and tickets.  Car parking tickets 
through an SMS messages is one example of this service. 
• Direct sales: people can download contents or applications to their mobile devices and 
charge on their bill (e.g., ring tones, wallpapers, applications, etc…). 
• Interactivity and data collection: this is a very attractive business to broadcasting 
channels. People can vote for their favourite actor or player by sending SMS messages, 
which cost relatively less than other voting media. However, on a high scale, millions 
of SMS messages are received, and therefore, big profit margins are generated at the 
end of the day. 
• Micro-finance: M-Pesa by Vodafone and MobileMoney by MTN and Standard Bank 
are two micro-finance systems. People are able to transfer money from one mobile 
user’s account to another using their mobile phone devices. 
• Support and maintenance: mobile service providers usually send service updates to 
mobile users via SMS. Other companies utilize SMS messages to notify their 
customers about a recent purchase or after sale maintenance status. 
Despite these many features available via SMS and other mobile services, when payments 
are involved, users’ level of acceptance is directly affected by the amount of payment 
required. According to SpeedFacts [206], users prefer to pay by mobile if the amount of 
payment is between 12.5 and 50 Euros while they prefer to use other payment options 
(e.g., debit/credit cards or cash) when the amount is more than 50 Euros (see Figure 4-12). 
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Figure 4-12: Preferred payment method of Internet users if away 
4.2.2 Security of mobile devices and network 
Despite the high user acceptance of mobile network services (e.g., voice calls and SMS 
messages), mobile networks, and mobile phones are not 100% secured. There are many 
articles published, which address the weaknesses of the mobile network infrastructure. 
Odell published a story in Financial Times about the Italian police who were able to track 
the location of a suspect using his mobile device. He also stated that mobile operators are 
able to tap all calls made from/to any mobile device utilizing their network, and worse, 
they can remotely install a piece of software that will turn the mobile device into a 
microphone, which transmits the user voice even when no call is active [207]. 
Another story published by Gupta [208] addressed one of Germany’s computer scientists, 
named Karston Nohl, and his team of 24 hackers who successfully cracked the algorithm 
used to encrypt mobile calls in GSM networks.  Likewise, an article published by Stanley 
[209] about intercepting and tapping mobile calls without the need for cracking the 
algorithms. He claimed that installing a fake base station to be used by mobile devices that 
are closer to it than to other real base stations allows an attacker to tap mobile calls passing 
through the fake base station. This is achieved with the help of a few software products 
that are available for free and the fake base station materials that cost an average of £1000 . 
SMS messages have suffered widely from what is known as SMS spoofing. It occurs when 
a fraudster manipulates the SMS message address information in order to impersonate a 
subscriber [210].  Therefore, SMS spoofing can be used for spamming or for posing social 
and/or political conflicts between different parties (i.e., an attacker, A, can spoof and send 
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a SMS message with unacceptable texts to user X, which will appear to him as if it is 
coming from user Y).  
Mobile devices are also now more prone to attacks than ever because of the increasing 
number of smart phones, which were introduced to replace the traditional cell phones. The 
main difference between a cell phone and a smart phone is that a cell phone does not have 
an operating system, although it can still make calls and send SMS messages and e-mails 
[211].  The mobile’s operating system (e.g., Windows Mobile, Google’s Android, iPhone’s 
iOS, and Nokia’s Symbian) is what makes a cell phone become a smart phone with more 
services like e-mail clients, web browsers, and other Internet services. Smart phones 
provide the user with the ability to connect to different networks at the same time (i.e., the 
ability to connect to the GSM network while surfing the web using EDGE, 3G, or Wifi 
networks). This makes the device vulnerable to different attacks (especially attacks from 
the Internet networks) that can compromise and utilize all other services and networks used 
by the mobile device (including services provided by GSM and CDMA). 
Hoffman [212] stated that the number of malware products targeting mobile devices is 
increasing. He said that most of the mobile platforms are susceptible to malware and they 
are not shipped with anti-virus software. Moreover, he stated that more than 400 mobile 
malware programs have already been detected; some are keyloggers, while others intercept 
communication and run functions without the need for user interaction. 
4.2.3 Mobile Devices as Authentication Tokens 
Recently, mobile devices have been widely used to authenticate payments or customers’ 
transactions online. Mobile devices are not used to identify a user; rather, the SIM card and 
the mobile number associated with it can be uniquely used to identify a user. This type of 
identification is similar to the use of a username in the traditional username/password 
authentication mechanism. The mobile number of a user cannot be considered as a secret 
since it is available for the user’s friends and relatives and sometimes it is listed in public 
mobile phone directories or published online. Hence, mobile phone numbers can offer 
more than what a username offers in traditional authentication. A mobile number is usually 
assigned to a SIM card, which by itself can work as an authentication token if it requires a 
PIN number to unlock and operate. 
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4.3 Summary 
Online banking has been among the fastest growing online businesses in the past few 
years. The services offered to bank customers online are critical and risky. People can 
perform a number of financial transactions, including the transfer of money from their 
accounts to other foreign accounts online. Thus, there is always a need to secure online 
banking systems with the latest and most trusted authentication mechanisms that are able 
to withstand most known attacks online. 
In this chapter, the status of online banking applications were classified into three 
categories: informational, local-transactional, and transactional online banking 
applications. The chapter then studied and discussed different cases of currently 
implemented authentication mechanisms in online banking and compared their security 
against the attacks covered in Chapter 2. 
Mobile communication is also considered one of the fastest growing and most acceptable 
communication channels around the globe. Mobile devices are the most personal devices 
today and people carry them more than any other personal item or device. For this reason, 
some researchers proposed the use of mobile devices as complementary authentication 
tokens that could play a major role in improving overall security if integrated with other 
authentication mechanisms.      
The next chapter proposes a multi-channel, authentication mechanism solution. This 
solution benefits from the advantages offered by a secondary channel other than the Web 
(e.g. mobile network) in a multilevel online banking environment. More details of the 
advantages of mobile devices in authentication are discussed in Chapter 5: Proposed 
Solution. 
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Chapter 5  
Proposed Solution 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 focused on authentication classes as well as attacks that can target any of the 
three core communication elements: end-user (EU), communication channel (CC), and 
online service provider (OSP).  Chapter 4 introduced online banking as one of the most 
critical and widely used online applications. Evidence was provided to support the 
assertion that current authentication mechanisms introduced by online banking applications 
are vulnerable to several online attacks. The evidence suggests that there is a need for a 
more secure authentication mechanism that is capable of providing better security while 
maintaining usability and fostering acceptability to end users. 
This chapter proposes a multi-channel authentication (MCA) infrastructure that is able to 
withstand the most popular, previously identified online attacks while maintaining 
acceptable levels of usability and acceptability. First, section 5.2 discusses the proposed 
infrastructure in terms of online banking, applicability, feedback, and its advantages over 
the single channel approach. Section 5.3 discusses the importance of the mobile network to 
the proposed MCA mechanism and highlights those features that make it the most suitable 
secondary channel for MCA. In section 5.4, the proposed MCA infrastructure is assessed 
by means of threat modelling based on the STRIDE process. The evaluation addresses all 
applicable attacks that target end-users (EU) and communication channels (CC) covered in 
Chapter 2.  
5.2 Proposed Infrastructure 
Authentication mechanisms currently implemented by online banking sites are criticized 
for their inability to deliver systems that meet the highest standards of security while 
maintaining high usability. Some online banking systems offer their customers advanced 
security technology and features using tokens and biometrics. However, because usability 
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is neglected in most of these systems, customers sometimes find it difficult to do banking 
online. For example, some online banking systems require the use of a SecureID token for 
the customer to transfer money from one account to another. The token by itself is not a 
personal device that one would carry all the time. If the customer does not have the token 
at the time of transfer, he or she will not be able to complete the task. Another usability 
issue occurs when the bank implements Java-based add-ons (e.g., on-screen virtual 
keyboard) that are not compatible with all browsers. These usability issues may lead to 
customers not fully accepting these authentication mechanisms and this may lead to 
reduced customer loyalty. It is, therefore, important to introduce an authentication 
mechanism that is perceived by customers to offer superior security to other alternatives 
while being usable in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction [213]. 
MCA has the potential to protect customers from most known attacks. However, a 
suboptimal implementation of MCA could lead to security problems and/or usability 
weaknesses and possible rejection by customers. In terms of security, the online banking 
application case discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.1.3.3) proves this argument. In terms of 
usability, improper implementation of MCA could cause frustrations leading to rejection of 
the mechanism and the site, which could negatively affect the market share of the 
organization. Therefore, it is vital to ensure the optimal implementation of MCA.  
Figure 5-1 provides a general overview of how a multi-channel authentication mechanism 
should be implemented. However, there will be variations depending on business needs 
and security level requirements. 
This proposal suggests that MCA should be implemented on a multilevel structure. A user 
should be able to carry out basic functions throughout the web application by logging in 
using a conventional authentication mechanism (e.g., knowledge-base authentication). At 
this stage, only read-access is granted. If the user wants write/modify access, then a 
random one-time “secret” with the task details should be passed to the user over a 
secondary channel (this must be a non-web channel). It is important to ensure that the 
system delivers the secret factor through a channel other than the one used for user login, 
which might be compromised. Task details are sent along with the secret factor to make 
sure that the user is aware of the task he or she is verifying (i.e., to contextualize the 
message). This is vital to avoid any possibility of man-in-the-middle or man-in-the-
browser (both will be abbreviated as MITM/B) and real-time phishing/pharming 
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(abbreviated as RTP/P) attacks. These attacks are discussed in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 of 
Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 5-1:  The proposed MCA infrastructure 
Once the OTP is received via the secondary channel, the user can verify his/her secret 
using any available channel. Only at this stage will the write/modify task be authenticated 
by the system. 
5.2.1 MCA for Online Banking 
Online banking systems are the most critical online business applications due to the risk 
involved in the financial transactions they offer to their customers. High security measures 
are crucial to foster a trusting relationship between the bank offering the online banking 
services and its customers. Usability, on the other hand, is also important to keep these 
customers loyal to the bank. There is no single solution that is favourable to all customers 
and that meets all of their different expectations. However, providing a system that is 
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customizable to match the different needs and preferences of different customers without 
compromising security gives the bank a competitive advantage over other banks. This can 
be achieved, in the context of the proposed MCA, by offering the users the opportunity to 
select where and how often to activate the MCA throughout the system. A minimum 
requirement must be implemented at some point before online transactions can be 
electronically carried out. This flexible customization does not affect the level of security 
offered by MCA; rather, it makes the application more usable and acceptable to users by 
matching their levels of risk appetite and awareness. 
To illustrate how this can be achieved, each of the customization factors (where and how 
often) is described in the practical scenarios below: 
• Where to implement:  users should be given the ability to select where to implement 
the MCA mechanism throughout the online banking application. A user with low or no 
privacy concerns might prefer to use MCA only at times when external financial 
transactions, such as “money transfer to an external account” and “bill payments”, are 
required. This means that MCA would not be required for balance checking or internal 
financial transactions (e.g., transferring money from account A to account B of the 
same user, credit card bill payment, etc…). If the user is very concerned about security 
and privacy, he or she might prefer to require MCA for every single transaction 
(internal or external) or even request to have MCA implemented at login. 
• How often to implement: some users might not be willing to involve their mobile 
phones or other channels into their online banking experience, and therefore, they 
would tend to minimize MCA to the least options available. For example, they may 
only activate MCA for financial transactions that involve more than a specific amount 
of money (individually and collectively). For example, if the amount specified were 
£100, no individual transaction that is more than £100 would be processed without 
MCA (whether in one transaction or multiple transactions with smaller amounts). This 
amount would be considered a threshold and it would trigger the MCA mechanism 
whenever the transacted amount reached or exceeded the limit. Feedback plays a 
complementing role here as the user could be informed by SMS or by other means 
about every single transaction completed. In contrast, users who are very concerned 
about security and would like to be in more control of their accounts might prefer to 
have the MCA mechanism involved in every single transaction no matter how much 
money is transacted. 
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This study proposes a default moderate implementation of MCA. That is, a user is allowed 
to login to the online account using a conventional authentication mechanism (e.g., 
username and password). This first level privilege gives the user access to account 
statements. To carry out a financial transaction (e.g., money transfer to another account) 
the user has to create a beneficiary account record for the target account. This process 
requires use of the MCA mechanism. The system sends the user an SMS message 
containing a one-time pin (OTP) and the details of the transaction and requests the user to 
validate the transaction by providing the OTP received. Once this procedure is completed, 
the beneficiary account becomes active and the user can then transfer money to it anytime, 
using only the standard authentication.  
It is important to mention that this proposal should support feedback. The application 
should also allow only a certain number of retries when verifying the OTPs. This helps 
avoid brute-force attacks (covered in section 2.4.1.3) that can succeed if no limitations are 
enforced. The flow chart depicted in Figure 5-2 further explains the way the proposed 
MCA implementation works. 
As shown in Figure 5-2, password retry limitations are implemented in three places 
throughout the application: the login phase, the activation of beneficiaries phase, and 
finally, when confirming transactions. If an invalid password or OTP is entered three times 
in any of these authentication phases, the account is deactivated automatically. The re-
activation procedure can be implemented in different ways. However, discussion of this is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
5.2.2 Applicability of MCA 
MCA can meet different needs depending on the business type and the level of security. 
Some applications might require military-grade authentication mechanisms while others 
might require the conventional username and password to authenticate users. 
Correspondence applications, as an example, might require MCA to be applied as the 
primary authentication level. Access to the user account can be denied until all 
authentication requirements have been met. However, the user is the one who should 
decide whether to enable these extra security measures or to disable them as the need for 
security varies from one user to another and even between different tasks by the same user. 
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Figure 5-2: The proposed MCA in online banking 
For example, a user uses the e-mail address x@example.com to communicate socially with 
friends and family members. This user utilizes this e-mail address every day and does not 
keep confidential e-mails stored in the account after they are pushed to e-mail client 
software installed on the user machine. In this case, this user does not require another 
verification channel for each login attempt to the e-mail client. Moreover, implementing a 
multi-channel authentication mechanism for this e-mail account could be considered a 
usability drawback since the user would need to be authorized several times a day using 
different channels. 
< 3 
< 3 < 3 
≥ 3 ≥ 3 
≥ 3 
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Consider that the same user has another e-mail address y@example.com. This e-mail 
address is used as a main contact address for the user’s payment account with Paypal, for 
eBay transactions, and as an alternative e-mail address to reset other e-mail accounts 
belonging to the user. Although the user might not need to access this account every day, it 
is more important and critical to secure this account than to do so with the first e-mail 
address. Therefore, the user is more likely to choose to use multi-channel authentication to 
control access to the second e-mail account. 
Online banking accounts might require a different setup as covered in section 5.2.1. The 
most important tasks carried out are those that require modification of the user’s balance 
statement (transferring money or paying utility bills). MCA should be implemented only 
when a request is issued by the user to initiate such transactions. Otherwise, traditional 
authentication may be enough for read-only access to the user records (e.g., checking 
account statements and payment histories). 
Another example is online community forums. MCA can be used by moderators or site 
administrators as they have privileges to change the site’s global settings and to edit other 
users’ posts and threads. The forum members, however, do not require such advanced 
authentication mechanism since their actions do not pose high risks that would require 
MCA. 
The proposed multi-channel infrastructure can meet the needs of many different online 
applications with many different purposes. However, the implementation should focus first 
on the usability and security requirements of the target application, and above all, should 
consider the costs and benefits of running such an infrastructure from the user’s point of 
view. 
5.2.3 Cost of MCA 
The running cost of MCA is relatively low, compared to other authentication technologies. 
The proposed MCA is the cheapest token-based authentication mechanism since it does not 
require introducing new tokens to the customers. The tokens are something the customers 
already have (e.g., mobile devices). Other token-based technologies invest heavily in 
designing and building the hardware. They then have to spend more on teaching the 
customers how to use these technologies. Worse, they are responsible for maintaining these 
tokens and offering customers live support. All these issues are avoided with MCA. Users 
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usually buy their own mobile devices and they maintain them directly with the supplier 
company. In terms of token awareness and use, SMS is an inexpensive, ubiquitous 
worldwide service that is used by most mobile users today. 
The only running cost of MCA is the cost of delivering the OTP, which is borne by the 
organization. In the proposed MCA, this means the cost of SMS messages exchanged 
between both OSP and EU. However, since there are two options for authorizing tasks in 
MCA, a customer is not required to send out SMS messages since it is sufficient to receive 
the SMS message that carries the OTP and transaction details. The customer then can 
confirm the OTP received by entering it into the screen using the Web channel (see Figure 
5-1). 
5.2.4 Feedback 
Feedback is one of the core aspects of good interface design. Nielsen included the visibility 
of system status as one of the top 10 usability heuristics [214]. He argued that any given 
system must inform its users about what is going on by means of an appropriate feedback. 
Feedback is categorized into two categories [215]: required and confirmatory.  The 
required feedback is the feedback given during task execution. According to [216], “when 
the feedback is immediately available, the user will be less likely to automate the task, and 
more likely to work in a controlled mode – making less errors”.  Based on this, required 
feedback is about making the system more usable to users. The confirmatory feedback, on 
the other hand, is the information given to the user at the end of a task. In the context of 
MCA, this can be represented by a confirmation SMS message that is sent to the users to 
inform them about the completion of a task and its details. For example, the banking 
organization may send a SMS message informing the customer that an amount of £100 has 
been transferred to the account number 12345678 successfully on Monday 13th of 
September 2010, 11:04:25pm. This feedback is a very important element of the overall 
security proposed in the MCA infrastructure. 
Another complementary feature of feedback suggested by the proposed MCA 
infrastructure is to allow transfer delays of a few minutes before the transaction completes. 
This delay can be set to zero seconds if the amount transferred is below a certain amount 
(e.g., £100). If the amount exceeds the specified amount, the system should incur a delay 
period before the transaction takes place. This allows the legitimate account owner to 
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report a fake/illegal transaction upon the receipt of the confirmatory feedback SMS 
message before the transaction is finalized. This is demonstrated in the scenario-based 
evaluation of the MCA mechanism covered in section 5.4. 
5.2.5 Advantages over Single Channel Authentication (SCA) 
The use of multi-channel authentication (MCA), as opposed to single channel 
authentication (SCA), can offer significant advantages in terms of both security and 
usability [217].  A number of different independent channels have to be compromised 
before full access to the user account is granted to an attacker. This makes non-targeted 
attacks almost impossible. It also makes targeted attacks harder, especially if the attacker is 
not geographically close to the user to be able to gain physical access to devices used as 
verification channels. 
Unlike SCA, MCA provides protection against most real-time attacks including MITM/B, 
RTP/P, and malware. Some of these attacks have the potential to capture and manipulate, 
in real time, the data exchanged between users (e.g., bank customers) and the online 
service (e.g., online banking web application). These attacks target organizations and users 
for economic gain and are considered global threats [86].  Data integrity is not maintained 
and both sides (i.e., users and online service providers) are often unaware of such attacks. 
With MCA, the attack is made visible to the user to reveal that the exchanged data has 
been altered by an attacker or malware (more evaluation of other attacks in section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2). MCA is safer because the online service provider will not process transactions 
without user confirmation nor will the user verify transactions he or she did not request. 
The whole idea behind using two different independent channels is to ensure integrity and 
authenticity even if one particular channel is compromised at the time of the attack. 
Since MCA is not limited to specific channels as long as they are very independent from 
the primary channel, various independent channels can be used in the MCA infrastructure. 
However, the proposal suggests that mobile networks (e.g., GSM, TDMA, and CDMA) 
should be used to achieve the best possible balance of security and usability. Mobile 
networks are the most practical and usable networks found to serve MCA implementation 
best. This recommendation is justified in the following section.  
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5.3 Mobile Network as Secondary Channel 
Mobile communication is currently the most widely spread and fastest growing 
communication technology around the world [218].  Since its introduction in the 1970s, 
mobile technology has undergone dramatic improvements and enhancements. Such 
improvements have expanded mobile communication functionality and added significant 
value to it. SMS has become a critical aspect of mobile communication and it is commonly 
used by different organizations and people around the globe (see section 4.2.1 for details 
and examples of the current use of SMS in mobile commerce). The Internet, on the other 
hand, has played a vital role in mobile communications along with SMS. The introduction 
of smart phones has expanded the range of services offered by mobile communication. For 
these reasons, mobile communication has become an integral part of day-to-day life. The 
ubiquitous influence of mobile technology has been significant in the past few years due to 
the emergence of various “m-“ services, such as m-commerce, m-learning, m-government, 
m-entertainment, m-gaming, and m-etiquette [218]. 
Mobile communication is protected against attacks by means of cryptography. For some 
mobile communication services, such as SMS, the cryptography is available to the public 
and can be used to decrypt SMS messages. For this reason, SMS messages do not offer a 
secure channel, and therefore, it has not been used solely as an authentication factor by 
itself, but rather as a complementary channel for authentication as discussed in section 
4.2.3 of Chapter 4. MCA currently proposes the use of SMS as a secondary channel. The 
status of mobile SMS messages makes them the most usable independent channel besides 
the Web for authentication. However, other channels can also be integrated into the 
structure as long as these channels are usable and do not share the same device used to 
serve the primary channel. For example, automated calls can be used to pass the OTP to 
the users via mobile or telephone networks. A user would receive an automated call from 
the service provider that would dictate the OTP number. This service can further be used to 
secure the phone call and verify that the mobile device holder is the legitimate account 
holder. This can be done by asking the customer to answer one of the registered secret 
questions (e.g., date of birth, social security number, PIN number, etc…). The answers 
provided by the customer can be entered numerically by keying the numbers using the 
mobile numpad. If the answer is correct, the program that is controlling the phone call can 
then dictate the OTP number to the customer. In this manner, the system ensures that the 
customer account remains secured even in case of targeted attacks. For example, if an 
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attacker was able to compromise a customer online account as well as physically to get 
hold of the mobile device used as a secondary authentication channel, the attacker would 
still need to know the answer to the secret questions asked by the automated call, which 
makes it harder to compromise. 
It is, however, very important to reiterate that the secondary channel cannot share the same 
device as the primary channel. As mentioned earlier, smart phones now offer different 
services other than the conventional voice calling service. A smart phone device can be 
used for Internet browsing as well as SMS, instant messaging, and voice-over-IP (VoIP) 
calling. If the same device is used as a primary channel (e.g., using the smart phone web 
browser to login to the bank account) and, at the same time, to receive SMS with OTP as a 
secondary channel, then compromising the device means compromising both channels at 
once. Therefore, the MCA proposed in this study strongly suggests the use of two 
physically separated independent channels to achieve the highest possible level of security 
to protect an online banking customer from the common attacks listed in section 2.4.  
5.4 Theoretical Evaluation of MCA 
The quality attributes of any given system architecture can be evaluated either theoretically 
or practically. These analyses complement each other to determine the extent to which 
such systems meet the desirable benefits and fits the needs of users. In terms of the MCA 
proposed in this study, secure Internet banking is the ultimate goal to reach. Although it is 
often impossible to prove that a given design is secure, a proper evaluation of the security 
properties of the design will usually enhance security. This is the essence of what is known 
as threat modelling [219].  
According to Jones [220], “Threat modelling is the core step in any security solution. It is 
a way to start making sense of the vulnerability landscape”. It is a six-stage process 
illustrated in Figure 5-3. These stages are required to evaluate a system thoroughly at the 
design phase. This study does not evaluate a complete, online banking system 
infrastructure. Rather, it evaluates only the authentication mechanism at the application 
level where the underlying network, host infrastructure design, and web-server 
technologies are ignored. 
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Figure 5-3: Threat modelling six-stage process 
To evaluate MCA architecture theoretically, a scenario-based evaluation suggested by 
[221] is used.  This employs threat modelling using STRIDE (an acronym for Spoofing, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of 
Privilege) and DREAD (Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users 
and Discoverability). STRIDE and DREAD are processes developed by the Microsoft 
Application Consulting and Engineering Team to represent various methods or scenarios 
through which an adversary may attack a system [222].  These processes will involve 
examining the proposed MCA architecture against attacks that target the communication 
channels (CC) and end-users (EU) listed in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 respectively. The 
attacks on online service providers (OSP), however, are ignored here because the MCA 
provides protections for the user and communication channel levels only.  
The practical evaluation of the proposed MCA architecture, on the other hand, involves 
empirical prototype testing on a sample of Internet users, which is covered thoroughly in 
Chapter 7. Information about attempted/successful attacks on banks’ online systems was 
not included in this chapter as banks treat these figures as strictly confidential and refuse to 
release them to the public. They believe that these statistics would severely affect their 
image and customers’ trust if made public. A few cases, leaked to the press about 
successful attacks on bank customers' accounts, were covered in section 4.1.1.2. These 
cases support the fact that the existing banks’ authentication mechanisms are still unable to 
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protect customers from cyber attacks. However, these limited cases do not reflect the real 
impact of cyber attacks on online banking systems. 
There are other threat modelling systems exist such as AS/NZS [223], CVSS [224] and 
OCTAVE [225]. However, the threat modelling process by Microsoft is the most suitable 
threat modelling approach for web application security risks and was used by Microsoft for 
their internal software threat and risk modelling for years. According to [226], AS/NZS 
approach is applicable for non-technical risks and does not provide structured methods to 
enumerate web application security risks. CVSS also, unlike threat modelling by 
Microsoft, suffers from a complex ranking system and does not cover design flaws. 
Although OCTAVE threat modelling is considered as a heavyweight risk methodology 
approach for large and small organizations, it does not provide assessment and mitigation 
of web application security risks.  
The following sub-sections will cover the six-stage process of threat modelling for MCA 
architecture using the STRIDE and DREAD processes as suggested by [220]. 
5.4.1 MCA Application Model and Attack Target Nodes 
Figure 5-4 shows a high-level architecture diagram that describes the composition and 
structure of an online banking application with MCA. The diagram illustrates how the 
main elements are connected to each other. These elements are: 
• Data Flows: represented by the one way arrows  
• Processes: represented by large diamonds 
• Data Stores: represented in the figure by the database 
• Interactors: represented by the EU and the web server 
• Trust boundaries: represented by the dotted lines 
The diagram also presents the assets of the system that need to be protected against attacks. 
Some of these assets (e.g., end user, informational services) do not pose high risks by 
themselves. However, if an attacker compromises them along with other types of assets 
such as transactional services, they could severely affect the overall security of the 
customer’s account. 
 99 
 
 
Figure 5-4: The proposed online-banking application architecture diagram 
The attack target nodes, which are represented in Figure 5-4 by the large dots, show the 
parts that need critical analyses at component levels to identify the threats. Trust 
boundaries, on the other hand, guard the entry points of the system where the passing data 
need to be validated, authenticated, and authorized. Four trust boundaries exist in the 
proposed architecture:  
• A trust boundary exists between the EUs and the OSP’s web server. It is responsible 
for authenticating end users and authorizing them to access the informational services 
of their accounts on the OSP’s web server. A conventional authentication mechanism is 
sufficient at this stage as discussed earlier in section 5.2.1. 
• Another trust boundary exists between the OSP’s web server and the EU. This 
addresses the delivery of transaction details and OTPs that the customers need to 
authorize transactions. The data flow is contained entirely within a trust boundary and 
no further authentication factors are needed. For example, in the case of mobile SMS 
messages, a mobile number of the customer identifies him/her to the system and the 
SIM unlock code, if it exists, represents the authentication factor. 
• A third trust boundary lies within the web server itself and splits the services offered by 
the system into informational and transactional. This trust boundary is responsible for 
authorizing customers to carry out transactional services that are assumed to be of 
high-risk nature (e.g., money transfer, bill payments, etc…). In this stage, multi-
channel authentication is the proper authentication mechanism to apply (see section 
5.2.1). 
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• The last trust boundary exists between the web server and the database and it protects 
the database from unauthorized read/write requests. Usually the database resides in a 
separate server, and therefore, this trust boundary allows the web application to access 
the database server using a fixed and trusted identity. This type of authentication 
mechanism is not related directly to the end users and is, therefore, out of the scope of 
this research. 
5.4.2 Identify and Categorize Application Threats Based on STRIDE 
According to [227], the identification of threats requires three tasks to be performed: 
identification of network threats, identification of host threats, and identification of 
application threats.  Since this research is solely concerned with the authentication 
mechanisms of an online banking application, the focus is on the third task only.  
The identifying and analyzing process requires categorizing the threats into the following 
six STRIDE nodes: 
• Spoofing: occurs when an attacker pretends to be a legitimate user/customer while 
he/she is not. 
• Tampering:  occurs when the data sent by a legitimate user/customer is modified in 
transit before it gets to its final destination. 
• Repudiation:  the ability for someone to deny that he/she has performed an action. 
• Information disclosure:  occurs when an attacker is able to read confidential 
information. 
• Denial of service:  occurs when an attacker disables the communication between the 
EU and the OSP. 
• Elevation of privilege:  occurs when an attacker is able to takeover access 
controls/privileges that he/she would not normally have. 
Each of the elements (data flows, data stores, processes, and interactors) depicted in Figure 
5-4 has a set of threats.  Table 5-1 shows the threats affecting each of these elements.  
The following sub-sections analyze and identify these elements individually based on the 
attack target nodes and the STRIDE approach. 
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Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information Disclosure 
Denial of 
Service 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Data Flows  X  X X  
Data 
Stores  X  X X  
Processes X X X X X X 
Interactors X  X    
Table 5-1:  Threats affecting elements [219] 
5.4.2.1 Analyzing data flows 
This section will cover the analysis of threats identified in the data flows. There are four 
data flows identified in Figure 5-4, which can be broken down and analyzed into the 
following: 
1. EU to web server (Informational Level):  The data flows from end users to the web 
server are sensitive and confidential and might carry access credentials. This data 
might be sniffed (Information Disclosure) either before they leave the EU or while they 
travel over the Internet. In addition, the web server might be targeted by an attack that 
could result in a complete failure either to accept the data or to respond to the 
customers’ requests (Denial of Service). Figure 5-5 presents the type of STRIDE 
threats category for this data flow level. 
 
Figure 5-5:  EU to web server (Informational Level) data flows threats 
2. Web server to EU (via a secondary channel):  The data flows from the web or Short 
Message Service Center (SMSC) server (in the case that SMS messages are used to 
serve as a secondary channel), which is responsible for delivering the verification 
codes to the customers via a secondary channel. This data can be captured at the user 
end or on the fly (section 0 covers how this could be done on mobile networks), and 
Informational 
Level 
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thus, are vulnerable to information disclosure types of STRIDE threats. Although there 
is no single incident recorded yet on a targeted denial of service on mobile devices, 
there are commercial devices used to disable mobile devices by preventing them from 
receiving signals from the base station. These devices are called “mobile phone 
jammers” and are primarily found in places where mobile phones must be switched off. 
These jammers can also be used as targeted attacks on mobile phones near the attacker 
to block the signals and ensure that the victim’s mobile coverage is lost (Denial of 
Service).  
3. EU to web server (Transactional Level):  The data flows from end users to the web 
server at the transactional level are susceptible to similar threats as those discussed for 
data flows from EUs to web servers at the informational level. 
4. Web server to the database:  This data flow is out of the scope of this research since it 
does not relate to the end user or the multi-channel authentication mechanism. 
5.4.2.2 Analyzing data stores 
The application model shows only one data store represented by a database component. 
This data store is vulnerable to tampering, especially if the attacker is among the bank 
employees who have legitimate access credentials to access the database. Information 
disclosure is another major threat since customers’ records in banking systems might 
contain very sensitive information such as credit card numbers, account details, and online 
banking access details. 
 
Figure 5-6:  Data store (database) STRIDE threats 
Databases are also prone to denial of service attacks. This could happen intentionally, 
caused by an attacker (whether an outsider or insider) or unintentionally due to a simple 
database error or a technical problem such as a full database drive. These kinds of issues 
might corrupt the database files and cause the database services to stop functioning or to go 
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down, hence causing a total failure in responding to queries. Figure 5-6 identifies the 
STRIDE threats applicable to the data store. 
5.4.2.3 Analyzing processes 
Processes are the only element susceptible to all STRIDE threats. A process that pretends 
to be the web server (Spoofing) has the ability to collect all the data that are submitted by 
the deceived customers. This also leads to information disclosure since these data could be 
sensitive and must only be known to the legitimate user. Furthermore, denial of service is 
another applicable threat here since the actual process is not accessible to the deceived 
customers. 
Elevation of privilege occurs when an attacker is able to tamper with the customer records 
or get physical access to the secondary channel. For example, an attack from an insider 
(employee) could modify the customer’s mobile number registered in the bank database 
with his/her own number. This allows the attacker to receive verification codes (OTPs) that 
are meant to be sent to the account holder’s mobile phone. If this occurs, the attacker will 
be able to carry out transactions on behalf of the legitimate customer. 
If there is no logging mechanism applied within the system or if an attacker were able to 
access the logs database, he/she could tamper with the data stored and modify the records. 
These records usually contain valuable tracing details such as the destination bank account 
number of the transaction the attacker accomplishes on behalf of the account holder. Thus, 
access to the database would allow the attacker to wipe out the evidences of such action 
(Repudiation Threat).  
5.4.2.4 Analyzing interactors 
Interactors are the end points of the system, such as EUs and OSPs. According to [219], 
interactors “are the data providers and consumers that are outside the scope of your system, 
but clearly related to it.” 
From the OSP side, the web server does not know who is connected to the customer’s 
account when a session starts. If the user is able to provide valid access credentials, then 
the web server assumes it is a legitimate user. However, if an attacker, at some point in 
time, were able to capture these credentials, then it could be the attacker who is connected 
to the web server (Spoofing), not the customer. The same threat types apply to the web 
server (OSP side). Sections 2.4.3.5 to 2.4.3.7 covered different attack techniques used to 
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deceive customers to provide access credentials to a fake website different from the 
original one hosted by the bank’s web server. 
Repudiation is another attack threat that occurs at times when an attacker is able to login to 
a customer account and request transactions on the customer’s behalf using a proxy server 
that is untraceable. 
5.4.3 Build an Attack Tree 
An attack tree is a formal and methodical way of collecting, documenting, and describing 
potential attacks on any given system in a structured and hierarchical manner [59, 227].  It 
contains a root node that represents the optimum goal of the attacker. It also contains leaf 
nodes, which are the attack methodologies used to achieve this goal. Figure 5-7 represents 
an attack tree for the proposed online banking application with MCA approach. The figure 
illustrates how an attacker could compromise a user online bank account and identifies the 
path the attacker would follow in order to accomplish this task. The main entries to achieve 
a successful attack are the EU, the CC, and the OSP. 
5.4.4 Evaluation of Threats 
Evaluating identified threats is the fifth step in the threat modelling process and it is about 
investigating each threat/attack and exploring how the new technology can mitigate its 
risk. A scenario-based evaluation is considered in the following sub-sections for this 
purpose where each applicable attack is evaluated individually. A user named “Ahmed” 
(the EU) who has a bank account with XYZ Bank (the OSP) will be used hereafter as an 
example case scenario for all the attacks. Another Internet user called “Zaid” will be 
considered as an attacker who will try all applicable attacks to compromise Ahmed’s 
online banking account. The evaluation assumes that XYZ Bank is implementing MCA as 
proposed in this research and will, therefore, show how it can mitigate the risk of the 
identified attacks. 
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Figure 5-7: An attack tree for the proposed online banking with MCA approach 
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5.4.4.1 Sniffing (2.1.1) 
Sniffing, the attack represented by 2.1.1 in Figure 5-7, is an attack that captures 
information transferred between EUs and OSPs. If Zaid has the proper tools that allow him 
to intercept Ahmed’s data transferred over the Web channel (the primary CC), he could 
extract Ahmed’s credentials (e.g., username and password) if this channel is not encrypted 
using SSL. If for some reason encryption were not implemented, MCA would protect 
Ahmed’s account by disallowing Zaid from initiating critical transactions such as money 
transfer. The only access Zaid will gain after he captures Ahmed’s username and password 
is the informational services offered by Ahmed’s bank, such as the account balance 
statement. The only transactional service allowed, at this point, for Zaid is money transfer 
to the beneficiary accounts that have been already approved by Ahmed. However, to 
mitigate this threat, the approved beneficiary accounts can be hidden so that only Ahmed 
can reach them using a search engine. This search engine allows Ahmed to locate an 
approved beneficiary account by searching for the nickname he set for that account, the 
beneficiary account, holder name, the beneficiary account number, or any other details 
associated with any of the approved beneficiary accounts. Zaid, on the other hand, will not 
be able to see any beneficiary account unless he is able to figure out a searchable piece of 
information that could retrieve the beneficiary account details. Even if this occurred, and 
Zaid were able to transfer money to an approved beneficiary account, the money could 
easily be traced since the beneficiary account is always an account Ahmed has previously 
approved and used.   
Moreover, with the confirmatory feedback feature implemented, Ahmed will receive an 
SMS message from the OSP informing him of the transaction. This will allow him to 
report such an incident quickly to the designated authority, especially if the amount is very 
high and the delay transfer feature is turned on. After all, capturing primary channel access 
credentials does not allow Zaid, even in the best scenarios, to create beneficiary accounts 
or transfer money from Ahmed’s online account to his account. The only way Zaid can 
transfer money to his own account is if his account were approved by Ahmed as a 
beneficiary account. This again would be easy to trace from the transactions log. 
Zaid will not be able to create new beneficiary accounts since this task requires a 
confirmation of the OTP that will be sent to Ahmed’s phone over a mobile network. 
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5.4.4.2 Man-in-the-middle (2.2.2) attacks of MCA 
MITM, indicated by the box 2.2.2 in Figure 5-7, attacks are real-time sniffing attacks. This 
type of attack is capable of altering the intercepted data between the EU and the OSP. The 
attack is transparent and neither end (EU or OSP) is aware of the attack. As a result, both 
ends assume data integrity. However, with the MCA mechanism implemented within the 
system, the potential damage of such an attack becomes very low. 
For example, if Zaid is able to compromise the CC and divert all communication traffic 
from both communicating sides (Ahmed and the XYZ Bank), he is only sniffing the traffic 
without interfering (passive mode). He watches the details Ahmed is requesting from his 
online account. Once Ahmed sends a request to add a new beneficiary account, Zaid will 
then intercept the request and change the beneficiary account details so it will reflect his 
own account number rather than the beneficiary’s account number. The bank will receive 
the request and will process it accordingly. As proposed by the MCA infrastructure, the 
beneficiary accounts must be approved by an OTP, which is passed to the user via an 
independent secondary channel other than the Web (e.g., mobile network). This means that 
Ahmed will receive a SMS message from XYZ Bank with the beneficiary account details 
and an OTP that will allow him to approve the beneficiary account. Here Ahmed will 
realize that the beneficiary account details received via the SMS message do not match the 
one he requested via the Web channel. He should not approve the transaction but should 
rather report this incident to the bank support for further investigation. As a result, the 
attack fails. 
5.4.4.3 User surveillance (1.2) 
User surveillance aims at capturing user credentials by monitoring the users through 
surveillance devices such as cameras. The main objective of such attacks is to replay the 
captured secrets later. With the MCA mechanism implemented, even if the surveillance 
devices were able to capture the OTP received by Ahmed’s mobile phone, that OTP is only 
valid for one time. Once Ahmed uses the received OTP to approve the designated 
beneficiary account, the same OTP cannot be reused again to approve another beneficiary 
account. Moreover, each OTP is linked with one and only one beneficiary account. Thus 
any given OTP will not activate/approve any beneficiary account other than the one 
associated with it. 
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5.4.4.4 Notes/token theft (1.3) 
Token or note theft, in the context of MCA, exists when the password is written down or 
when Zaid physically gets hold of Ahmed’s mobile (i.e., the mobile phone in this case acts 
as an authentication token since it receives the OTP). The former, if it occurs, would help 
Zaid to gain access to the informational services of Ahmed’s account. He would have 
limited access privileges similar to the ones covered in sniffing attack section 5.4.4.1. The 
latter should grant Zaid even fewer privileges although getting physical access to Ahmed’s 
mobile allows Zaid access to the stored SMS messages. Despite the fact that these 
messages could contain confidential information such as OTPs used to activate beneficiary 
accounts, this information is considered out-dated as long as Ahmed has already used it. 
Even if Ahmed has not used some of them at the time Zaid is able to compromise them, 
they are still associated with only the beneficiary accounts Ahmed has created. 
By physically getting control over the secondary channel, Zaid would have no access to 
Ahmed’s online bank system. This attack would only deny Ahmed from accessing his 
services temporarily. Therefore, token and note thefts are applicable attacks on MCA but 
they cannot offer Zaid full access to compromise Ahmed’s online account. 
5.4.4.5 Malware infection (1.1) 
Malware infection attacks using viruses, Trojans, or any other malicious software are 
capable of capturing access credentials and pass them to the attacker. Sometimes they are 
able to modify the transaction details the user is passing to the OSP. Considering MCA, in 
the former case, the attack outcome is similar to the user surveillance and notes theft 
attacks discussed in the previous sections. They will fail as the OTP protects users from 
any type of replay attacks. The second case is addressed with more details in section 
5.4.4.8. 
MCA also has the potential to protect end users from technical and non-technical social 
engineering attacks. For example, Ahmed receives a call from Zaid who is pretending to be 
one of the IT technicians that received a report about an issue with Ahmed’s account. Even 
if Zaid were able to deceive Ahmed and able to obtain the login password of the account, 
Ahmed would receive a SMS message whenever Zaid tries to create a beneficiary account 
(i.e., the proposal suggests that a beneficiary account must be created for any account to 
which the user needs to transfer money). If Zaid’s account were among the beneficiary 
accounts that have been approved earlier by Ahmed, a confirmatory SMS message 
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(feedback) would be sent to Ahmed’s mobile phone to confirm the transaction. This would 
help Ahmed to report the incident and trace the issue before the money is transferred away 
(if delayed transfer feature is implemented as discussed in section 5.2.4). 
5.4.4.6 Phishing (1.7.1) and Pharming (1.7.2 / 2.1.2.1) 
Phishing and Pharming are considered as technical social engineering types of attacks. 
Unlike non-technical social engineering, the attacker approaches online banking customers 
by means of electronic mails, websites, or DNS spoofing (see section 2.4.3.6 for more 
details). For example, Ahmed receives an e-mail from Zaid that apparently contains a link 
to XYZ Bank. The URL behind that link would take Ahmed to a fake website that is 
designed to match the look and feel of the original XYZ Bank. If Ahmed logs into that 
website, his access credentials would be stored and captured by Zaid. However, those login 
details would not help Zaid to request a money transfer from Ahmed’s account. He first 
needs to create a new beneficiary account for his own account and approve it before he is 
able to transfer money to it. 
5.4.4.7 Clickjacking (1.5) 
Clickjacking has an effect similar to the effects of malware infection attacks. It installs 
malicious software in the victim’s machine so the attacker can control it remotely. 
As an example in the case of online banking with MCA, if Ahmed clicks on a button on a 
website that results in installing a virus or Trojan in his machine, all access credentials can 
be captured and controlled by Zaid. However, Zaid also needs to control Ahmed’s mobile 
phone in order to accept and manipulate the OTP numbers sent by the OSP whenever there 
is a new request to create beneficiary accounts. 
5.4.4.8 Man-in-the-browser (2.2.3) attacks  
Man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks are similar to the MITM attacks. The difference is that 
with MITB, the controlling element that intercepts the data and alters its details is a 
computer program residing in the victim’s machine. If such a program were able to control 
Ahmed’s web browser, it could create beneficiary accounts or alter existing beneficiary 
account details requested by Ahmed in the background, before these requests are sent to 
the OSP. However, as covered in section 5.4.4.2, Ahmed would know if his request has 
been altered once he receives the SMS message that contains the transaction details and the 
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OTP. If the details do not match, then Ahmed would know that his original request was 
altered. 
5.4.5 Risk Mitigation and Security Controls 
According to [220], four security controls can be adequately used to mitigate the risks 
presented by threats identified in any threat modelling. These security controls are 
corrective control, deterrent control, detective control, and finally, preventive control. 
Figure 5-8 illustrates how these controls are put in place based on the security controls 
structure presented in [220]. 
 
Figure 5-8:  Security controls implemented for the MCA infrastructure (adapted from [220]) 
These security controls are expanded further in Table 5-4, which summarizes the outcome 
of the threat modelling analysis based on the STRIDE process. 
5.4.6 Rate the Threats (based on DREAD) 
The final step in the threat modelling is to prioritize the identified threats based on the risks 
they pose.  The risk rate is calculated based on what is called “DREAD model” suggested 
by Microsoft.  It stands for the following parameters [227]: 
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• Damage potential: the damage effect that can be caused by the vulnerability if 
exploited. 
• Reproducibility: the easiness of reproducing the attack. 
• Exploitability: the easiness of launching the attack. 
• Affected users: the scope of affected users by the attack. 
• Discoverability: the easiness of discovering the vulnerability. 
The scale used to rate the risk of the threats is represented by the values 3 (High), 2 
(Medium), and 1 (Low).  Table 5-2 shows a suggested interpretation of this scale on 
DREAD model. 
 Rating High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) 
D Damage 
potential 
The attacker can subvert 
the security system; get 
full trust authorization; 
run as administrator; 
upload content. 
Leaking sensitive 
information 
Leaking trivial 
information 
R Reproducibility The attack can be 
reproduced every time 
and does not require a 
timing window. 
The attack can be 
reproduced, but only 
with a timing window 
and a particular race 
situation. 
The attack is very 
difficult to reproduce, 
even with knowledge 
of the security hole. 
E Exploitability A novice programmer 
could make the attack 
in a short time. 
A skilled programmer 
could make the attack, 
then repeat the steps. 
The attack requires an 
extremely skilled 
person and in-depth 
knowledge every time 
to exploit. 
A Affected users All users, default 
configuration, key 
customers 
Some users, non-
default configuration 
Very small percentage 
of users, obscure 
feature; affects 
anonymous users 
D Discoverability Published information 
explains the attack. 
The vulnerability is 
found in the most 
commonly used feature 
and is very noticeable. 
The vulnerability is in 
a seldom-used part of 
the product, and only a 
few users should come 
across it. It would take 
some thinking to see 
malicious use. 
The bug is obscure, 
and it is unlikely that 
users will work out 
damage potential. 
Table 5-2: Threat rating table [227] 
To calculate the risk rate (high, medium, or low) for any given threat identified in this 
study, we need to count the risk value of each DREAD attributes based on the risk each 
threat poses to the online banking application with MCA. Then the total value of these 
ratings will indicate the proper risk rating each threat has.  Microsoft suggested that a total 
rating from 12 to 15 should be considered (High risk), a rating from 8 to 11 is considered 
(Medium risk), and finally from 5 to 7 is considered as (Low risk) where 5 is the minimum 
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score any threat could get due to the fact that there are 5 parameters exist for each threat 
(each will get at least a score of 1). 
Table 5-3 represents the outcome of the DREAD and risk rating calculations for each 
attack on the proposed MCA separately. 
Attacks D R E A D Total Risk Rating 
Malware infection (1.1) 2 3 1 1 2 9 Medium 
User surveillance (1.2) 2 1 2 1 1 7 Low 
Notes theft (1.3) 2 3 3 1 1 10 Medium 
Tokens theft (1.3) 1 1 3 1 1 7 Low 
Key loggers (1.4) 2 2 2 1 3 10 Medium 
Clickjacking (1.5) 2 1 1 3 3 10 Medium 
Guessing (1.6) 2 1 1 1 1 6 Low 
Social engineering (non-
technical) (1.7) 2 1 3 1 1 8 Medium 
Phishing (1.7.1) 2 1 2 2 2 9 Medium 
Pharming (1.7.2) 2 2 1 1 2 8 Medium 
Pharming (2.1.2.1) 2 2 1 3 2 10 Medium 
Sniffing (2.1.1) 2 2 1 1 2 8 Medium 
SQL Injection (2.2.1) 2 2 1 3 2 10 Medium 
MITM (2.2.2) 2 2 2 1 1 8 Medium 
MITB (2.2.3) 2 3 1 1 2 9 Medium 
Policy Violation (3.1) 3 2 2 3 2 12 High 
DoS (3.2) 3 1 1 3 1 9 Medium 
Table 5-3:  DREAD-rating table 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter proposed a MCA solution that is capable of better withstanding most known 
attacks that target online banking applications than are other existing authentication 
mechanisms. Based on a theoretical evaluation, while the main aim of this solution is to 
offer better security, it was also important to ensure usability and acceptability. 
To assess the security of the MCA theoretically, this chapter reported on a threat modelling 
evaluation of the MCA based on the STRIDE process and DREAD rating by Microsoft. 
The outcome of the evaluation has proven that no single point of attack in the MCA 
solution poses high risk or allows the attacker to compromise the customers’ online 
banking accounts. The usability and acceptability of MCA, however, can only be assessed 
practically. Chapter 6 covers the design and implementation of the proposed MCA 
mechanism. This allows better evaluation of both usability and acceptability from the 
users' point of view. 
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 STRIDE Classification 
Entry 
Points Impact 
DREAD Risk 
Rating Security Controls 
User surveillance 
(1.2) • Information 
disclosure 
EU 1. Disclose confidential access/financial info. 
2. Transfer money to approved beneficiary 
accounts 
Low • Encrypting EU to OSP data flow 
• Hide beneficiary accounts by allowing 
access to them via a search engine Sniffing (2.1.1) CC Medium 
Man-in-the-
middle (2.2.2) 
and Man-in-the-
browser (2.2.3) 
• Spoofing 
• Tampering 
• Repudiation 
• Info. disclosure 
• Denial of service 
• Elevation of privilege 
CC 
3. Altering transaction details sent by the 
customer 
4. Transfer money to approved beneficiary 
accounts 
5. Modify transaction details originated from 
both sides (EU and OSP) 
Medium 
• OTP must be valid for one use only 
• Every OTP must be associated with 
only one beneficiary account 
Notes theft (1.3) • Info. disclosure 
EU 
6. Disclose confidential access/financial info. Low • Provide alternative secondary channel 
at emergencies Token theft (1.3) • Denial of service 7. Deny customer access to mobile service Medium 
Malware 
infection (1.1) 
and Clickjacking 
(1.5) 
• Tampering 
• Information 
disclosure 
• Repudiation 
EU 
8. Disclose confidential access/financial 
information 
9. Modify transaction details originated from 
both sides (EU and OSP) 
Medium 
• Implement feedback through the 
secondary channel for every 
transaction 
Social 
engineering (non-
technical) (1.7) 
• Spoofing 
• Information 
disclosure 
EU 
10. Disclose confidential financial info. 
including the OTP sent to the customer 
11. Create beneficiary accounts and initiate 
money transfer to them 
Medium 
• Send beneficiary account details along 
with the OTP via the secondary 
channel 
• Delay process of critical transactions 
for few minutes to allow customers to 
report attack attempts on their 
accounts 
Phishing (1.7.1) • Spoofing 
• Info. disclosure 
• Denial of service 
EU 12. Disclose confidential financial info. 
13. Deny customer access to the legitimate 
OSP 
Medium 
Pharming  
(1.7.1 / 2.1.2.1) EU/CC Medium 
Table 5-4:  Threat modelling based on STRIDE process and DREAD rating summary table 
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Chapter 6  
Design and Implementation 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the proposed MCA solution is to provide an online banking solution 
that offers better security for the customers and, at the same time, is usable and acceptable. 
These three variables (security, usability, and acceptability) need to be evaluated against 
the proposed MCA solution in order to check that it meets all proposed requirements. 
Security was evaluated theoretically using threat-modelling evaluation (covered in Chapter 
5). Usability and acceptability, on the other hand, can be assessed only in practical terms 
where users are consulted to give their feedback based on their experience with the 
proposed solution. 
In order to evaluate the usability and the acceptability of MCA, a prototype application that 
simulates an existing online banking system was developed. This prototype application 
was designed to meet the main requirements of the proposed MCA architecture.   
This chapter first presents the main aspects of the MCA in section 6.2. The design 
recommendations of the proposed MCA solution constitute section 6.3. The design options 
and implementation are discussed in sections 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. This chapter 
concludes with a list of security and usability guidelines for real online banking application 
design and implementation. 
6.2 Aspects of the MCA 
The proposed MCA infrastructure, as proposed in Chapter 5 and shown in Figure 5-1, has 
the following aspects: levels, factors, and channels. These are the main aspects of any 
MCA design option. The requirements of any given system will specify how, what, when, 
and where to implement these elements. 
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This section discusses these aspects and shows why they are important characteristics of 
the proposed MCA mechanism. The section also presents a guideline for the 
implementations of these elements. 
6.2.1 Levels 
Levels describe what service level a customer would have in an online banking system. 
This can be achieved by dividing the system core services or functions into different levels. 
Each level can be assigned to a specific group of users (see Figure 6-1). More privileges 
are granted to the users when moving to a higher level. For instance, level 1 in Figure 6-1 
offers limited services (i.e. informational services) to user group 1 while level 2 offers 
more services (i.e. transactional services) to user group 2. 
 
Figure 6-1:  System levelling structure 
Dividing an online banking system into multiple levels is a vital step towards securely and 
effectively managing services and functions for different groups of users using single 
application interface. 
The MCA architecture suggests the following guidelines to implement levelling properly: 
• Service level:  the services offered to the users throughout the system must be 
represented in a cumulative way. A user authenticated to access higher-level services 
should be able to utilize the services offered by that level as well as the services offered 
by all preceding levels (see Figure 6-2). 
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Figure 6-2:  Services level diagram 
• Session management:  despite the fact that sessions must be managed and kept alive for 
the time the users are logged-in, these sessions must be terminated at once if there is a 
suspicion of an attack, such as the account being accessed by different IP addresses at 
the same time. Also, and most importantly, the session used to authenticate users on 
transactional levels must be valid for one-time use only. The user must authenticate 
each transaction individually (see Figure 6-3). 
 
Figure 6-3:  MCA architecture session management 
• Sequential authentication:  a user should not be granted a higher-level access unless he 
or she is already authenticated in all lower-levels. This is important to ensure that all 
channels are used to carry out a transaction. 
• Single user interface:  although the system will be divided into different levels, all 
these levels must be represented by a consistent user interface. This is important so that 
users do not feel they are being diverted to different systems or interfaces while 
moving from one level to another.  
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6.2.2 Factors 
Factors complement the role of levels. They are the secret keys used by users to get access 
to their accounts or to authorize critical actions within the system. Sometimes the system 
administrator can assign different levels to one or more groups of users where these users 
can use different access keys (the factors) to access each level individually (see Figure 
6-4). This is known as multi-level authentication [26] and is covered with more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 
Figure 6-4:  The implementation of factors into multi-level system 
The MCA architecture suggests the following guidelines concerning factor 
implementation: 
• Multi-factor:  each user must use multiple factors in order to get access to services 
provided by different levels throughout the system. It is recommended that basic 
informational services are provided at the base level where users can access them using 
traditional authentication factors such as a username and password. This authentication 
mechanism can also be used in higher transactional levels but not as a primary 
mechanism. It can be used, rather, as a complementary authentication mechanism along 
with another authentication mechanism that is delivered over a different independent 
channel. 
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• One-time factors:  the factors used to authenticate users to the transactional level of 
their account must be single-use, only valid for one use, linked, linked to one 
transaction only, and time-limited, valid for a specific period. These transactional-level 
factors must be delivered to the users via a different channel other than the primary 
Web channel used to authenticate these users at the Information Level of their 
accounts. 
6.2.3 Channels 
Channels are a vital component of MCA. While factors ensure proper management of user 
privileges, channels assert that these factors are exchanged between the system and the 
users in a proper and un-compromisable way. The proposed MCA architecture suggests the 
following guidelines with respect to channel implementation: 
• Multi-channel:  each level of the system must be authenticated using a different factor, 
as stated previously, and by means of different channels where possible. The minimum 
requirement is that at least two channels be used before the user is able to access any 
upper level transactions within the system. 
• Independence:  the channels must be independent. That is, factors and information 
exchanged via different channels must not be delivered using the same delivery path or 
medium. For example, if the factor used to authenticate users to the first level was 
exchanged between the system and the users through the Web channel, then the factor 
used to authenticate the users for the second level must not be delivered using the Web 
channel. The second factor must be delivered over a different independent channel 
such as mobile network. 
The proposed MCA solution suggests that SMS messages are used as a communication 
medium to exchange the secondary channel factors with the user. However, other 
communication media can be used as long as they are independent of the primary channel 
used to authenticate users to their accounts. 
To summarize, Figure 6-5 encompasses all three aspects of MCA in one architecture 
diagram. 
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Figure 6-5:  MCA architecture diagram 
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6.3 Design Recommendations 
6.3.1 User Defined versus System Generated Passwords 
The passwords used to authenticate users to the base/primary level should be user-defined 
passwords. Simple password policies that ensure a balance of security and usability should 
be enforced rather than complex policies. This is important to minimize the user passwords 
being written down on notes or papers. These passwords, on their own, do not pose high 
risk since they alone cannot grant an attacker access to the transactional level of the user 
account. The users will need to use other authentication factors to access the transactional 
levels as pointed out in section 6.2.2. 
6.3.2 Language Support 
Language differences are an important aspect of cultural background. It is a neglected 
security feature in almost all online applications that, if utilized, can improve security. The 
alphabet used to form a password can be treated as a knowledge-based authentication 
factor. In fact, it is the hardest type of knowledge-based authentication since it requires 
compatible peripheral devices beside knowledge to extract and understand. For instance, a 
user from Oman who speaks Arabic can choose to receive the OTP in Arabic alphabets. 
This will limit the chances of a foreign attacker who does not understand or read Arabic 
alphabets to extract the OTP from the SMS message if he or she were able to physically 
compromise the user’s mobile phone or capture the message on the fly. Even in the case 
where the attacker uses a translator to translate the text message to English or a language 
he or she understands, an input device (e.g. keyboard) has to be available so the attacker 
would be able to send the OTP in the correct language alphabet to the bank system. It 
would be even harder for the attacker to extract the OTP if an automated call was initiated 
from the bank servers to dictate the OTP to the user rather than sending the OTP in an 
SMS message. 
The language support can also be used for the conventional username and password. The 
user should be allowed to enter the password in his or her language or using in different 
language alphabets. The system should implement a feature that would allow the 
application to detect the language used in the password and compare it with the one stored 
in the user account record in the database. This would make it harder for the attacker to 
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recognize what languages the user has used since there is no form field submitted along 
with the password that will tell the attacker which language the user has used in the 
password. 
6.3.3 Encryption / Securing Key Delivery 
The factors travelling between users and the system should be encrypted using the latest, 
up-to-date, cryptography formulas. This is vital to ensure that data are delivered securely 
without interference or interception. Although not all channels are considered secure, such 
as SMS messages, they significantly improve the overall security of the system when used 
as an auxiliary delivery channel alongside the Web channel. 
6.4 MCA - Design Options 
MCA is a flexible authentication mechanism that caters to different organizations’ and 
clients’ needs. This section will cover the design options of MCA based on the three 
aspects (levels, factors, and channels) discussed in the previous section. The details of each 
of these designs, the advantages and disadvantages, and the criteria for selecting the best 
design for online banking are presented next. 
6.4.1 Design option 1 – Transaction-based Authentication 
This design suggests that the customer must always be authenticated using the MCA 
mechanism to access each successive level of the system. For instance, a user is required to 
enter the username and password to access his or her account. If both username and 
password matches the user record in the database, the system would prepare an OTP and 
deliver it to the user via a secondary channel such as a mobile network. Once the user 
successfully verifies the transaction by entering the OTP via the bank server, the system 
would then open a new session for him or her to access the first level services. This session 
would be responsible to keep the user authenticated for the first level of services as long as 
the user does not logout or keep the application idle for a specific length of time. These 
level services are only informational where the customer has only read-access to the 
records stored under his or her account. 
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For transactional level services, the user must authenticate each transaction individually. A 
new session would be created for each transaction after the application verifies the OTP 
submitted by the user. This session would be live until the transaction is carried out and 
then it would be terminated and would no longer be valid for another transaction. Here the 
user does not have to logout to terminate the session; the session is valid only for one 
transaction. For example, if the user would like to transfer an amount of money to another 
account, the bank will send a new OTP to the user’s mobile number. Once he or she 
verifies this OTP, the transaction will be carried out and no further transactions can be 
carried out without a new OTP (see Figure 6-6). 
 
Figure 6-6:  Design option 1 – Transaction-based authentication process 
Although this design offers the highest possible MCA security, it uses the secondary 
channel authentication mechanism exhaustively. This will increase the running cost of the 
MCA mechanism for the user since each transaction must be validated by an OTP that is 
delivered to the customer via an independent channel. It will also degrade the overall 
usability and accessibility of the system. The users are required to access the other channel 
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each time they want to access their accounts. If the other channel is unavailable, it will 
cause disruption and latency in accessing online services. 
6.4.2 Design option 2 – Beneficiary-based Authentication 
 
Figure 6-7:  Design option 2 - Beneficiary-based authentication process 
This granularity option aims at minimizing the use of the secondary channel while 
maintaining security. It suggests that customers should have access to the informational 
level using only the conventional one factor authentication mechanism such as username 
and password. The same authentication mechanism should also be used to authorize 
transactions at higher levels. However, these transactions are only allowed for the 
beneficiary accounts pre-approved. These beneficiary accounts can be manipulated at the 
informational level but they are only approved by OTPs that are delivered through the 
secondary channels. Thus, secondary channels are used only to approve beneficiary 
 124 
 
accounts once and customers are not required to utilize the secondary channel every time 
they want to authorize a transaction. 
This design offers better usability and is more cost effective than design option 1. Security 
is maintained since the attacker will not be able to create beneficiary accounts without 
compromising the secondary channel. For transactions to be carried out, the attacker also 
needs to compromise the conventional access credentials since they are requested by the 
system as depicted in Figure 6-7.   
6.5 MCA Implementation – XYZ Bank 
The implementation of the MCA proposal is an important part of this study. It was stated 
that the aim of this research is to “design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple 
channels to resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used mechanisms. 
Furthermore, such a mechanism will also be usable and acceptable to users”. One can 
only test the usability and acceptability by involving end users in the evaluation process. 
Such evaluation goes beyond the technical evaluation of utility and can provide 
accessibility in-context [228]. 
To facilitate the evaluation, a prototype online banking web-application was implemented. 
The application features an MCA mechanism that complies with design option 2 described 
in section 6.4.2 since this design offers a moderate implementation of authentication via 
SMS. Figure 6-8 shows a storyboard for different pages designed to achieve proper 
implementation of the proposed MCA solution.  
The storyboard illustrates how the application pages are connected to each other. It also 
reflects the sequence in which these pages are to be accessed. For instance, the user cannot 
access page 1.1.4 (secondary channel selection) before first completing page 1.1.3 (mobile 
verification). A money transfer request (page 1.2.2.1) is a sub-page of the beneficiary 
accounts page (page 1.2.2), and therefore, the user will not be able to access this page 
unless the request to access it comes from the beneficiary accounts page. The same 
sequence is repeated for the rest of all other pages displayed in Figure 6-8. 
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Figure 6-8:  XYZ Bank prototype application storyboard 
6.5.1 Application Overview 
The prototype application has been put into five separate tiers as depicted in Figure 6-9:  
PHP files tier, Presentation logic tier, Business logic tier, Configuration tier, and the Data 
stores tier.   
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Figure 6-9:  The prototype application architecture 
Each of these five tiers plays an important role in the application architecture. Their 
functions are described in the following bullets: 
• PHP files tier:  this tier contains all web-application files that are accessible directly by 
the users. They produce HTML documents that are formatted in a way that users can 
read and understand. 
• Presentation logic tier:  this tier is responsible for styling PHP files. They are usually 
made of templates that work as base format that will later shape the front-end style of 
the PHP files. The application uses templates to present the interface layout. These 
templates share almost the same layout with only differences in the codes and the links 
they display to the users. Figure 6-10 illustrates the common layout for all templates 
used in the MCA prototype application.   
 
Figure 6-10:  Common application templates layout 
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There are three main templates used in the application: 
o Guest template: is a template responsible for pages that the users visit without 
the need to login. These pages include Home page, Research page, Contact 
researcher, Tasks page, Information sheet page, and Registration page. 
o Signed-in template: is a template that presents all private pages that the user can 
access after he or she is signed in. These pages are restricted from other users 
who do not have accounts or records in the database. 
o Pop-up template: this template is responsible for presenting the layout of the 
pop-up windows that appear throughout the application.   
• Business logic tier:  this is the tier where data are manipulated and processed. It acts as 
the brain of the application, which decides what output should be produced to the users. 
The outcomes of this tier move to the presentation tier for styling and formatting before 
they are finally displayed to the users through the PHP files. 
• Configuration tier:  is the tier that holds the configuration files. These files hold the 
key setting values that help the application to decide which language to use, which 
cookies are responsible for which elements, and which database to connect to and use. 
Configuration files also hold sensitive information such as database access credentials. 
For this reason, these files are the most critical files that should be kept secured from 
unauthorized access.  
• Data stores:  these are represented by the database, cookies, and language files. All 
these data stores are connected so that none of them can work independently. For 
instance, the language files contain Arabic and English phrases that are used 
throughout all templates and PHP pages. The cookies stored in the users’ machines will 
have a value that will specify which language the user prefers to use. If the user has 
selected Arabic, then the cookie will store the value that represents the Arabic language 
in his machine. The Arabic language file will then be used to represent data in the 
templates and PHP files. Finally, the data sent back from the users will be stored in the 
database in the same language currently used (Arabic language in this case). 
As shown in Figure 6-9, all five tiers are separated from each other. This is important to 
improve performance, to update easily and efficiently and to maintain the core functions 
without the need to compromise the other tiers [229]. 
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Figure 6-11:  MCA application - Home page (login) - Implementation 
The main page of the application presented as Figure 6-11 gives a brief illustration of how 
these five tiers communicate with each other to present the pages to the users. This 
document uses the Guest template (Presentation logic tier) to present the header and 
footer. The login form is directly connected to the database (Data stores tier) for a quick 
check if the user has entered a valid username and password or not. The configuration file 
is the intermediary connector that makes such communication possible (Configuration 
tier). The cookies’ default language value is English; therefore, the English language file 
will be used to display the contents of the page (Data stores tier again). Finally, the page is 
accessed directly by the user through the file index.php (PHP files tier) which is processed 
in the web-server and converted to an HTML document as seen in Figure 6-11. 
6.6 Implementation Guidelines 
For any online banking system to implement MCA, there are several guidelines that have 
to be taken into consideration. Some of these guidelines were already implemented in the 
prototype application and some others were not implemented (marked with [*]) as part of 
this research study. They are categorized into security and usability guidelines below. 
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6.6.1 Security guidelines: 
• [*] Users should not be allowed to enrol into the system online. There must be a way to 
verify that the user registered to use the online service is legitimate and that he or she is 
the real owner of the mobile number provided. 
• User correspondence details (e.g. mobile number, alternative mobile number) must not 
be displayed in the user online account and must be kept hidden from online access at 
all levels. Although there are on going studies proposing encrypted version of SMS 
messages such as the one proposed in [230], current SMS protocol and the encryption 
formula are publicly available for software developers. Therefore, if an attacker were 
able to capture the account holder’s mobile numbers, he or she would be able to send 
out SMS messages to the OSP on behalf of the legitimate customer. 
• [*] The primary communication channel (web channel) between the user and the bank 
web-server must be encrypted and secured. This can be achieved by using the HTTPS 
protocol (based on the design recommendations covered by section 6.3.3). 
• [*] Transaction processing delays should be implemented, especially for transactions 
that involve large amounts of money. This will give the customer time to report the 
incident in case of a social engineering attack that has successfully deceived the 
customer to give out the informational level factors as well as the OTP to activate a 
beneficiary account. A scenario-based evaluation of this feature was covered in 
Chapter 5. 
• [*] A further process-based authentication class can be implemented after the customer 
receives the OTP. For example, a partial disclosure technique can be used to extract a 3 
or 4 digits that can be used to confirm a transaction from 6 or more digits sent to the 
user’s mobile as OTP. The user remembers a private number which represents the 
places of these digits in the OTP (e.g. 356 represents the 3rd, 5th and 6th digits of a given 
OTP).  Such mechanism is applied by Swivel Authentication Solution [231]. 
• [*] The bank should enforce access policies that restrict customers from using the same 
smart phone to access the bank online application while receiving OTPs via SMS 
messages.  The bank can also impose this policy by restricting mobile phone browsers 
from accessing their online applications. This will ensure that there is no single point of 
attack that will help an attacker to compromise the user’s account fully. Rather, for any 
attack to succeed, different independent authentication channels have to be 
compromised. More details of smart-phones’ security were covered in section 0 of 
Chapter 4.  
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• Login authentication and transaction authorization must not share the same channel. If 
conventional authentication mechanisms, such as username and password, are used to 
authenticate users to login, then transactional services must be authorized using an 
independent secondary channel such as a mobile network (see section 6.2.3). 
• Users must be allowed limited retries to authorize critical transactions before the 
account is deactivated. This will secure the account from brute-force attacks that could 
try to figure out the OTPs used to authorize transactions.  
• Confirmatory feedback via SMS messages is vital when transactions are carried out. It 
is also important to notify the account holder by SMS message when the account has 
been deactivated for any reason (the importance of feedback is further covered by 
section 5.2.4). 
• [*] Users should be given the option to lock their accounts anytime using the mobile 
network channel. If the user receives an SMS message, for example, requesting to 
verify a given OTP without being logged into his account, this means that an attacker 
was able to compromise the account and is trying to authorize a critical transaction. At 
this time, the user should be able to lock down the account by sending an SMS 
message command followed by the same OTP received or by sending the OTP in 
reverse order to the bank server from his or her mobile device. This will deny the 
attacker any further actions in the account and will allow the user to have enough time 
to report this incident to the bank. The SMS message requesting to lock the account 
down has to include the OTP sent to the user (whether in reverse order or following a 
command) to ensure that this message has been received from the legitimate account 
holder after he or she has received the SMS message that has the OTP. 
• [*] Users should be allowed to unlock their accounts manually only (by approaching 
the bank in person or by any other legitimate means). 
6.6.2 Usability guidelines: 
• Users should be allowed to choose whether to utilize MCA at the beneficiary account-
creation level or at the authorizing payment transactions level. Some users are more 
interested in authenticating each and every critical transaction while others prefer to 
minimize the number of times they use their mobiles to authenticate transactions. MCA 
mechanism can also be offered at login level as suggested in design option 1 if 
necessary (see section 6.4.1). 
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• Users should be allowed to request the bank server to resend the OTP by SMS 
messages in case of delays or mobile network lagging. However, each SMS message 
must have a unique code that would differentiate it from other SMS messages. This is 
important to avoid confusion about which OTP to use if more than one message has 
arrived. 
6.7 Summary 
The developed prototype web-application was designed to comply with the guidelines and 
MCA mechanism design option presented in this study. The web application was designed 
to support testing the usability and user acceptability of the proposed MCA solution. After 
the application was designed, a set of 5 tasks was prepared for the users to do. All users’ 
actions were logged into the database to examine the time each user took to fulfil each task 
alone. The evaluation of the data gathered from users who tested the application is covered 
thoroughly in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7  
Evaluation 
Thesis Statement 
It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple channels to 
resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used mechanisms. Furthermore, 
such a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to users in Oman. 
This chapter presents an overview research methodology used to test this hypothesis. The 
results show that online banking is indeed acceptable to Omani users and that MCA is, in 
particular, usable and acceptable to users in Oman. The first part of the thesis statement 
was addressed thoroughly in Chapter 5 and this chapter will only address the usability and 
acceptability aspects.  
The study reported here was carried out to assess users’ acceptance of online banking in 
Oman in general as well as usability and acceptability of the multi-channel authentication 
(MCA) mechanism to Omani users. Overall acceptance of online banking is an important 
step prior to studying the usability and acceptability of any new technology under online 
banking applications (including MCA). This is vital to ensure the clarity of feedback 
recorded from users of MCA as some users might not accept MCA because they originally 
have negative perceptions of online banking as a whole. 
The hypotheses are discussed in different sections of this chapter. In section 7.5.1, the 
demographic characteristics and their effects on the attitudes of customers to accept and 
adopt online banking were tested (Hypotheses H1a to H1e, see Table 7-1). In section 7.5.3, 
internal and external variables of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) were 
hypothesized to test the proposed extended TAM for online banking technology 
(Hypotheses H1f to H1h in Table 7-1). Finally, the main hypotheses on usability (section 
7.6.1) and acceptability (section 7.6.2) of multi-channel authentication were developed 
(Hypotheses H2a to H2d in Table 7-1); they are reviewed towards the end of this chapter. A 
total of 12 hypotheses are listed in Table 7-1. 
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The usability and acceptability hypothesis has been split up into the following: 
Hypotheses	   Source	   Mechanism	  
Online	  banking	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H1a:	   Gender significantly influences customers’ usage 
of online banking	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1b:	   Marital status significantly influences customers’ 
usage of online banking	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1c:	   Education level significantly influences 
customers’ usage of online banking	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1d:	   Age significantly influences customers’ usage of 
online banking	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1e:	   Income significantly influences customers’ usage 
of online banking	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1f:	   Trust & relationship has a positive effect on 
Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1g:	   Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived 
Ease of Use (PEU)	   [232] Pre-questionnaire H1h:	   Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease 
of Use (PEU)	   [232] Pre-questionnaire 
Multi-­‐channel	  Authentication	  is	  usable	  and	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H2a:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  effective	   [48, 233] Post-questionnaire, Logs H2b:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  efficient	   [48, 233] Logs H2c:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  satisfactory	   [48, 233] Post-questionnaire H2d:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	   [232] Post-questionnaire 
*	  OB:	  online	  banking	   	   	  
Table 7-1:  The list of hypotheses developed in this study 
This chapter is divided into six sections: the first section 7.1 covers the survey design and 
techniques used to collect data from participants. Section 7.2 presents the experiment trials 
and the difficulties encountered during the data-gathering phase. Section 7.3 outlines the 
demographic profile of all participants and discusses the dropout rates from the 
experiment. Section 7.4 presents a series of preliminary tests that are essential for further 
analysis testing of the hypotheses. Next, section 7.5 discusses the factors affecting 
adoption of online banking in Oman. The first part of this section assesses the demographic 
variables hypotheses for possible influence on the adoption of online banking in Oman. 
The second part hypothesizes some external TAM variables found in the literature to affect 
users’ adoption of online banking. It then presents the results of the hypotheses testing; the 
resulting extended TAM is presented in Figure 7-37. Section 7.6 covers the usability and 
acceptability of the multi-channel authentication mechanism and addresses the outcome of 
the last two hypotheses being tested in this chapter. 
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7.1 Survey Design 
A survey is one of the most popular methods used in social science to capture users’ 
reactions and performance with a system or prototype [234, 235].  Questionnaire and 
observation are two main survey techniques used for data gathering. Sharp defines 
questionnaires as “a series of questions designed to be answered asynchronously”; they can 
be conducted either on paper or in online format (i.e., via e-mails or web) [235].   
According to him, observations may be direct or indirect. Direct observation involves live 
monitoring of things as they happen, while indirect observation involves recording the 
user’s activities to be investigated at a later time.  In this research, web-based online 
questionnaires and indirect observations were used together to record data and collect 
feedback from users. The following sections will outline the design of both techniques. 
7.1.1 Online Questionnaire Design 
Online questionnaires are becoming an increasingly common research tool for a variety of 
research fields [235, 236].  They offer distinctive advantages over traditional paper 
questionnaires such as the ability to reach a wider sample quickly and easily. They are 
interactive and cost effective (e.g., printing, travelling, data entry), and they generate a fast 
response, data validation (i.e., users input such as e-mail address, mobile number, and age 
can be validated and checked whether or not the user has entered them correctly), rule 
enforcement (i.e., selecting only one radio option), and data entry direct from users to the 
database [235, 237].  Other advantages of web-based questionnaires, compared to paper 
and e-mail-based questionnaires include live and centralized management of the questions 
in case further modifications are needed to the questionnaire items. 
Most of the scales used in the online questionnaire adopted in this study were derived from 
existing scales in the literature and adapted to fit this study’s context. For example, the 
study [232] used a list of online banking services to determine which of the services the 
users used. This list was compared with the online banking services offered by banks 
operating in Oman. Only those services that matched were presented in the questionnaire. 
These services were presented in two columns, each of which used a 5-option Likert scale. 
Each column represented a different online banking method: the first column represented 
conventional online banking systems and the second one represented the online banking 
system with multi-channel authentication. Users selected how likely they were to use each 
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of the listed services based on the types of online banking used. The scale is presented in 
Appendix B. 
To test the usability of the proposed multi-channel authentication mechanism and the 
functionality of the alternative channel mechanism, questions from the survey presented by 
[48] were used. These questions were originally used to study the usability of fourth-factor 
authentication (voucher system). The same technique is also included in the prototype 
application as an emergency authentication factor. 
Finally, to identify the factors affecting the adoption of online banking in Oman, five 
survey questions from [232] were used.  These assessed ease of access, trust and 
relationship, security, convenience, and ease of use. These factors have been previously 
tested in Oman by [5] and [4].  The former found that security and data confidentiality 
issues have been major barriers in adopting online banking in Oman.  It also found that the 
banking sectors in Oman were reluctant to use e-commerce applications due to the security 
weaknesses these applications have. The latter study found that usefulness and ease of use 
factors were among the main drivers of online banking adoption in Oman.  It also found 
that trust and ease of access were the major inhibitors. This study sought to confirm both 
results and to determine whether customers in Oman have changed their opinions about 
adopting online banking in the intervening 4 to 6 years. 
The questionnaire was posed in two languages: English and Arabic. This was necessary 
because all users are non-native English users, and this could make some questions 
presented in the questionnaire unclear or misinterpreted if posed only in English, as argued 
by [238]. 
7.1.2 Indirect Observation 
Indirect observation is another important technique commonly used to capture user activity 
and interaction with a prototype system. In this study, it was not feasible to monitor the 
users directly in person or indirectly by recording their interaction with the system on 
surveillance cameras. Most of the participants accessed the application and tested it from 
different geographical places during the same period in Oman. Thus, the only realistic 
observation was to automate the process and log all user actions in the database. This 
logging script ran every time the user loaded a web page. It recorded the user’s identity, the 
page’s filename, the time the user visited the page (i.e., in Unix system-based time which 
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represents the number of seconds from midnight January 1, 1970), query strings, and form 
variables. Query strings and form variables (i.e., also known as GET and POST methods 
respectively) provided important details, along with the page’s filename, to better identify 
the task the user engaged in at a given time (more details in section 7.4.1.2). 
7.2 Experiment Trials 
The experiment underwent various trials and improvements between 2008 and 2010. The 
first pilot study did not reveal any issues. However, after moving to the trial phase, the 
outcome revealed usability issues that were corrected for the second trial of the prototype 
application. The results of the first trial were published in 2010 [239]. 
The following sections will report on all issues encountered in the first trial and the issues 
addressed in the second trial to overcome the emergent usability and ease of access issues. 
7.2.1 First Experiment Trial  
The application was hosted on a local web-server connected to the Sultan Qaboos 
University’s network in Oman. The server was a personal computer with limited resources 
such as low memory and slow speed. A mobile modem was connected to this server to 
send and receive SMS messages from/to the users. SMS gateway software was installed to 
serve as an intermediate gateway between the application database and the mobile modem 
(see Figure 7-1). 
 
Figure 7-1:  First trial, prototype, application structure 
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The first version of the application included many features, such as a real SMS gateway 
and support for the security skin (covered in section 4.1.3.3) allowing the users to upload a 
profile image. The initial pilot study of the first experiment trial did not reveal any 
usability issues. After the trial began on the 25th of August 2008 and web users started 
using the application, the researcher started receiving negative feedback from some 
participants complaining about various aspects, summarized in the following points: 
• SMS messages: some users did not receive the SMS messages from the system in good 
time. Such SMS messages should normally arrive in real time from the SMS gateway 
installed on the web server hosting the application. Other users complained that they 
had received more than one message with different one-time pin (OTP) numbers. Still 
others received advertisement messages related to the SMS gateway installed on the 
server instead of the message containing the OTP. 
• Unclear instructions: many users were lost in some of the tasks and did not know how 
to complete them. This issue was also reported by similar study carried out in the UK 
[91]. The participants did not read or follow the instructions, which were printed in a 
sheet given to each of them, for testing a 2-factor authentication method. They had 
difficulties completing the tasks. 
• Compatibility: some reported that some features were not compatible with their 
systems (e.g., the Java script live countdown timer on the activate_beneficiary.php 
page did not work). 
After investigating these complaints, the researcher was able to pinpoint different issues 
that needed to be corrected.  
The delay that some users experienced in receiving SMS messages was related to the fact 
that the personal mobile modem had a limited capacity to send more than one SMS 
message at a time.  Thus, if many users were connected to the server and were requesting 
the application to send SMS messages all at once, the modem would queue the messages 
and send them one by one until all messages were sent. This practice also sometimes led to 
messages being sent repeatedly. The users tended to request new messages to be sent to 
their mobile phones if the first SMS did not arrive immediately. Hence, a number of SMS 
messages resulted, each with a different OTP. 
Some users received advertisement SMS messages rather than the messages with OTP. 
This was because the SMS gateway installed in the web server was commercial software 
called “Ozeki NG SMS Gateway” and was acquired on a trial basis due to the high cost of 
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the full license version. Hence, the software dropped every 10th to 20th SMS message sent 
from the application and replaced it with an advertisement SMS message for Ozeki NG 
Informatics Ltd. 
Some instruction clarity issues also needed to be addressed. In this first trial, users were 
instructed to download a guide, which had all the instructions on how to complete all 
required tasks. The guide was in PDF format. However, most participants ignored this 
guide and started using the application directly to do the tasks. Many of these users had 
problems completing the tasks due to usability issues. 
Most of the respondents experienced difficulties understanding task 7, which was the task 
requesting them to utilize the fourth authentication factor as an alternative channel as if the 
primary channel were temporary unavailable. Others suggested making the application 
friendlier and presenting it in two languages (English and Arabic). 
The following subsections will discuss the outcomes of the first trial analysis and cover 
other difficulties the users encountered and reported. 
7.2.1.1 Sample profile and results 
 
Figure 7-2:  Dropouts of participants in the first trial 
A total of 77 people participated in the study. However, only 43 completed the 
questionnaire. Figure 7-2 shows the major dropouts of participants in tasks 4 and 7. Users 
completed mobile activation to have their bank account activated in Task 4. Participants 
who dropped out at this point confirmed that they thought it was the end of the testing 
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process and they did not realize that they needed to complete further tasks, which they did 
not notice in the task guide. 
Task 7, on the other hand, asked the users to test the fourth authentication factor by 
pretending that their primary authentication device was not available. The fact that the 
users were testing this feature for the first time and that most of them had difficulties 
understanding the requirements could be the reasons for so many dropouts at this stage. 
 
Figure 7-3:  First trial sample profile 
Unfortunately, it was difficult to determine the demographic background (education level, 
age group, gender, etc…) of those who dropped out because the questionnaire was posed at 
the end of the application. Users in the first trial were not requested to complete the 
questionnaire before they completed all required tasks, and therefore, valuable details on 
those who dropped out in the middle were missed. Figure 7-3 presents the first trial’s 
statistical information. 
Internet Banking (IB) Experience Gender 
Age Group 
Age Group (in years) 
N
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r 
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7.2.2 Pilot Test of the Second Experiment Trial 
A pilot test is a small trial of the main study and aims at ensuring that the proposed 
research methods are viable [235].  Performing a pilot test is especially important when 
data are collected through self-administered questionnaires where the investigator is not 
available to assist participants when they need help [240]. 
The pilot test was first tested by a research fellow from the University of Glasgow who 
provided valuable comments on the questionnaire and the wording used throughout the 
application. Another research colleague commented on questions in the questionnaire and 
advised on breaking down some general questions into sub-questions to enhance clarity. A 
few other pilot tests were carried out by academics in Sultan Qaboos University and by 
some industry personnel in Oman and revealed some minor cosmetic issues that were 
resolved before the final trial. Finally, some specialists from the banking sector in Oman 
helped in reviewing the Arabic terms used in the questionnaire and suggested some more 
appropriate alternatives commonly used by the banking sector. 
7.2.3 Usability Issues Addressed in the Second Trial 
The second trial commenced on the 21st of February 2010. Major changes were 
implemented in this version. First, the “upload profile image” feature was no longer 
available as the results showed that only 2 to 3 participants uploaded images to their 
profiles in the first trial. Some might well have withdrawn from the application at this stage 
because they could not find images to upload on their machines. 
Secondly, the survey was split into two questionnaires: pre and post questionnaire. The 
split process was based on questionnaire focus. Those items not directly related to the 
application and multi-channel authentication were posed in the pre-questionnaire (e.g., user 
demographic details, factors influencing the adoption of online banking, etc…). The user 
was requested to complete the pre-questionnaire directly after the registration process. This 
ensured that there was a record of those users who dropped out without completing all 
tasks. The post-questionnaire was administered towards the end of the trial after the user 
had completed all required tasks. 
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Figure 7-4:  On screen mobile simulation for SMS reading and sending 
Thirdly, it was decided to incorporate a mobile simulator that appeared on the screen to 
substitute for the user mobile phone (see Figure 7-4). This was another vital improvement 
so the application could be independent of any physical modem or SMS gateway (which 
were limited by capacity and trial-based license in the first trial). Furthermore, this change 
allowed the researcher to host the application on a much more efficient, more reliable, and 
faster web-server hosted in the USA since there was no need for an SMS modem to be 
physically connected to the web-server, as in the first trial (see Figure 7-5). This change 
also allowed the participants who were concerned about divulging their mobile number to 
register fake mobile numbers since no real SMS messages were involved. Participants who 
had privacy concerns on the first trial were now free to use a spurious mobile number to 
test the application. 
 
Figure 7-5:  Second trial prototype application structure 
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Another major change was to improve the “ease of use” and to integrate the instructions 
and task guide into the application. The number of tasks was reduced to 5 and the interface 
was redesigned so each web page gave an indication of the user’s progress at any single 
point (i.e., a progress indicator displayed the user’s progress in percentage and displayed 
the tasks that were not yet completed). Moreover, along with on-screen systematic 
instructions, flash tutorials with recorded screen and mouse movements were designed to 
help the user to understand how to complete the required tasks. These instructions were 
available on every web page of the application. In addition to these instructional details, 
every link that the user was required to click as the next step in the process was designed to 
blink so that the user could find his or her way to complete all tasks without any issues. 
Finally, some bugs reported in the first trial were fixed in the second trial and the overall 
design was improved to serve users better without any browser compatibility issues. The 
core templates were modified and restructured so the prototype application could serve 
users in both languages: English and Arabic. The user could switch between languages 
anytime along the way without losing any saved data. The session remained live even after 
the language had been switched. All instructions, tutorials, feedback, and phrases were 
translated into Arabic accordingly. The results of the second trial are discussed in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
7.2.4 Application Requirements/Tasks (Second Trial) 
There were five different requirements or tasks set up for users to test this application, 
starting with registration and finishing with money transfer. The users were asked to follow 
a list of tasks that provided information on all the requirements the user had to meet in 
order to test all the features of the prototype application. These tasks are described in the 
following subsections. 
7.2.4.1 Task 1:  Registration 
The registration process was the first requirement. It served as the enrolment process to the 
bank system. However, in real online banking systems, this element would not exist and 
the only way for the user to enrol would be to approach the bank in person and apply for an 
online banking account. This is important because there must be a way to check that the 
people applying for this service are who they claim they are. 
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Figure 7-6: Task 1 - Storyboard 
The prototype registration process had three stages: initial registration and mobile number 
registration, pre-questionnaire, and primary mobile number activation (see Figure 7-6).   
 
Figure 7-7: Registration - stage 1 - WebMD activity diagram 
In the first stage, the user was asked to open an account by choosing a username, a 
password, and an e-mail address. The application checked username availability. If no 
matches were found, the new username was registered and a new account for the user was 
created in the database (see Figure 7-7).  
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Figure 7-8: Registration page – stage 1 - Implementation 
Figure 7-8 presents the implementation design of the registration process (stage 1). This 
page included an AJAX feature that allowed the user to check the availability of the new 
username without the need to reload the page. It also featured a password strength bar, 
which reflected how strong the chosen password was. This feature utilized a formula that 
calculated the strength of a string based on factors like length, case, and special characters. 
It categorized the passwords into six categories: very weak, weak, better, medium, strong, 
and strongest. 
Once this first stage was completed, a new account was created for the user and the 
application advised him or her to complete a pre-questionnaire.  After the user completed 
the pre-questionnaire, the application initiated the 2nd stage of registration. At this stage, 
the user was asked to enter his or her name, mobile number, and an alternative mobile 
number. The user’s mobile number would be used to interact with the user directly (i.e., 
passing the OTP to the user and receiving confirmation from him or her when the mobile 
network channel is selected for verifications). The alternative mobile number, on the other 
hand, would be used solely for situations where the primary mobile number is lost or 
unavailable; hence, it exemplifies the use of 4th factor authentication [48] as an emergency 
authentication mechanism as discussed later in this chapter. 
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Figure 7-9: Registration task - stage 3 - implementation 
The final stage of the registration task activates the primary mobile number. The user was 
redirected to the mobile activation page (see Figure 7-9). The application requested the 
user to open a mobile phone simulator to read the SMS message sent from the bank. This 
mobile simulator was used in the application to avoid any network interruptions while 
users are testing the prototype application. This implementation prevented SMS message 
delivery failure whether the user had submitted valid mobile numbers or not. In addition, 
the SMS gateway software license and the hardware needed to implement live SMS 
messages for all users without restrictions were expensive and exceeded this researcher’s 
allocated budget.  
For these reasons, the users were instructed to click on a mobile icon that appeared on the 
screen. This mobile icon opened an on-screen mobile phone that simulated a mobile phone 
the user could have in real life. Once the user clicked on the icon, a mobile phone appeared 
on the screen with a welcome message informing the user that he or she had received a 
SMS message from XYZ Bank. The user was to click on the “Read” button to read the 
message. The SMS message then appeared from the screen, representing the exact message 
that would be delivered to the user’s mobile phone number if the SMS gateway were 
enabled by the system (see Figure 7-9). The user had to read the message and extract the 
OTP included somewhere within the message. This OTP was then to be used in the 
available text-box on the previous screen to activate the mobile number. 
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This process was important to teach the participant how the application and mobile phone 
interacted with each other. This 3rd stage does not exist in the real online banking 
applications as the customer’s mobile numbers can be verified at enrolment. 
 
Figure 7-10: Mobile simulator - (a) Welcome message, (b) SMS message 
Along with the OTP that sent to the user, the SMS message also contained a request code 
(as can be seen in Figure 7-10). This request code acted as a unique code to differentiate 
between different OTPs if the user requested more than one SMS message to be sent out. 
In real implementations, and for other authentication purposes where SMS messages were 
used to complement other authentication mechanisms, mobile networks sometimes 
encounter issues such as lagging. If this happened, and the user did not receive the SMS 
message within a specific time (60 seconds in the case of the prototype application), the 
system would allow him or her to request another SMS message with a new OTP and 
different request code. If the user received both SMS messages at the same time, only the 
SMS message with the request code that matched the one displayed on the screen would be 
used to validate the request. The same applied to all other SMS correspondences between 
the application and the user. 
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7.2.4.2 Task 2:  Verification channel selection 
After the user’s mobile number had been successfully verified, the application asked the 
user to select the more convenient verification channel to use (see Figure 7-11). This 
verification channel defined how the user would verify the OTP received from the system.  
 
Figure 7-11: Task 2 - Storyboard 
There are two methods available: 
1. Verifying OTP through the web channel (see Figure 7-12): this approach suggested that 
the user would receive the OTP via a SMS message, and then that he or she would 
verify this OTP back to the system by entering it in a text field on the screen. 
 
Figure 7-12:  Verifying OTP through the web channel 
2. Verifying OTP through the mobile network channel (see Figure 7-13):  the user 
received the OTP by SMS as suggested by the previous method; however, here the user 
would verify the OTP by sending it back to the system using a mobile network (by 
SMS).  
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Figure 7-13:  Verifying OTP through the mobile network channel 
Once the user selected one of the available verification methods, the application created a 
test bank account and credited an amount of OMR 10,000 to be used in later tasks. 
7.2.4.3 Task 3:  Beneficiary accounts 
The participants in this task were required to create beneficiary accounts to transfer money 
among them. There was no limit on the number of beneficiary accounts each user could 
create. However, the most important factor in this task was to introduce the MCA 
mechanism implementation for the user to test as suggested by section 6.4.2.   
 
Figure 7-14: Task 3 - Storyboard 
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As illustrated in Figure 7-14, first the user needed to request to add a new beneficiary 
account from the beneficiary accounts page. The application then requested the user to 
enter the beneficiary account details as depicted in Figure 7-15. 
 
Figure 7-15:  Add new beneficiary account form - implementation 
After the user submitted these details, the application created a new beneficiary account, 
which was not yet active, and sent out an SMS message to the user to activate the account. 
The format of the message is shown in the Figure 7-16 below. 
  
Figure 7-16:  SMS message format for activating a beneficiary account 
Three important variables were included in the SMS message body: the beneficiary 
account number, the confirmation code, and the OTP. The beneficiary account number 
helped the user to know if he or she were authenticating the beneficiary account that was 
originally created or another beneficiary account that had been created by an attacker. The 
confirmation code, on the other hand, was an identification code for the SMS message, 
which the user could match with the confirmation code displayed on the screen. If they 
matched, then the OTP sent in this message was the OTP to be entered on the screen (or to 
be replied back via SMS message to the bank system if the user selected to verify the OTP 
by SMS in Task 2). This feature served the same function as the request code covered 
earlier in Task 1. 
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Figure 7-17:  Activate beneficiary account - implementation 
For the user to activate the new added beneficiary account, he or she had to open the 
activation window assigned to the beneficiary account (see Figure 7-17). After ensuring 
that the confirmation code from the screen and the SMS message matched, then the user 
could extract the OTP from the message and write it in the text-box available in the 
window. 
Once the correct OTP was submitted, the beneficiary account was activated and the 
participant could then move to Task 4. 
7.2.4.4 Task 4:  Money transfer 
Money transfer services and other financial services that involve moving money away 
from the user account belong to the transactional level of the system. All previous tasks 
dealt with the informational level only. Hence, Task 4 could not be completed without 
completing Task 3 that, in turn, required the MCA mechanism to complete. It is vital that 
transactional level services be restricted from access or manipulation unless they, or any 
services leading to them, are authenticated using the MCA mechanism. 
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Figure 7-18:  Task 4 – Storyboard 
Task 4 was comprised of three steps, starting from the account home page (see Figure 
7-18). To initiate a money transfer request, the user had to access the beneficiary accounts 
page shown in Figure 7-19. Any activated beneficiary account listed on this page had three 
options enabled in front of its record. A description of the role of each of these three 
options follows. 
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Figure 7-19:  Beneficiary accounts page - implementation 
• Transfer: this option allowed the user to transfer money to the beneficiary account 
associated with this option. It took the user to another page with a transfer form that 
had to be filled (see Figure 7-20).  
 
Figure 7-20:  Money transfer form - implementation 
• Delete: this option deleted the beneficiary account. Any additional beneficiary account 
required another OTP activation following a deletion.  
• History:  this allowed the user to view all transaction history for the selected 
beneficiary account. 
The maximum transfer allowed was OMR 5,000 per transaction. This limitation ensured 
that the user could test the transfer process at least twice because the application initially 
credited the user account an amount of OMR 10,000 for testing purposes after the 
completion of Task 2). 
 153 
 
 
Figure 7-21:  Money transfer confirmation page - implementation 
Figure 7-21 shows the confirmation page displayed to the user after he or she had selected 
and submitted the amount and description in the transfer page. It confirmed the transaction 
details for the user to verify. The verification process was completed by submitting the 
account login password. Once the password was submitted and verified, the transaction 
took place. 
7.2.4.5 Task 5:  Emergency authentication mechanism 
In this final task, the user was advised to test the 4th factor authentication approach 
suggested by [48] (see Figure 7-22). This works in real applications only in situations 
where the primary channel medium (user mobile number in this study) is not available. An 
alternative mobile number can be used to process the user transactions until the primary 
medium is available again. This can be done by creating a new beneficiary account just the 
way the user did in Task 3. However, this time the user saw the option “Switch to the 
alternative channel” in the beneficiary account, activation window (see Figure 7-23).   
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Figure 7-22: Task 5 - Storyboard 
 
Figure 7-23:  Beneficiary activation window - Task 5 - implementation 
If the user selected this option, another page asking him or her to confirm the switch 
channels request appeared. Once the user confirmed the request, a one-time password was 
sent out via SMS message. However, this time, the SMS message was not delivered to the 
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user’s mobile number; rather, it was sent to the alternative mobile number registered in the 
user’s account. The SMS message sent in this case would look like the one depicted in 
Figure 7-24. 
  
Figure 7-24:  The SMS message format sent to the alternative mobile number 
This message contained only one factor: the one-time password,  a one-time random string 
that contains numbers and letters. The message asked the mobile holder to pass this 
password to the account owner so he or she could use it to authorize transactions. No 
further details needed to be passed along with this message for security reasons. The holder 
of this mobile number must not know what beneficiary account the account owner would 
like to activate nor would he or she know any other details related to the user account. 
Figure 7-25 shows the window that appeared to the account owner once he or she tried to 
activate a beneficiary account while the account was switched to the alternative channel 
mode. 
  
Figure 7-25:  Beneficiary account activation window - alternative channel mode - implementation 
If the valid password were entered, the beneficiary account would be activated and the user 
account would be switched back to the normal mode again. 
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After the user completed this final task, the application showed a link to the post-
questionnaire, which collected user feedback about the MCA mechanism implemented in 
the prototype application. 
7.2.5 Participants 
Participants were contacted by electronic mails, SMS messages and by meeting them face-
to-face.  A total number of 188 people took part in the experiment. 
Due to the tied social relationships between people in Oman, it was important to test the 
effects of these independent variables on the researcher friends and colleagues who 
participated in the study.  The sample was divided into two groups: friends and colleagues 
and other participants. These two groups were assessed separately to spot any possible 
social relationship effects on the results in two different areas of the research: 
1. Demographic profile and dropout rates (section 7.3.2). 
2. Users’ satisfaction testing of MCA (section 0). 
 
Figure 7-26: Percentage of friends and colleagues compared to other participants in the study 
Initial frequency analysis revealed that the friends and colleagues comprised 31% of the 
total sample size of 188 participants (see Figure 7-26). 
7.3 Demographic Profile of Participants 
A total of 188 participants registered. Figure 7-27 depicts the demographic profile of all 
participants as well as the percentage of those who successfully completed all tasks.  
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Figure 7-27:  Demographic profile of all participants 
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These details are used in sections 7.3.1 and 7.5.2 to examine the relationship between the 
demographic characteristics (as independent variables) and the dependent variables (e.g., 
dropout rates and factors influencing online banking adoption). 
It is also important to mention here that the recorded literacy rate in Oman (in 2007) for 
young males and females reached 99 and 98% respectively [241].  According to the same 
source, although there were almost 96% people with phones, only 10% people in Oman 
had an Internet connection in 2007. However, according to [242], Internet usage in Oman 
has increased radically to almost 41.7% as of June 2010. 
7.3.1 Dropout Rates 
A user who did not complete all tasks required in the study was considered as a “not 
completed case”, which meant that the user dropped out at some stage within the 
experiment. A total of 95 participants (50.5%) dropped out or did not complete all 
requirements (see Figure 7-27). These participants’ details were still valid and used to 
different analysis through this chapter since more than half of these participants completed 
the pre-questionnaire (more details presented in Table 7-16).  
To examine the relationship between the participants’ demographic characteristics 
(independent variables), with the dropout rates (a dependent variable), a chi-square test for 
independence was used, as suggested by [155]. 
Variable	   Value	   df	   Asymp.	  Sig.	  	  (2-­‐sided)	  
Gender	   0.605** 1 .437 
Marital	  status	   .023** 1 .880 
Education	  level	   15.342* 3 .002 
Age	  group	   2.131* 3 .546 
Monthly	  income	   5.080* 4 .279 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
**	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Table 7-2: Chi-square test for independence summary results between demographic profile and 
dropout rates 
The results in Table 7-2 show that only the education level scored significantly below 0.05. 
The relationship between education level and dropout rates is significant (X2(3) = 15.342, 
p < 0.05). This suggests that the number of users who completed all tasks is affected by the 
level of education. To examine this fact, a close look to the chi-square test results produced 
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by SPSS 19 in Table 7-3 will help to clarify the relationship between education levels and 
the dropout rates. 
Education	  Levels	  
Completed?	  
Total	  No	  (%)	   Yes	  (%)	  
Technical/Professional	  Training	   19 (82.6%)    4 (17.4%) 23 
College	  graduation	  (4	  years)	   43 (49.4%) 44 (50.6%) 87 
Master	  degree	  or	  equivalent	   17 (43.6%) 22 (56.4%) 39 
Postgraduate	  degree	   0 (0%) 5 (100%) 5 
Total	   79 (51.3%) 75 (48.7%) 154* 
* Total participants reported their level of education was 154 (82%) out of 188 (see Figure 7-27) 
Table 7-3:  Cross tabulation between education level and dropout rates 
The information depicted in Table 7-3 shows that users’ failure rate to complete the tasks 
is very high (82.6%) for those who belong to the technical/professional training category. 
This rate decreases to 49.4% for users who have a college degree and to 43.6% for those 
with a Master degree or equivalent. Finally, the failure rate reached zero for those who had 
acquired a postgraduate degree. 
Due to the small number of postgraduate degree participants who completed all tasks (5 
cases only), the test was re-run after eliminating these cases to see if they influenced the 
relationship between education level and dropout rates.  The outcome of the test was still 
significant (X2(2) = 9.928, p = 0.007, see Appendix D1) 
These figures reflect the fact that many of those who have not yet acquired a college 
degree may have not had the chance to try online banking prior to the pilot. In contrast, 
there is a high probability that those who completed a postgraduate degree have already 
started work with or are familiar with online banking. This can be further investigated by 
checking the relationship between users who have tried online banking before (online 
banking experienced users) and the dropout rate.   
Figure 7-28 illustrates the relationship between experienced users and the dropout rates. 
The results show that only 39.5% of total users who had not tried online banking before 
completed all tasks, while 57.6% of users who had used online banking before were able to 
complete all tasks. The SPSS 19 results show that the relationship between online banking 
users (participants who have experience with online banking) and dropout rates is 
significant (X2(1) = 5.293, p < 0.05, see Appendix D2) 
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Figure 7-28: Relationship between online banking (OB) experienced users and dropout rates 
7.3.2 Affects of Social Relationships on Dropout Rates 
A crosstabulation analysis by SPSS 19 was used to check the affects of social relationships 
on dropout rates. Figure 7-29 illustrates the outcome of the analysis and shows that the 
number of participants from both groups, friends and colleagues and others, were almost 
similar.  However, the number of people who dropped out was significantly different in 
both groups.  While only 11 participants from friends and colleagues group dropped out, 
84 participants dropped out from the other group. 
 
Figure 7-29: Relationship between social relationship and dropout rates 
The chi-square test for independence indicated significant association between social 
relationships and dropout rates, X2(1, n=188) =  33.142, p < .001, see Appendix D1. 
42.4%	  
57.6%	  
Dropped	  out	   Completed	  
OB	  User	  None	  OB	  User	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7.4 Preliminary Test 
Four preliminary tests were carried out in order to prepare the data for analysis. First, the 
questionnaire’s variables were arranged into pre, post, and common. This was necessary to 
create data sets that could be processed by SPSS 19 for analysis and hypothesis testing. 
Second, the application logs were examined and arranged in data files. New variables, 
based on the existing variables, were introduced, and saved along with other variables on 
file. This process was important to prepare data for the subsequent data screening process. 
After data were prepared in different files, they were checked for missing data. The process 
involved careful examination of each variable to determine how these missing data should 
be treated (i.e., ignore, replace, or delete). Finally, the data, especially the data from 
application logs, were checked for extreme scores (outliers). The process involved setting 
up some limitations to the formula to ensure that all extraneous extreme scores were 
omitted while maintaining the outliers that existed for valid reasons. 
7.4.1 Data Preparation 
Two sets of data were collected from the application database. The first set came from the 
online questionnaires and the other set came from the logs, which recorded the users’ 
interactions with the application. The following subsections discuss how each of these sets 
was analyzed. 
7.4.1.1 Questionnaires 
Both pre and post-questionnaire data were analyzed. Data from these questionnaires were 
extracted and placed in separate files. Nevertheless, data that identified the personality and 
the background of the participant (e.g., gender, age, prior Internet banking experience, 
Internet usage frequency, education level, and monthly income groupings) were treated as 
common variables and were, therefore, included in both data files (see Figure 7-30). 
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Figure 7-30:  Common variables between the pre and post-questionnaire data files 
7.4.1.2 Application logs 
Application logs represented the interaction activities of the users and created a record for 
each link clicked on by the user. The row data in the logs table were recorded in a format 
that could not be used as variables in the analysis and, therefore, some transformation 
listed below was carried out to ensure data readiness for analysis.   
To prepare the logs for analysis, first, a new variable was created to calculate the time each 
user spent on each page of the application (in seconds). The following formula was used to 
calculate these values: 
TSn = VTn+1 – VTn 
where TS is the time spent on each page (in seconds), VT is the page visit time (in Unix 
base time), and n is the record index in the logs table. 
The formula calculated the time spent on any given page (TSn) by subtracting the time the 
user visited this page (VTn) from the time the user visited the next page (VTn+1). There 
were 12,995 records in the log table and calculating TSn manually was inefficient. 
Therefore, a script (see Appendix A) was designed to automate the calculation process and 
to store the TSn values in a new field in the logs. 
	  
Start	  task	  identifiers	   Finish	  task	  identifiers	   Intermediate	  
pages	  Page	   Query	  String	   Page	   Query	  String	  
Task	  1	   profile.php	   -­‐	   channels.php	   mode=sent	   2 
Task	  2	   channels.php	   -­‐	   account.php	   mode=new	   0 
Task	  3	   transfer.php	   -­‐	   transfer.php	   activate=true	   3 
Task	  4	   transfer_page.php	   bn_id=	   account.php	   acc_no=	   1 
Task	  5	   transfer.php	   -­‐	   transfer.php	   activate=true	   6 
Table 7-4:  The 5 tasks identifiers 
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Next, a list of task identifiers was created to calculate the overall time a user spent on each 
task (see Table 7-4).  This process was vital to determine how much time each user spent 
doing each task, which, in turn, could help identify the tasks that were not user friendly or 
that were hard to complete. 
After these identifiers had been established, another script calculated the time each user 
spent on each task (see Appendix A). The following formula was used to calculate the time 
spent (TS) for each task and the total time spent (TSt) for all 5 tasks per user: 
 
where TS is the time spent on each page (in seconds), i is the pages count for a given task, 
and n is the page index. When the outcome of this formula is equal to zero, the user did not 
complete the task. 
7.4.2 Data Screening 
SPSS 19 was used to check data accuracy and validity. This was an important phase before 
analyzing the data. The results of descriptive statistics showed no errors in the data 
gathered from questionnaires. The averages were normal for all variables of both 
questionnaires (i.e., the pre-questionnaire and post-questionnaire). The minimums and 
maximums were both within the expected range for each set of questions. The 
questionnaire data screening analysis is presented in Appendix C. 
The data gathered from database logs’ tables, however, showed some outliers and extreme 
points. The following subsections discuss these issues in more detail along with procedures 
followed to deal with the missing data values from both questionnaires and logs.  
7.4.2.1 Missing data 
Researchers [155, 243, 244] categorized missing data based on their characteristics into 
three categories: missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and 
missing not at random (MNAR). MCAR happens when “subjects who have missing data 
are a random subset of the complete sample of subjects” [245].  Thus, the probability of an 
observation being missing does not depend on the information that is observed or not 
observed, and the cause of “missingness” is completely random. With data being MAR, the 
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“missingness” may depend on the information that is observed but it is independent of 
information that is not observed. MNAR, on the other hand, occurs when “missingness” 
depends on both observed and unobserved information. MCAR and MAR can be ignored 
while the MNAR cannot [155, 243, 244] because MNAR usually reflects a systematic 
pattern and data are not missing randomly. Tabachnick and Fidell argued that if the 
“missingness” rate is lower than 5%, then the missing data could be ignored without any 
further analysis [243]. Therefore, the SPSS 19 statistical software package was used to 
identify the percentage and pattern of the missing data for the pre-questionnaire and post-
questionnaire (Appendix C).  
Variables	  
N	  =	  188	  
Valid	   Missing	   %	  
How	  often	  do	  you	  make	  use	  of	  Internet	  banking	  service?	   119 69 36.7 
With	  how	  many	  banks	  do	  you	  do	  your	  Internet	  banking	  services?	   114 74 39.4 
Which	  is	  your	  highest	  level	  of	  education?	   154 34 18.1 
What	  is	  your	  current	  occupation?	   178 10 5.3 
To	  which	  monthly	  income	  group	  you	  belong	  (in	  OMR)?	   172 16 8.5 
Table 7-5: Pre-questionnaire variables that incurred a “missingness” rate higher than 5% 
The results showed that the “missingness” rate in the post-questionnaire was lower than 
5% for all variables. By contrast, pre-questionnaire data revealed 5 variables that incurred 
a “missingness” rate higher than 5% (see Table 7-5).  However, after a closer look at these 
variables, only two variables were truly missing. 
The first 2 variables in Table 7-5 were related to question 3 in Section A of the pre-
questionnaire (see Appendix B), which asked the users if they made use of an Internet 
banking facility. All participants who selected “No” for that question were asked to ignore 
the following two questions (i.e., represented by the first two variables in Table 7-5) and 
proceed to section B. The 69 participants who did not answer these questions were those 
users who participated in the study without having online banking experience. These users’ 
data will be discussed in the next section. 
The missing rate in the second question is higher, which means there were 5 more 
participants (i.e., 74 who did not answer the 2nd question and 69 who did not answer the 1st 
question in Table 7-5) who used online banking but preferred not to answer the 2nd 
question. However, 5 participants out of 188 incurred only a 2.7% “missingness” rate, 
which therefore, can be treated as MCAR and ignored. 
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The education level, on the other hand, was a question to be answered by all participants (a 
total of 188) and the “missingness” rate was 18.1% (i.e., higher than 5%, and therefore, not 
able to be ignored). Thus this variable is further analysed in section 7.4.2.2. 
After a close look to the data file created in SPSS 19, it was found that 4 participants have 
ignored many consecutive questions presented in section C of the pre-questionnaire and 
also dropped out at that point. When these 4 cases were ignored for the last two variables 
in Table 7-5, the missingness rate for the variable “current occupation” dropped below 5% 
and therefore can be ignored. However, the “monthly income” variable still incurred 6.5% 
missingness rate even after these 4 cases were dropped.  Therefore, further analysis is 
required for this variable and is presented in section 7.4.2.3. 
7.4.2.2 Missing data – Education Level 
In order to examine whether this happened randomly, the SPSS 19 option “Missing Value 
Analysis (MVA)” with “Crosstabulations of categorical and indicator variables” was used 
as suggested in [246].  This method helps identify the differences in missing values among 
categories.  
Table 7-6 shows how the education level values were affected by other common variables 
(e.g., gender, marital status, current occupation, organization business area, and monthly 
income). For example, the number of missing values in the gender variable appeared to 
vary between male and female. 87.1% of male respondents reported their educational level 
while only 74.2% of female respondents did. 
A more drastic difference can be noticed in marital status. Those who were single were 
much less likely to report their level of education compared than those who were married. 
Only 73.0% of the single respondents reported their education level, while the percentage 
of those who were married and reported levels of education was 90.7%. 
Likewise, the age group variable had the same effect as seen in marital status. 24.0% of 
respondents who were 18 to 27 years old did not report their education level, while fewer 
from the age groups of 28 – 37 and 38 – 47 did not report their level of education (10.1% 
and 6.3% respectively). The age group of 48 to 57 years did not contain enough available 
data to be included. 
Looking at the table for organization or business area, the missing values among categories 
do not appear to vary much. Whether someone’s organization was a banking and financial 
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service, a communication and utilities organization, an educational facility, or a service 
industry, it did not seem to affect whether data were missing for the level of education 
variable. While the low count categories were ignored, most missing values were in the 
range from 12.3% to 16.7%.  The difference was minimal and likely due to chance. 
Variables	   Missing	   Education	  Level	  (N=188)	  
Gender	   2	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Female	   	   46 74.2 16 25.8 
	   Male	   	   108 87.1 16 12.9 
Marital	  Status	   6	   Count	   %	   Missing	  	   %	  Missing	  
	   Single	   	   54 73.0 20 27.0 
	   Married	   	   98 90.7 10 9.3 
Age	  Group	   6	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   18	  to	  27	   	   57 76.0 18 24.0 
	   28	  to	  37	   	   80 89.9 9 10.1 
	   38	  to	  47	   	   15 93.8 1 6.3 
	   48	  to	  57	   	   1 50.0 1 50.0 
Current	  Occupation	   10	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Student	   	   30 65.2 16 34.8 
	   Self-­‐employed	   	   5 83.3 1 16.7 
	   Clerical	   	   51 87.9 7 12.1 
	   Professional	   	   15 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Service	  staff	   	   3 75.0 1 25.0 
	   Management	   	   34 94.4 2 5.6 
	   Sales	   	   2 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Other	   	   8 72.7 3 27.3 
Organization	  Business	  Area	   24	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Banking	  and	  financial	  services	   	   25 89.3 3 10.7 
	   Transport	  and	  distribution	   	   1 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Communication	  and	  utilities	   	   13 86.7 2 13.3 
	   Trade	  and	  commerce	   	   11 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Education	   	   50 87.7 7 12.3 
	   Service	  industry	   	   15 83.3 3 16.7 
	   Farming	  and	  agriculture	   	   1 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Self-­‐employed	   	   0 0.0 0 0.0 
	   Other	   	   24 72.7 9 27.3 
Monthly	  Income	  (in	  OMR)	   16	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Less	  than	  500	   	   21 63.6 12 36.4 
	   500	  to	  1,000	   	   71 84.5 13 15.5 
	   1,001	  to	  1,500	   	   30 96.8 1 3.2 
	   1,501	  to	  2,000	   	   12 92.3 1 7.7 
	   More	  than	  2,001	   	   11 100.0 0 0.0 
Table 7-6:  Crosstabulations of education level verses other common variables 
Finally, monthly income seems to be the highest influencing variable on reporting the level 
of education.  If a respondent had an income less than OMR 500, then a response for 
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education level was more likely to be missing. At least 92.3% of the respondents whose 
income was more than OMR 1,501 reported level of education.  Moreover, 96.8% of 
respondents who fell into the monthly income group of OMR 1,001 – 1,500 reported their 
education level.  On the other hand, this rate decreased dramatically with lower monthly 
incomes.  Only 84.5% of respondents from the monthly income group of OMR 500 – 
1,000 reported their education level while the highest “missingness” rate of education level 
recorded among all categories was 36.4%, which fell in the monthly income group of 
OMR 500 or less. 
7.4.2.3 Missing data – Monthly Income Group 
Missing Value Analysis (MVA) of SPSS 19 was used again to check the affects of the 
common variables on the monthly income group values.  In this analysis, however, only 
184 out of 188 participants records were used.  The four records dropped represented the 
participants who failed to answer several consecutive questions from section C in the pre-
questionnaire. 
Table 7-7 presents the outcome of the MVA between monthly income groups and other 
common variables (e.g. gender, marital status, age group, and level of education). The 
results found matched the outcome from the MVA between education level the common 
variables.  For example, male participants were more likely to report their monthly income 
than their female counterparts.  That is, 96.0% of male respondents reported their monthly 
income while only 88.3% of female respondents did. Likewise, almost 98% of married 
respondents have reported their monthly income while only 86.5 of single respondents did. 
Age group showed the most significant differences where younger participants were much 
less likely to report their monthly income than their older counterparts.  For instance, 
13.3% of respondents who belong to the age group 18 to 27 years did not report their 
monthly income group. This percentage has declined drastically to 2.2% for the 
participants who belong to the age group 28 to 37 years. Furthermore, all participants who 
are 38 years or more reported their monthly income group. 
Looking at the table for current occupation, only students groups recorded missing values 
of 19.6% in the monthly income group variable.  All other participants have reported the 
group of monthly income they belong to. 
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Finally, the missing values for both organization business area and education level did not 
show a specific pattern that can be reported and therefore the missingness incurred can be 
treated as MCAR. 
Variables	   Missing	   Monthly	  Income	  Group	  (N=184*)	  
Gender	   0	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Female	   	   53 88.3 7 11.7 
	   Male	   	   119 96.0 5 4.0 
Marital	  Status	   2	   Count	   %	   Missing	  	   %	  Missing	  
	   Single	   	   64 86.5 10 13.5 
	   Married	   	   106 98.1 2 1.9 
Age	  Group	   2	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   18	  to	  27	   	   65 86.7 10 13.3 
	   28	  to	  37	   	   87 97.8 2 2.2 
	   38	  to	  47	   	   16 100.0 0 0.0 
	   48	  to	  57	   	   2 100.0 0 0.0 
Current	  Occupation	   6	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Student	   	   37 80.4 9 19.6 
	   Self-­‐employed	   	   6 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Clerical	   	   58 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Professional	   	   15 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Service	  staff	   	   4 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Management	   	   36 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Sales	   	   2 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Other	   	   11 100.0 0 0.0 
Organization	  Business	  Area	   20	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Banking	  and	  financial	  services	   	   25 89.3 3 10.7 
	   Transport	  and	  distribution	   	   1 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Communication	  and	  utilities	   	   13 86.7 2 13.3 
	   Trade	  and	  commerce	   	   11 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Education	   	   50 87.7 7 12.3 
	   Service	  industry	   	   15 83.3 3 16.7 
	   Farming	  and	  agriculture	   	   1 100.0 0 0.0 
	   Self-­‐employed	   	   0 0.0 0 0.0 
	   Other	   	   24 72.7 9 27.3 
Level	  of	  Education	   30	   Count	   %	   Missing	   %	  Missing	  
	   Technical/professional	  training	   	   23 100.0 0 0.0 
	   College	  graduate	  (4	  years)	   	   79 90.8 8 9.2 
	   Master	  degree	  or	  equivalent	   	   38 97.4 1 2.6 
	   Postgraduate	  degree	   	   5 100.0 0 0.0 
* Four cases (participants) were dropped from the total number because they did not complete the whole 
section of the pre-questionnaire that has these variables 
Table 7-7:  Crosstabulations of monthly income group verses other common variables 
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7.4.2.4 Outliers 
According to [247], an outlier is an observation that is numerically distant from the rest of 
the observations.  It is also simply referred to as “the values within the data that are well 
above or well below the majority of other cases” [155].  Outliers can be identified using 
different techniques.  Assessing normality of a distribution is one way to identify outliers.  
Gravetter [248] defined normal distribution as a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve, which has 
the greatest frequency of scores in the middle, with smaller frequencies towards the 
extremes. 
The data that could be checked for normality in this study were the data retrieved from the 
log table since they comprised the only data set that contained continuous variables (e.g., 
the time the user spent on each task in seconds).  The rest of the data collected from the 
questionnaires could not be tested for normality, as all variables involved were discrete 
rather than continuous. 
In order to test the normality and to check for outliers, the option “Explore” in SPSS 19 
was used. The results revealed some extreme points and abnormal figures (see Table 7-8). 
Tasks	   Time	  Spent	  (in	  seconds),	  n=87	  
Task	  1:	  Registration	  &	  mobile	  auth.	   M	   5%	  Trim.	  M	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Create	  a	  profile	   7978.74 1594.9 80.00 18 221401 
	   b.	  Authenticate	  mobile	  number	   3453.75 138.72 96.00 18 284876 
Task	  2:	  Auth.	  channel	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Select	  an	  auth.	  channel	   66.25 55.60 41.00 8 380 
Task	  3:	  Beneficiary	  account	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   3980.15 72.42 40.00 6 333428 
	   b.	  Create	  an	  account	  	   71.66 57.16 44.00 14 766 
	   c.	  Activate	  the	  account	   266.02 162.50 103.00 21 5775 
Task	  4:	  Money	  transfer	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Fill	  transfer	  details	   6940.79 38.48 29.00 7 577486 
	   b.	  Confirm	  the	  transfer	   5923.29 24.48 20.00 8 512243 
Task	  5:	  Alternative	  channel	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   37886.68 108.15 63.00 5 3280413 
	   b.	  Create	  a	  new	  account	  	   67.78 60.63 53.00 0 399 
	   c.	  Open	  activation	  page	   966.97 27.21 16.00 3 80939 
	   d.	  Switch	  to	  alternative	  channel	   12.44 11.13 7.00 2 74 
	   e.	  Activate	  the	  account	   5691.41 82.77 62.00 19 318568 
Table 7-8:  Descriptive statistics for the raw data from logs 
Table 7-8 shows how the data are distributed randomly without forming a specific pattern. 
This is usually caused by high numbers of extreme scores in the data and this can be noted 
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well in the table. For example, the maximum time one user spent doing the sub-task 5-a 
was 3,280,413 seconds (about one month and a week’s time). This is clearly not a realistic 
figure. The reason behind such an extreme score could have been that the user left the 
application in the middle of Task 5 and returned after almost 5 weeks to complete the 
work. This outlier negatively affected the means of all task scores. 
Similarly, the 5% trimmed mean (TM) on the table, in most of the tasks, shows significant 
differences, compared to the normal means (M). This is because the 5% trimmed mean 
ignores 5% of the data from each side. The significant change in the TM means that those 
dropped data were extreme and had a major influence on the normal data means. 
Although the extreme outliers that influenced the normal means (M) in this study could be 
removed to correct the analysis, other outliers were valid and existed for a reason. A user 
might have been working on a specific task and suddenly got lost and was unable to 
continue fulfilling the requirements of that task. The user would then try to redo the task. A 
third and fourth try, which required extra time, might have been needed to go back to the 
task guide to read the instructions more carefully before the user was finally able to finish 
the task. The application, in this case, would count the time from the first try until the user 
successfully completed the requirements of that task. 
Another user might have a very slow Internet connection. It would take more time to load 
pages, which would contribute towards the total time spent in each task. If the time the user 
needed to load each page exceeded a few seconds (e.g., more than 4 to 6 seconds per 
page), this could cumulatively have added up to more than a minute to complete one task, 
such as task 5 (i.e., with about 6 pages that needed to load several times in some cases). 
Accordingly, to correct the data for further analysis, a number of seconds equal to 120 (2 
minutes) was accepted as a maximum time needed to fulfil the requirements of each page. 
Thus, if the application recorded a time of less than 120 seconds, then this data was 
considered valid; otherwise, it was rejected and replaced with 0. Naturally, a user would 
not spend more than 2 minutes on a web page unless it was intensively asking for input 
with complex client-side validations. In this study, the most time-consuming page among 
the 5 tasks was the “profile.php” page at Task 1-a, which required the user to input the full 
name, primary mobile number, and alternative mobile number. Under normal conditions, 
this could be done in less than 15 to 20 seconds. The researcher believed that 120 seconds 
was sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of any page, taking into consideration unusual 
factors that might increase the average time needed for each page such as Internet 
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connection slowness, slow user typing, time taken to read information from the task guide, 
and validation errors. 
After removal of the extreme scores, the “Explore” test of SPSS 19 was rerun accordingly. 
The results revealed better normality with minor outliers that were not considered extreme. 
The TM and M were close to each other in almost all tasks (see Table 7-9). 
Tasks	   Time	  Spent	  (in	  seconds),	  n=87	  
Task	  1:	  Registration	  &	  mobile	  auth.	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Create	  a	  profile	   67.40 63.73 58.00 0 215 
	   b.	  Authenticate	  mobile	  number	   83.43 82.07 74.00 1 197 
Task	  2:	  Authentication	  channel	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Select	  an	  authentication	  channel	   44.85 42.61 36.00 0 147 
Task	  3:	  Beneficiary	  account	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   43.31 39.95 37.00 6 217 
	   b.	  Create	  an	  account	  	   40.36 38.27 39.00 1 139 
	   c.	  Activate	  the	  account	   87.89 83.69 69.00 21 248 
Task	  4:	  Money	  transfer	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Fill	  transfer	  details	   36.16 33.35 26.00 0 139 
	   b.	  Confirm	  the	  transfer	   23.95 20.80 19.00 8 124 
Task	  5:	  Alternative	  channel	   M	   TM*	   Median	   Min.	   Max.	  
	   a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   67.57 61.50 46.00 4 249 
	   b.	  Create	  a	  new	  account	  	   61.80 57.37 52.00 0 230 
	   c.	  Open	  activation	  page	   24.85 20.60 14.00 0 202 
	   d.	  Switch	  to	  alternative	  channel	   12.44 11.13 7.00 2 74 
	   e.	  Activate	  the	  account	   74.17 69.55 59.50 19 238 
* 5% Trimmed Mean 
Table 7-9:  Descriptive statistics of a clean version of logs data 
The 0s that replaced the extreme scores recorded per web-page has caused the results in 
Table 7-9 to show 0 as the minimum completion-time for several sub-tasks. These 0s do 
not represent actual completion-time for these sub-tasks, but rather represent that there 
were extreme outliers that were rejected and replaced with 0s. 
The only one 0 minimum completion-time represented in Table 7-8 (sub-task 5-b) might 
be due to one participant or more who started the task but did not complete it and closed 
the web-page. Such behaviour caused a missing task end-time and therefore is represented 
by 0. 
Some of the tasks, in Table 7-9, comprised more than one web page that the user needed to 
visit in order to complete the whole task. For example, to complete task 1-b (i.e., 
authenticate mobile number), the user had to open the authentication page followed by 
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another window, which simulated a mobile phone that the user used to “read” or “send” 
SMS messages. Once the user read the message and copied the One Time Pin (OTP), that 
window could be closed and the user returned to the authentication page to submit the 
OTP. This, accordingly, increased the total time the user needed to complete a sub-task 
(i.e., given that each web page was allowed a maximum of 120 seconds of time, which 
made the total equal to the number of web pages multiplied by 120). Therefore, another 
condition was applied to eliminate extreme outliers that might not have been cleared in the 
first cleaning cycle. This condition was implemented by defining “missing values” in SPSS 
19 for all variables that represented the sub-tasks. These definitions dropped any sub-task 
score that was more than 250 (i.e., the total time the user spent on each sub-task should not 
have been more than 250 seconds). Since all sub-tasks involved, at most, two web pages, 
no more than 240 seconds should have been spent for each sub-task per user (maximum 
value should not exceed 240). However, due to some unexpected behaviours noted from 
the logs, some users tended to open more than one version of the web page, which 
duplicated the entries in the log files, and therefore, doubled the calculated time spent for 
each sub-task. The 250-second limit per sub-task dropped all scores that were affected by 
such behaviour and, at the same time, ensured that people who suffered from slow Internet 
connections were still allowed a further 10 seconds on top of the given 240s for both 
pages. 
7.4.3 Summary 
The preliminary test carried out in this section was important to screen and prepare data for 
the analysis. Two sets of data were prepared: those that came from the questionnaires and 
the ones came from the application logs table. The former dataset was first divided into 
three categories: pre, post, and common.  A data screening process using SPSS 19 was 
used to check these data for validity; making sure they were transferred into SPSS 
correctly for further analysis. 
The application logs were then prepared and arranged into different variables to make the 
analysis feasible. SPSS 19 was used again to screen the data and eliminate possible 
extreme figures.  Different formulae were used in section 7.4.1.2 to ensure data validity for 
usability analysis covered in section 7.6.1. 
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7.5 Factors Influencing Adoption of Online Banking 
7.5.1 Demographic Variables Hypotheses 
To investigate whether or not the demographic characteristics influenced the adoption of 
online banking in Oman, these characteristics were hypothesized as follows: 
H1a: Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1b: Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1c: Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1d: Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1e: Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
7.5.2 Hypotheses Testing – Demographic Variables 
To investigate the effects of demographic characteristics on the adoption of online 
banking, the demographic variables (gender, marital status, education level, age group, and 
monthly income group) were compared between the online banking users and non-users. 
SPSS 19 was used to test the hypotheses drawn in section 7.5.1 for demographic variables 
(H1n, n=a to e).  Table 7-10 shows a brief summary of the chi-square test results.  
Variable	   Value	   df	   Asymp.	  Sig.	  (2-­‐sided)	  
Hypothesis	  test	  result	  	  
(p-­‐value=0.05)	  
H1a:	  Gender	   8.015** 1 .005 Support H1a 
H1b:	  Marital	  status	   7.574** 1 .006 Support H1b 
H1c:	  Education	  level	   21.511* 3 .000 Support H1c 
H1d:	  Age	  group	   12.125* 3 .007 Support H1d 
H1e:	  Monthly	  income	   23.399* 4 .000 Support H1e 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
**	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Table 7-10: Chi-square test for independence summary results between demographic profile and 
attitude towards adopting online banking 
 
Further analysis was conducted using cross tabulations to provide greater insight than 
single statistics of chi-square. Cross tabulations allow the display of joint distribution of 
two or more variables, and thus, to describe the distribution of two or more variables, 
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simultaneously [232].  The results from cross tabulation analysis are presented and briefly 
discussed in the following subsections. 
7.5.2.1 Gender 
In literature, there are many different arguments on gender and its direct impact on 
technology adoption. For example, [249] found men to be more concerned with 
achievement than women. Another study [250] stated that men may be more task-oriented 
(i.e., the accomplishment of a task that requires the use of technology [251]) than women. 
Other factors such as characteristics of system design, training, and documentation may 
also affect technology usage [151], which may manifest in differences among men and 
women’s experiences [252].  
Concerning this study, it can be noted from Figure 7-31 that 37% of female respondents 
used online banking services. This figure increased to 63% when considering male 
respondents. This confirms that males are more likely to adopt online banking than 
females. As chi-square test results suggested in Table 7-10, gender significantly impacted 
the adoption of online banking (X2(1) = 8.015, p < 0.01) and these results confirmed the 
outcomes  drawn by [253] and [254].   
 
Figure 7-31: Relationship between gender and percentage of online banking (OB) experience 
In Oman, the significant relationship between gender and online banking could also be 
attributed to the dominating Arabic and Islamic cultures. These cultures specify different 
roles for male and female in the society. For example, despite the public equality of rights 
and duties, males are primarily responsible for family’s external and financial affairs, while 
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females are expected to take care of home and children. It is also socially unacceptable in 
Oman for females to attend Internet cafés. Hence, it is more appropriate for females in 
Oman to use the Internet only from home or work [255]. 
These results confirm the argument made by [256, 257] that gender is affected by social 
and cultural factors in the context of technology adoption. 
7.5.2.2 Marital Status 
Figure 7-32 shows that the adoption of online banking is significantly affected by the 
marital status of users (X2(1) = 7.574, p < 0.01, see Table 7-10). While only 41% of single 
respondents used online banking, 63% of married respondents adopted online banking. 
This may have been a consequence of the fact that people in Oman get married in their 20s 
(i.e., based on 2003 figures: mean age at marriage in Oman is 24.8 for men and 28.1 for 
women [258]).   
 
Figure 7-32: Relationship between marital status and percentage of online banking (OB) 
It is common in Oman that people do not open bank accounts until they start paid 
employment. This leaves an average of 3 to 4 years for high-school diploma graduates or 1 
to 2 years for college degree (4 years) graduates to have worked, and maybe utilized online 
banking services, before getting married. 
7.5.2.3 Education level 
Education level results depicted in Figure 7-33 show that the higher the education level 
achieved the greater the probability of the user adopting online banking. While only 36% 
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of technical/professional training graduates adopted online banking, 50% of college 
graduates had used online banking before. This percentage increased to 100% for those 
who had acquired a postgraduate degree.  Thus a highly significant relationship existed 
between education level and adoption of online banking (X2(3) = 21.511, p < 0.001, see 
Table 7-10).  
The crosstab analysis was re-run to test the relationship significance without including the 
Postgraduate degree group since there is only a small number of participants recorded in 
this group (5 cases).  The results again revealed a highly significant relationship between 
education level and adoption of online banking (X2(2) = 18.406, p < 0.001, see Appendix 
D2). 
 
Figure 7-33: Relationship between education level and percentage of online banking (OB) users 
These results were not surprising as online banking adoption usually increases with 
education level [259]. High-educated users are more likely to utilize online banking than 
their low-educated counterparts. They are usually more Internet literate [254] and involved 
with online services than uneducated people. This is especially true in Oman since 
computer literacy was first introduced to the primary education system in the academic 
year 1998/1999 [255].  This means that the first cohort of these students were in their final 
year of the higher education certificates by the time this experiment was conducted 
(therefore excluded).  
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7.5.2.4 Age group 
Age group, like other demographic characteristics, showed significant impacts on the 
adoption of online banking (X2(3) = 12.125, p < 0.01, see Table 7-10). The column chart 
results in Figure 7-34 justify this outcome.  
 
Figure 7-34: Relationship between age group and online banking (OB) users 
Although the percentage of respondents who adopted online banking was the same (50%) 
for both age groups 38 to 47 and 48 to 57, the small number of respondents in both these 
groups (see Table 7-11) did not impact the overall relationship between age group and 
online banking experience.  The percentage of online banking users increased from 39% 
for the age group between 18 to 27 years to 66% for the age group between 28 to 37 years, 
the same figure decreased to 50% for both age groups between 38 and 47 years and 
between 48 and 57 years (inclusive).  
Age	  Group	  (in	  years)	  
Online	  banking	  user?	  
Total	  No	   Yes	  
18	  to	  27	   44 28 72 
28	  to	  37	   30 59 89 
38	  to	  47	   8 8 16 
48	  to	  57	   1 1 2 
Total	   83 96 179 
Table 7-11: Cross tabulation between age group and users with online banking (OB) experience 
To test the effects of the small number of respondents who belong to the age groups 38 to 
47 and 48 to 57, the test was re-run excluding these two groups.  The results revealed an 
even higher significant relationship (X2(1) = 10.956, p = 0.001, see Appendix D2).  
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The results revealed that younger people in Oman are less likely to adopt online banking 
than their older counterparts. This does not confirm the findings reported in [147] where 
there was no significant link between age and users’ decision to adopt online banking in 
Saudi Arabia.  
7.5.2.5 Monthly Income Group 
Monthly income group was another demographic characteristic that showed a highly 
significant impact on online banking adoption (X2(4) = 23.399, p < 0.001, see Table 7-10). 
Individuals with higher monthly income were more likely to adopt online banking. 
 
Figure 7-35: Relationship between monthly income group (in OMR) and percentage of online 
banking (OB) users 
The stacked column chart in Figure 7-35 illustrates the positive relationship between the 
two variables. Only 39% of participants whose income was less than OMR 500 adopted 
online banking. This figure increased dramatically to the highest figure of 90% for 
participants who incurred a monthly income rate of more than OMR 1,000. The rate 
decreased to 54% for those receiving a monthly income between OMR 1,501 and 2,000 
and increased again to 82% for the last group of those who have income of more than 
OMR 2,000.  
The relatively small number of participants who belong to the last two monthly income 
groups might be the reason behind maintaining a highly significant relationship between 
monthly income group variable and online banking adoption.  The first three groups that 
reflected a steady increase of adoption pattern were seen to be the ones that affected the 
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relationship because of the number of participants involved in these groups (see Table 
7-12). 
Monthly	  Income	  Group	  (in	  OMR)	  
Online	  banking	  user?	  
Total	  No	   Yes	  
Less	  than	  500	   19 12 31 
500	  –	  1,000	   43 41 84 
1,001	  –	  1,500	   3 28 31 
1,501	  –	  2,000	   6 7 13 
More	  than	  2,000	   2 9 11 
Total	   73 97 170 
Table 7-12: Cross tabulation between monthly income group and users with online banking (OB) 
experience 
These results can be attributed to different reasons. Low-income people might have 
difficulties affording the cost of home computers and Internet services.  In Oman, banks 
also charge monthly fees on accounts with balance less than OMR 100. Thus, low-income 
people might only maintain one account and not see any benefits managing it online. 
There is a correlation between age and adoption, and also between income and adoption. 
Since income tends to rise the longer we work it could well be that these two factors are 
related in some way, but we do not have the data to confirm this.  
7.5.3 External TAM Variables Hypotheses 
The TAM variables used in this research are based on questions proposed in similar studies 
carried out by Padachi [153] and Sohail [154]. These questions were analysed and grouped 
into different related questions as mentioned in section 3.5.2. It was, therefore, important in 
this research to carry out a factor analysis to identify the interrelationship between these 
questions and to identify the most suitable related groupings possible. In this sense, and 
based on factor analysis reporting guidelines suggested by Pallant [155], the 14 items in 
Table 7-13 were subjected to principal components analysis (PCA) using SPSS 19. Prior to 
performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the 
correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Oklin value was .9, which exceeds the recommended value of .6 [260], and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity [261] reached statistical significance (p=.000), supporting the 
factorability of the correlation matrix (more details in Table 7-13). 
The principal components analysis shown in Table 7-13 revealed the presence of four 
components, explaining 50.9%, 9.5%, 6.3%, and 5.4% of the variance, respectively. These 
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results were initially rotated, using varimax rotation, to isolate more meaningful 
dimensions. The percentage of variance was reflected by a clear break after the second 
component in the screeplot (available along with Component Matrix table in Appendix D). 
All variables reported loadings scores more than 0.5. 
Factors	   Rotated	  factor	  loading	  
Percentage	  of	  
variance	  
Ease	  of	  use	    50.9% 
	   a.	  Convenient	  way	  of	  doing	  bank	  transactions	  	   .899  
	   b.	  Time	  saving	   .851  
	   c.	  Ease	  of	  performing	  e-­‐transaction	   .789  
	   d.	  User	  friendly	  web	  site	   .694  
	   e.	  Range	  of	  electronic	  services	  offered	   .665  
Trust	  and	  relationship	    9.5% 
	   a.	  Bank	  response	  rate	  to	  queries	   .821  
	   b.	  Ethical	  and	  professional	  conduct	   .780  
	   c.	  Bank’s	  policy	  to	  compensate	  for	  losses	   .775  
	   d.	  Reliability	  of	  your	  banker	   .584  
Ease	  of	  access	    6.3% 
	   a.	  Connection	  speed	   .892  
	   b.	  Convenience	  to	  access	  the	  service	   .716  
Security	    5.4% 
	   a.	  Length	  of	  Internet	  experience	   .849  
	   b.	  Security	  of	  Internet	  transaction	   .677  
	   c.	  Clear	  and	  understandable	  instructions	   .519  
KMO	  and	  Bartiett’s	  Test	  
	   Kaiser-­‐Meyer-­‐Olkin	  Measure	  of	  Sampling	  Adequacy	   .900	  
	   Bartlett’s	  Test	  of	  Sphericity	   	  Sig.	   .000	  
Table 7-13: Summary of the ‘Factor Analysis’ for factors influencing adoption of online banking 
The most significant factor was ease of use. The other influencing factors were trust and 
relationship, ease of access, and security (consistent with research reported in [153, 154] 
where trust and relationship and security were treated as external variables).  The only 
differences between these results and the previous two studies were that the analysis 
carried out in this research found a significant relationship between convenience and ease 
of use variables and that these, therefore, were combined in one component, named 
‘perceived ease of use’.  
Based on the preceding factor analysis, the three factors selected as external variables were 
trust and relationship, ease of access, and security. The TAM internal variables 
relationships such as PEU à PU, PEU/PU à Attitudes, Attitudes/PU à Intention, were 
not addressed as they are out of the scope of this research.  However, the results of other 
similar studies were reported instead.  
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Based on the literature review of studies on the same area (see sections 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.1 and 
3.5.2.3), it becomes necessary to formulate the research hypotheses for external variables 
as follow: 
H1f: Trust and relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1g:  Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1h: Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
The measurement model for this study based on TAM can therefore be represented by 
Figure 7-36 below: 
 
Figure 7-36: The measurement model of the study based on TAM 
7.5.4 Hypotheses Testing – TAM External Variables 
There are three non-demographic hypotheses (drawn in section 7.5.3):  
H1f: Trust and relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1g:  Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1h: Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
According to Pallant [155], correlation analysis can be used to describe the strength and 
direction of the relationship between two variables (e.g. Security à PEU).   
Based on the summary results of factor analysis in Table 7-13, four components were 
found to represent all 14 questions presented in section B of the pre-questionnaire: ease of 
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use, trust and relationship, ease of access, and security. Therefore, the mean scores for each 
of these components have to be calculated separately for each participant so it can be used 
in the correlation anaylsis. 
To achieve this, SPSS 19 was used to compute the mean scores of all cases and put the 
results in a new four variables, which represents the four components identified by the 
factor analysis.  These new variables data were then used to test the hypotheses using 
correlation technique in the following sections. 
7.5.4.1 Correlation analysis 
This section discusses the results relative to the correlation analysis of the hypothesis 
formed for the external variables of the proposed TAM. The relation of these variables 
with the PEU can be assessed by examining the correlation, which illustrates how strong is 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables, and the (R2) value, 
which shows the amount of variance explained by independent variables. SPSS 19 was 
used to test the correlation between the forgoing external variables of TAM and results of 
correlation are shown in Table 7-14. 
	   PEU	   T&R	   EoA	   Security	  
Perceived	  ease	  of	  use	   Pearson	  Correlation	   1    
	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	       
Trust	  and	  relationship	   Pearson	  Correlation	   .638** 1   
	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .000    
Ease	  of	  access	   Pearson	  Correlation	   .690** .508** 1  
	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .000 .000   
Security	   Pearson	  Correlation	   .676** .649** .510** 1 
	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	   .000 .000 .000  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n=184 
Table 7-14:  Correlation analysis results 
All three variables showed significant statistical support. Trust and relationship, ease of 
access, and security were correlated significantly (i.e. correlation > .6) with the PEU. All 
relationships between these variables and PEU were investigated using the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient. There was a strong, positive correlation between 
trust and relationship and PEU, r = .638, n = 148, p < .001 (R2 = 0.407, Table 7-15), with 
high levels of trust and relationship associated with high levels of PEU. The highest 
correlated variable with the PEU was ease of access which r = .690, n = 148, p < .001 (R2 
= 0.476, Table 7-15). 
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Hypothesis	   Relationship	   R2	   Correlation	   p-­‐Value	   Supported?	  
H1f	   T&R	  à	  PEU	   0.407 0.638 0.000 Yes 
H1g	   EoA	  à	  PEU	   0.476 0.690 0.000 Yes 
H1h	   Sec	  à	  PEU	   0.457 0.676 0.000 Yes 
Table 7-15: Assessment of the TAM external variables 
The second highest correlated variable with the PEU was security r = .676, n = 148, p < 
.001 (R2 = 0.457, Table 7-15). Thus, high levels of perceived security are associated with 
high levels of PEU. 
The hypotheses were tested against the results in Table 7-15. All hypotheses proposed for 
the TAM external variables were supported. 
7.5.5 Research Model 
Based on the earlier results that cover theoretical background and analyses of different 
determinants of customer attitudes toward online banking acceptance, an extended TAM 
model for online banking acceptance in Oman was derived. Figure 7-37 illustrates this 
research model and the extended variables. 
 
Figure 7-37:  Extended TAM for online banking in Oman (Note: the results shown for internal 
TAM constructs were extracted from [147]) 
To summarize, all extended variables tested in the TAM model scored significant 
relationship with PEU (see Figure 7-37). These results confirm with a similar recent study 
conducted in Saudi Arabia by Al-Somali [147]. 
 184 
 
7.6 MCA – Usability and Acceptability 
It is vital to mention that this study is concerned with the usability and acceptability of the 
multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism and is not concerned with the usability 
and acceptability of the prototype web-application. Therefore, the variables covered may 
well not be the same as the variables found in the literature for testing websites’ overall 
usability and acceptability. Also it is important to mention that in some cases, where 
appropriate, only data from existing online banking users was used since participants who 
did not use conventional online banking could not meaningfully compare the two systems 
and were, therefore, unable to tell whether MCA was a better alternative or not. 
The following subsections address the measurement of both usability and acceptability of 
the multi-channel authentication mechanism. 
7.6.1 Measuring Usability of MCA 
Usability in this research is measured using the three ISO metrics suggested by The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO): effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction [101] (defined in section 3.2). Effectiveness and efficiency of MCA were 
measured, in this study, using dependent variables such as completion-time and dropout 
rates that were collected from the application logs. Satisfaction, on the other hand, was 
measured based on respondents’ feedback on a set of 5-option Likert scales in the online-
questionnaire. Hence, the following hypotheses were tested: 
H2a: Multi-channel authentication mechanism is effective 
H2b: Multi-channel authentication mechanism is efficient 
H2c: Multi-channel authentication mechanism is satisfactory 
The following subsections report on the tests of these three hypotheses individually, based 
on the three ISO usability metrics. 
7.6.1.1 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness, in the context of MCA usability evaluation, meant that the participants were 
able to complete all tasks effectively without dropping out at any point. The application 
logs maintained detailed information about all participants who registered in the 
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experiment. This information was useful to determine the completion rates for each of the 
5 requested tasks.  
 
Figure 7-38: Completion task rate for all participants 
Figure 7-38 illustrates the completion task rate for the 188 participants who tested the 
application. It can be noted that the major dropout happened in task 1 (registration and 
mobile authentication). This task consisted of two sub-tasks: creating a profile (T1a) and 
authenticating the registered mobile number (T1b). Based on the statistical frequency 
analysis of the application logs using SPSS 19, which is depicted in Table 7-16, 43 
participants dropped out while creating their profile (i.e., entering their name and mobile 
number directly after they finished filling in the pre-questionnaire) and another 6 
participants dropped out before they successfully authenticated their registered mobile 
number. The cumulative number of participants who dropped out before completing task 1 
was 49 and this figure was the highest recorded drop out and accounted for 22.9% of the 
total participants of this study. These participants had not, at that point, tested the multi-
channel authentication (MCA) mechanism, which entered the process after the user created 
and authenticated a beneficiary account using a mobile (task 3). Therefore, completion and 
dropout rates were ignored for the first two tasks. The independent variables that might 
have caused high dropout rates in these tasks were analyzed and discussed earlier in 
section 7.3.1. 
Based on Table 7-16 figures, although the cumulative dropout rate was 37.8% for the first 
two tasks, the subsequent MCA related tasks (tasks 3, 4, and 5) recorded only a 12.7% 
dropout (T5e cumulative dropout rate – T2a cumulative dropout rate). Furthermore, there 
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was 2.7% to 3.1% dropout rate for sub-tasks T3b, T4a, and T5b. These tasks were basic 
functions that did not directly involve MCA to accomplish. 
Tasks	   Completed	  N	  =	  188	   Dropped	  out	  
Task	  1:	  Registration	  &	  mobile	  authentication N	   %	   N	   %	   C.	  ≈%*	  	   T1a.	  Create	  a	  profile	   145	   77.1	   43	   22.9	   22.9	  	   T1b.	  Authenticate	  mobile	  number	   139	   73.9	   6	   3.2	   26.1	  
Task	  2:	  Authentication	  channel	   N	   %	   N	   %	   C.	  ≈%*	  	   T2a.	  Select	  an	  authentication	  channel	   117	   62.2	   22	   11.7	   37.8	  
Task	  3:	  Beneficiary	  account	  creation	   N	   %	   N	   %	   C.	  ≈%*	  	   T3a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   115	   61.2	   2	   1.1	   38.8	  	   T3b.	  Create	  an	  account	  	   109	   58.0	   6	   3.2	   42.0	  	   T3c.	  Activate	  the	  account	   108	   57.4	   1	   0.5	   42.6	  
Task	  4:	  Money	  transfer	   N	   %	   N	   %	   C.	  ≈%*	  	   T4a.	  Fill	  transfer	  details	   102	   54.3	   6	   3.2	   45.7	  	   T4b.	  Confirm	  the	  transfer	   102	   54.3	   0	   0.0	   45.7	  
Task	  5:	  Alternative	  channel N	   %	   N	   %	   C.	  ≈%*	  	   T5a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   100	   53.2	   2	   1.1	   46.8	  	   T5b.	  Create	  a	  new	  account	  	   95	   50.5	   5	   2.7	   49.5	  	   T5c.	  Open	  activation	  page	   93	   49.5	   2	   1.1	   50.5	  	   T5d.	  Switch	  to	  alternative	  channel	   93	   49.5	   0	   0.0	   50.5	  	   T5e.	  Activate	  the	  account	   93	   49.5	   0	   0.0	   50.5	  
*	  Rounded	  cumulative	  dropout	  percentage	  
Table 7-16: Sub-tasks completion and dropout rates 
T3b and T5b were identical and requested users to create a beneficiary account by 
submitting a name and an account number using a basic form with text boxes and drop-
down menus. T4a, likewise, requested users to submit the amount of money they would 
like to transfer using a form with only two text boxes and a submit button. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that these users encountered usability issues or even made an effort to try to 
accomplish these simple tasks. The dropout rate of these sub-tasks (total of 8.9% dropout 
rate) could have been caused by other unknown external factors. This decreases the total 
dropout rates that were more likely to be caused by the MCA mechanism to 3.8% (12.7% - 
8.9%). According to [262], a technology is effective as long as only less than 5% of its 
users will have technical issues. These technical issues could lead them to request support 
or to abandon the system, or hence, to dropout in the context of this study’s experiment.   
Since the analysis revealed that only 3.8% (less than 5%) of total participants dropped out 
before completing all tasks because of usability issues related to the MCA mechanism, the 
effectiveness hypothesis of MCA, therefore, was supported. 
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7.6.1.2 Efficiency 
Efficiency is another usability metric defined by ISO. It can be evaluated by measuring the 
completion time of each task and sub-task separately. A system is considered efficient if 
users are able to accomplish tasks such as registration within a reasonable time. The 
response and loading time variables were neglected here since this study was testing the 
usability of the MCA mechanism rather than the web application design itself, as stated 
earlier in this section.   
This study was comprised of 5 tasks, each of which had one to five sub-tasks. A sub-task, 
most of the time, is represented by one web document where users are instructed to enter 
details in a form provided within that page or extract useful information (e.g., OTP, SMS 
message, or password) that the user might need in other subsequent tasks. Nevertheless, 
there are few sub-tasks that request users to access more than one page at a time to fulfil 
the requirements. For example, T1b (Task 1, sub-task b) was part of the registration and 
mobile authentication task. The main requirement of this sub-task was to authenticate the 
mobile number the user had to submit at T1a (creating a profile). The user was instructed 
by the application to open a web page that showed a mobile phone icon. Next, the user was 
advised to click on the mobile phone icon to read the SMS message, which contained the 
OTP, in a new web page that simulated a mobile phone. Finally, the user would have to 
navigate through the simulator and copy the OTP, after which the simulator would be 
closed and the OTP would be entered in the text field that would automatically appear in 
the previous web page (the page that originally has the mobile phone icon). 
To investigate the completion time for each sub-task, statistical frequency analysis in SPSS 
19 was used to extract the mean and median of the time-spent variable. The results are 
depicted in Table 7-17.   
The mean scores provided in Table 7-17 clearly show that most of the sub-tasks 
completion times were below one minute. The highest completion times recorded were for 
the three tasks T1b, T3c and T5e which incurred mean scores of 83.4, 87.9 and 74.2 seconds 
respectively.  This could be a result of the fact that the users are requested to open the 
mobile simulator in all these three tasks to read the SMS message, extract the OTP and 
then entering it into the screen for final submission. The change in mean score between the 
similar sub-tasks cannot be attributed to learning effects because both 2nd and 3rd tasks 
were similar, as mentioned, to the first task T1b (task 1, sub-task b: authenticating mobile 
number). The only difference between T1b and the other tasks was that the first task’s OTP 
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was used to authenticate the mobile number, while the OTP of T3c and T5e was used to 
activate a beneficiary account. Therefore, if learning effect were the reason behind the 
decrease in the completion time mean score between T3c and T5e, then it would make more 
sense that T1b would incur a longer completion time mean than both T3c and T5e, while it 
incurred only 83.4 seconds as shown in Table 7-17. 
Tasks	  
Completion	  time	  (in	  seconds)	  
Mean	   Median	  
Task	  1:	  Registration	  &	  mobile	  authentication	   Total 168.32	   132	  	   T1a.	  Create	  a	  profile	   67.4 58 	   T1b.	  Authenticate	  mobile	  number	   83.43 74 
Task	  2:	  Authentication	  channel	  	   Total	   44.85 36 	   T2a.	  Select	  an	  authentication	  channel	   44.85 36 
Task	  3:	  Beneficiary	  account	  creation	  	   Total	   209.36 175 	   T3a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   43.31 37 	   T3b.	  Create	  an	  account	  	   40.36 39 	   T3c.	  Activate	  the	  account	   87.89 69 
Task	  4:	  Money	  transfer	  	   Total	   66.11 49 	   T4a.	  Fill	  transfer	  details	   36.16 26 	   T4b.	  Confirm	  the	  transfer	   23.95 19 
Task	  5:	  Alternative	  channel	  	   Total 160.21 122 	   T5a.	  Open	  accounts	  page	   67.57 46 	   T5b.	  Create	  a	  new	  account	  	   61.8 52 	   T5c.	  Open	  activation	  page	   24.85 14 	   T5d.	  Switch	  to	  alternative	  channel	   12.44 7 	   T5e.	  Activate	  the	  account	   74.17 59.5 
Table 7-17:  Completion time of experiment tasks 
Although completion-time in online-based experiments is not as reliable as other 
measurements used to test other hypotheses due to unforeseen environmental and personal 
factors (e.g., answering a phone call, discussing prompt issue with a colleague, sudden 
power shut-down, having a cup of coffee, etc…) which can intervene and affect the time 
spent on each task, it can still be made more reliable with the support of qualitative scales. 
For example, a supportive qualitative measurement of MCA efficiency was the mean score 
recorded for one of the post-questionnaire statements that asked the user to state how much 
he or she agrees or disagrees with the following statement (using 5-option Likert scale, 1 
strong disagree to 5 strong agree):  
I feel that MCA has just made things complicated and time-consuming 
Based on the analysis results illustrated in Table 7-19, the mean score for this statement 
was 2.4 (Median = 2, Mode = 1). This mean score was the lowest score recorded among 
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other statements and it clearly shows that most of the users did not find MCA a time-
consuming technology overall. However, the implementation of an on-screen simulated 
mobile phone could have affected these results where delivery delay of SMS messages and 
mobile network signal have been neglected. 
For all the reasons covered in this section, the efficiency hypothesis of MCA was 
supported. 
7.6.1.3 Effects of experience, gender and age on usability (efficiency) 
The effects of participants’ grouping existed in the independent variables such as 
experience (experienced users and inexperienced users), gender (male and female) and age 
(18-27, 28-37, 38-47, 48-57 and more than 57 years) was investigated to test for 
differences between these groups on overall tasks completion time. 
Mann-Whitney U Test was used to test all variables where independent-sample t-test was 
used to confirm these results. The data in each variable had enough participants to ignore 
the normality distribution assumption of t-test except for gender which had lower than 30 
female users (was ignored therefore). 
The Mann-Whitney U Test results in Table 7-18 revealed no significant difference in the 
overall tasks completion time of all groups of variables tested (experience, gender and age 
group). All probability values (p) were higher than the significance level (.05).  The results 
of the variables experience and age group were also confirmed by the outcome of the 
independent-sample t-test. 
Variables	   Groups	   N	  
p	  
U	  Test	   t-­‐test	  Experience	   Online	  banking	  users	   52 
.552 .503 Non-­‐online	  banking	  users	   33 Gender	   Female	   28 
.813 - Male	   59 Age	  Group	  (years)	   18	  to	  27	   34 .707 .681 28	  to	  37	  	   42 
Table 7-18:  Results of Mann-Whitney U Test and independent-sample t-test for differences 
between experience, gender and age group on overall tasks completion time. 
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7.6.1.4 Satisfaction 
Satisfaction is the most subjective part of usability [263] and it  is necessary to ensure that 
users will continue to use the technology.  In the context of this study, satisfaction was 
tested based on a set of Likert scales. These questions aligned with [98]’s model of the 
attributes of system acceptability (usability part of the model) as well as with the system 
usability scale (SUS), a usability scale by [233] that can be used for global assessments of 
systems usability. 
To evaluate users’ satisfaction based on the questions asked in the questionnaire, it is first 
necessary to describe the mean scores for each of these questions.  
Variables,	  scale:	  [Strong	  Disagree	  (1)	  to	  Strong	  Agree	  (5)]	   Mean	   Median	   Mode	  If	  multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  (MCA)	  service	  is	  implemented	  by	  your	  bank,	  I	  would	  recommend	  it	  to	  others	   4.3 5 5 I	  expected	  the	  MCA	  to	  work	  the	  way	  it	  did	   4.2 4 4 I	  trust	  that	  MCA	  would	  protect	  me	  from	  Internet	  fraud	  and	  attacks	   4.0 4 5 I	  feel	  that	  MCA	  has	  just	  made	  things	  complicated	  and	  time-­‐consuming	   2.4 2 1 With	  MCA,	  I	  am	  not	  worried	  about	  using	  public	  computers	  for	  Internet	  banking	  services	   3.6 4 3 I	  would	  imagine	  that	  most	  people	  would	  learn	  to	  use	  this	  system	  very	  quickly	   3.8 4 4 I	  found	  the	  alternative	  channel	  feature	  convenient	  when	  (in	  case)	  my	  primary	  channel	  (for	  example	  your	  mobile	  phone)	  is	  unavailable	   4.3 5 5 I	  would	  prefer	  to	  use	  the	  alternative	  channel	  option	  than	  making	  a	  call-­‐center/help-­‐desk	  call	   4.1 4 5 
Table 7-19:  Descriptive statistics of usability questions 
Table 7-19 provides a descriptive analysis of the user usability questions. It can be noted 
that the lowest mean score was for the only negative-type question about MCA, ‘I feel that 
MCA has just made things complicated and time-consuming’ with an average mean score 
of 2.4 (median = 2, mode = 1). This indicates that participants found MCA to be effective 
and efficient to use; supporting the results drawn in sections 7.6.1.1 and 7.6.1.2. 
In terms of security, although most of participants were neutral when answered the 
question ‘With MCA, I am not worried about using public computers for Internet banking 
services’ (mode = 3), they gave very positive responses to the question ‘I trust that MCA 
would protect me from Internet fraud and attacks’ with mean score of 4.0 (median = 4, 
mode = 5). 
It is also clear that the top two variables that scored the highest mean of 4.3 were ‘If multi-
channel authentication (MCA) service is implemented by your bank, I would recommend it 
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to others’ and ‘I found the alternative channel feature convenient when (in case) my 
primary channel in unavailable’. These figures indicate that online users found both the 
multi-channel authentication mechanism and the emergency alternative authentication 
channel feature usable and were satisfied. Moreover, the fact that users were prepared to 
market the idea and recommend it to their friends was an indication of their overall 
satisfaction and willingness to accept and adopt the MCA technology. Therefore, the 
satisfaction hypothesis of MCA was supported. 
7.6.1.5 Effects of social relationships on usability (satisfaction) 
To further validate this outcome, the affects of social relationships on satisfaction were 
also analyzed using the Mann-Whitney U Test. 
Factors	  
F&C?*	   Md**	  
Z	   p	  	   r***	  
Yes	   No	   F&C	   Oth.	  If	  MCA	  service	  is	  implemented	  by	  your	  bank,	  I	  would	  recommend	  it	  to	  others	   43 36 5.0 4.0 -0.981 0.33 0.11 I	  expected	  the	  MCA	  to	  work	  the	  way	  it	  did	   43 36 4.0 4.0 -0.363 0.72 0.04 I	  trust	  that	  MCA	  would	  protect	  me	  from	  Internet	  fraud	  and	  attacks	   43 35 4.0 4.0 -0.293 0.77 0.03 I	  feel	  that	  MCA	  has	  just	  made	  things	  complicated	  and	  time-­‐consuming	   43 36 2.0 2.5 -1.172 0.24 0.13 With	  MCA,	  I	  am	  not	  worried	  about	  using	  public	  computers	  for	  Internet	  banking	  services	   42 36 4.0 3.0 -0.545 0.59 0.06 I	  would	  imagine	  that	  most	  people	  would	  learn	  to	  use	  this	  system	  very	  quickly	   43 36 4.0 4.0 -0.727 0.47 0.08 I	  found	  the	  alternative	  channel	  feature	  convenient	  when	  (in	  case)	  my	  primary	  channel	  (for	  example	  your	  mobile	  phone)	  is	  unavailable	   41 36 5.0 4.5 -0.290 0.77 0.03 I	  would	  prefer	  to	  use	  the	  alternative	  channel	  option	  than	  making	  a	  call-­‐center/help-­‐desk	  call	   43 36 4.0 4.0 -0.100 0.92 0.01 
*	  Friends	  and	  colleagues?,	  **	  Median	  
***	  effect	  size	  was	  calculated	  manually	  based	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  Test.	  	  The	  formula	  
used	  was:	  r	  =	  |z|	  /	  square	  root	  of	  N	  [155]	  (N:	  total	  number	  of	  cases	  for	  both	  OB	  and	  none-­‐OB	  users)	  
Table 7-20:  Comparative evaluation of social relationships on satisfaction using Mann-W. U Test 
Table 7-20 illustrates the outcome of the test. It can be clearly noticed that the p values are 
larger than .05, which indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
satisfaction scores of friends and colleagues and other participants.  
7.6.1.6 Effects of experience, gender and age on usability (satisfaction) 
The outcome drawn in section 0 represented the results for all participants who completed 
all tasks and did the post-questionnaire.  This includes experienced users who already 
adopted online banking services and the inexperienced users who are unfamiliar with 
online banking services. To investigate the effects of experience on users’ satisfaction 
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measured earlier in section 0, a Mann-Whitney U Test technique is used to compare the 
mean scores of usability variables for experienced and inexperienced online banking users. 
The same test was carried out to also check for effects of gender and age on usability 
(satisfaction). The alternative independent-sample t-test was not a suitable technique 
because the data violated some general assumptions for this test such as homogeneity of 
variance and normal distribution of sample (cannot be ignored since total number of 
inexperienced users were less than 30). The results of Mann-Whitney U Test are shown in 
Table 7-21. 
Factors	  
N,	  Exp.?*	  
p	  
N,	  Gender	  
p	  	  
N,	  Age	  Group	  
p	  
Yes	   No	   M	   F	   18-­‐27	   28-­‐37	  If	  multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  (MCA)	  service	  is	  implemented	  by	  your	  bank,	  I	  would	  recommend	  it	  to	  others	   52 25 0.69 55 24 0.70 32 38 0.18 I	  expected	  the	  MCA	  to	  work	  the	  way	  it	  did	   52 25 0.62 55 24 0.78 32 38 0.73 I	  trust	  that	  MCA	  would	  protect	  me	  from	  Internet	  fraud	  and	  attacks	   52 24 0.15 54 24 0.57 32 38 0.90 I	  feel	  that	  MCA	  has	  just	  made	  things	  complicated	  and	  time-­‐consuming	   52 25 0.69 55 24 0.07 32 38 0.32 With	  MCA,	  I	  am	  not	  worried	  about	  using	  public	  computers	  for	  Internet	  banking	  services	   51 25 0.72 54 24 0.18 32 37 0.72 I	  would	  imagine	  that	  most	  people	  would	  learn	  to	  use	  this	  system	  very	  quickly	   52 25 0.41 55 24 0.61 32 38 0.94 I	  found	  the	  alternative	  channel	  feature	  convenient	  when	  (in	  case)	  my	  primary	  channel	  (for	  example	  your	  mobile	  phone)	  is	  unavailable	   51 24 0.84 53 24 0.44 31 37 0.70 I	  would	  prefer	  to	  use	  the	  alternative	  channel	  option	  than	  making	  a	  call-­‐center/help-­‐desk	  call	   52 25 0.15 55 24 0.84 32 38 0.91 
*	  Experienced	  user?	  
Table 7-21:  Comparative evaluation of experience, gender, and age on users’ satisfaction (MCA) 
using Mann-Whitney U Test 
All probability values (p) shown in Table 7-21 in the experience column were not less than 
or equal to .05, so the results were not significant. There were no statistically significant 
differences in the satisfaction scores of experienced users and non-experienced users.  
The same results apply for gender and age group. None of these independent variables 
found to have significant differences in the satisfaction scores among their groups 
(male/female and 18-27/28-37 years). All probability values (p) for both gender and age 
were greater than the significance level of .05. Therefore, no further investigation of effect 
size was needed.  
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7.6.2 Measuring Acceptability of MCA 
Acceptance of online banking technology was covered thoroughly in section 7.5. Both 
online users with and without online banking experience were involved in the study and all 
data was used to test the hypotheses. However, to investigate the user acceptability of the 
multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism, only participants with online banking 
experience were considered. It was not feasible to ask customers who had not utilized or 
tested online banking services before to give feedback on a new online banking 
technology. They did not have the required background experience on the existing 
technology on which to base their decisions and opinions on a new one.  
Participants were asked to indicate how likely they would be to use different online 
banking services on an online banking system with and without multi-channel 
authentication (based on their existing experience with conventional online banking). To 
analyze these data, two statistical techniques available as suggested by [155]: paired-
samples t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.  Both techniques are used when comparing 
the mean scores for one group of people based on two different conditions. In this case, the 
study compared the mean scores for online banking users’ preferences when using a 
conventional online banking system and when using an online banking system with a 
multi-channel authentication mechanism. The same assumptions drawn for the 
independent-sample t-test and Mann-Whitney U Test discussed earlier in section 7.5.4 
applied here for both techniques. While considering the violation of the normally 
distributed assumption due to the large sample size, this study tested the data using paired-
samples t-test first and then confirmed the results with the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test as 
presented in the subsequent sub-sections.  
7.6.2.1 Paired-samples t-test 
Table 7-22 shows a brief summary of the results of paired-samples t-test analysis by SPSS 
19 for online users when using online banking systems with multi-channel authentication 
(OBMCA) and when using conventional online banking systems (COB) (more detailed 
results are provided in Appendix D).  
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Variables	  
M*	  
t	  
Sig.	  	  
(2-­‐
tailed)	  
eta**	  
squared	  OBMCA	   COB	  1.	  Do	  inter	  account	  funds	  transfer	   4.06	   3.36	   3.600 0.001 .146	  2.	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  personal	  account	   4.18	   2.89	   6.424 0.000 .355	  3.	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  local	  bank	  account	   4.17	   2.99	   6.434 0.000 .353	  4.	  Transfer	  funds	  to	  credit	  card	  account	   4.05	   3.19	   5.553 0.000 .289	  5.	  Do	  foreign	  transfer	   3.82	   2.38	   7.532 0.000 .431	  6.	  Top-­‐up	  mobile	  phones	   4.07	   2.61	   8.291 0.000 .478	  7.	  Order	  cheque	  books	   3.79	   3.32	   2.509 0.014 .076	  8.	  Stop	  lost	  ATM	  cards	   3.99	   3.42	   2.626 0.010 .082	  9.	  Stop	  lost	  credit	  cards	   3.93	   3.45	   2.302 0.024 .066	  10.	  Apply	  for	  a	  credit	  card	  limit	  change	   3.87	   2.97	   4.489 0.000 .210	  11.	  Request	  the	  issue	  of	  current	  acct.	  state.	   4.39	   3.73	   3.872 0.000 .165	  12.	  Setup	  standing	  order	  transactions	   4.08	   2.88	   6.739 0.000 .380	  13.	  Setup	  new	  account	   3.81	   2.73	   4.871 0.000 .236	  14.	  Apply	  for	  foreign	  currency	  accounts	   3.59	   2.88	   3.233 0.002 .125	  15.	  Apply	  for	  debit/credit	  card	   3.86	   2.83	   5.373 0.000 .278	  16.	  Apply	  for	  a	  loan	   3.43	   2.53	   4.027 0.000 .180	  17.	  Request	  telephone	  banking	   3.86	   2.84	   4.809 0.000 .236	  
*	  M:	  Mean	  scores;	  OBMCA:	  Online	  banking	  with	  MC;	  COB:	  Conventional	  online	  banking	  (without	  MCA)	  
**	  eta	  squared	  was	  calculated	  manually	  based	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  paired-­‐samples	  t-­‐test	  in	  Appendex	  D.	  
The	  formula	  used	  was:	  t2	  /	  (t2	  +	  (N	  –	  1))	  	  
Table 7-22: Paired-samples t-test comparing online users’ preferences for using online banking 
services on systems with MCA and without MCA 
7.6.2.2 Discussion 
The results show significant differences in users’ preferences between OBMCA and COB 
in all of the services offered. The top five services which scored the highest magnitude of 
the MCA’s effect were make payment to other personal account, make payment to other 
local bank account, do foreign transfer, paying to top-up mobile phones and setup standing 
order transactions with eta squared of .355, .353, .431, .478 and .380 respectively. These 
scores represent a substantial difference in users’ preferences between OBMCA and COB 
(i.e., based on [264] guidelines that state an eta squared score above .14 represents a large 
effect). These five services were services that either participants might use on a daily basis 
or have security concerns using them via conventional online banking, unlike other 
services, such as ordering a chequebook, stopping a lost ATM card, applying for a loan, or 
requesting telephone banking. This indicates that participants were concerned about the 
services they required more frequently or those that involves money transfer to a foreign 
accounts or countries. This can also be supported by the fact that the least mean scored 
among all services was the ‘Do foreign transfer’ service. The lowest mean scores of this 
service in conventional online banking reflects the unwillingness of bank customers to 
utilize such service without improved authentication technology such as MCA. 
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7.6.2.3 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is a non-parametric alternative statistical technique to the 
paired-samples t-test and especially used for the data that are measured only at the ordinal 
(ranked) level.  Similarly to the Mann-Whitney U Test, the normal distribution assumption 
is not required for this technique. 
Variables	   Z	  
Sig.	  	  
(2-­‐tailed)	   Effect	  size	  r	  *	  1.	  Do	  inter	  account	  funds	  transfer	   -3.310 0.001 0.26 2.	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  personal	  account	   -5.144 0.000 0.41 3.	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  local	  bank	  account	   -5.049 0.000 0.40 4.	  Transfer	  funds	  to	  credit	  card	  account	   -4.691 0.000 0.37 5.	  Do	  foreign	  transfer	   -5.684 0.000 0.46 6.	  Top-­‐up	  mobile	  phones	   -5.849 0.000 0.47 7.	  Order	  cheque	  books	   -2.401 0.016 0.19 8.	  Stop	  lost	  ATM	  cards	   -2.216 0.027 0.18 9.	  Stop	  lost	  credit	  cards	   -2.177 0.029 0.17 10.	  Apply	  for	  a	  credit	  card	  limit	  change	   -4.063 0.000 0.32 11.	  Request	  the	  issue	  of	  current	  account	  statement	   -3.479 0.001 0.28 12.	  Setup	  standing	  order	  transactions	   -5.337 0.000 0.43 13.	  Setup	  new	  account	   -4.163 0.000 0.33 14.	  Apply	  for	  foreign	  currency	  accounts	   -3.043 0.002 0.24 15.	  Apply	  for	  debit/credit	  card	   -4.320 0.000 0.35 16.	  Apply	  for	  a	  loan	   -3.564 0.000 0.29 17.	  Request	  telephone	  banking	   -4.214 0.000 0.34 
*	  Effect	  size	  was	  calculated	  manually	  based	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  Wilcoxon	  Signed	  Rank	  Test.	  	  The	  formula	  
used	  was:	  r	  =	  |z|	  /	  square	  root	  of	  N	  [155]	  (N:	  total	  number	  of	  cases	  for	  both	  OB	  and	  none-­‐OB	  users)	  
Table 7-23: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test comparing online users’ preferences for using online 
banking services on systems with MCA and without MCA 
7.6.2.4 Discussion 
The results from Table 7-23 show significant differences in all users’ preferences between 
OBMCA and COB in most of the services offered. This was identical to the results from 
the paired-samples t-test presented in Table 7-22. The top five variables that scored highest 
effect size (r) were Make payment to other personal account, Make payment to other local 
bank account, Do foreign transfer, Top-up mobile phones and Setup standing order 
transactions with effect size values of 0.41, 0.40, 0.46, 0.47 and 0.43 respectively.  These 
results confirmed the results found earlier from paired-samples t-test. 
The variables Stop lost ATM cards and Stop lost credit cards were among the variables that 
scored the lowest significance rates in both tests and this can be attributed to the fact that 
both of these services do not pose high risk to the account holder.  They do not involve 
money transactions and therefore the majority of the participants did not mind using either 
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online banking with MCA or conventional online banking technologies to utilize such 
services online. 
Overall, both tests confirmed that the participants in this study accepted and preferred to 
use online banking web-application with MCA than other conventional online banking 
authentication techniques for all 17 banking services listed in section B of the post-
questionnaire (see Appendix B4). 
7.6.3 Comparison with Other Studies 
Table 7-24 summarizes the differences and matches between this research and Weir’s 
study discussed in section 3.3.1. 
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   Weir’s	  study	  2010	  [122]	   This	  research	  
Demographics	   • 141 participants from UK 
• 77 female and 64 male 
• 93 online banking users and 48 non-OB users 
• 188 participants from Oman 
• 62 female, 124 male and 2 missing 
• 99 online banking users, 86 non-OB users and 3 missing 
Research	  
methodology	  
• Controlled environment 
• OTPs were delivered to physical mobile phones given to users 
(Sony Ericsson K-700 model) via SMS 
• Uncontrolled environment 
• OTPs were delivered to a simulated on-screen mobile phone 
(Sony Ericsson 7-750 model) via SMS  
Statistical	  techniques	   • Parametric • Parametric confirmed by non-parametric 
Findings 
Effectiveness	   • Multi-channel authentication was the most effective (without no 
problems facing the participants) authentication method 
compared to other 2-factor authentication mechanisms 
• Multi-channel authentication was effective with a 3.8% dropout 
rate (section 7.6.1.1) 
Efficiency	   • Not measured • MCA was found efficient based on time-completion rates and 
usability questionnaire (section 7.6.1.2) 
Satisfaction	   • 2-factor authentication methods scored significantly higher than 
the 1-factor method for online banking authentication usability 
metrics used in the questionnaire overall 
• Multi-channel authentication method scored significantly higher 
than the conventional 1-factor/2-factors authentication methods 
for online banking (section 0) 
Security	   • The majority of participants were interested in the security 
benefits of OTP via secondary device or channel 
• The majority of participants trusted that MCA method would 
protect them from online fraud and attacks (section 0) 
Age	  *	  Usability	   • Younger participants scored significantly higher in terms of 
usability than their older counterparts 
• No significant differences found in the satisfaction scores among 
different age groups (section 7.6.1.6) 
Experience	  effects	   • Previous experience effected usability scores awarded to each 
authentication method tested 
• Previous experience had no effects on satisfaction of users 
towards MCA method (section 7.6.1.6)  
• Previous experience had no effects on efficiency of MCA method 
(section 7.6.1.3) 
Table 7-24: Comparison of findings between this research and another study in the same area 
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7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the survey design and data collection techniques used in this 
study. It explained different preliminary analyses including data preparation and screening, 
which were necessary to provide valid and clean data for the hypothesis testing and 
analysis. More importantly, this chapter provided empirical results that support the 
theoretical evaluation of multi-channel authentication covered in section 5.4 of Chapter 5. 
The results supported all hypotheses. Details of the hypotheses testing results are 
illustrated in Table 7-25 below. 
Hypotheses	   Results	  
Online	  banking	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H1a:	   Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1b:	   Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1c:	   Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online 
banking	   Supported	  H1d:	   Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1e:	   Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1f:	   Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   Supported	  H1g:	   Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   Supported	  H1h:	   Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   Supported	  
Multi-­‐channel	  Authentication	  is	  usable	  and	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H2a:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  effective	   Supported	  H2b:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  efficient	   Supported	  H2c:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  satisfactory	   Supported	  H2d:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	   Supported	  
Table 7-25: Hypotheses testing results  
The adoption of online banking in Oman was found to be influenced by different 
demographic factors such as gender, marital status, education level, and income level as 
well as other external variables such as trust and relationship, ease of access, and security. 
All these factors had an impact on customers’ decisions about whether or not to accept and 
adopt online banking in Oman. These results were found to be consistent with the results of 
similar studies by [5] and [4]. The former found that security is the major factor that affects 
people’ decisions to adopt online banking in Oman. The latter, likewise, found security and 
other factors such as ease of access, and trust and relationship to be among the main 
drivers of online banking adoption. Both of these results were confirmed by the outcomes 
of this study. 
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The second set of hypotheses was proved by testing the usability and acceptability of the 
multi-channel authentication mechanism. Usability was tested based on the three usability 
metrics defined by the ISO standards: effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. For the 
MCA to be effective, at least 95% of the online banking customers should have been able 
to complete the tasks without making mistakes. Efficiency in the context of MCA meant 
that online banking customers were able to accomplish online banking transactions using 
the MCA mechanism in a reasonable time and with reasonable effort. Satisfaction, on the 
other hand, meant the customers felt satisfied about MCA, and therefore, the continuity of 
their usage of online banking with MCA and their willingness to recommend this service to 
others were ensured.   
Acceptability of the MCA mechanism was the final factor to be evaluated in this chapter. It 
was necessary to narrow the data used to test acceptability to only those customers who 
had already experienced conventional online banking. This was important to eliminate any 
biased results that could have resulted if non-online banking customers were involved in 
the test to show their acceptance of the MCA mechanism without prior experience with 
online banking services. All the usability and acceptability hypotheses enumerated at the 
beginning of this chapter were supported. 
The findings from usability measures were compared with another study published by 
Weir in 2010. The comparison revealed the areas where the two populations of UK and 
Oman differs or matches in terms of their perceptions of usability and security for online 
banking authentication methods. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The recent advances in communication and Internet technology have made online services 
more widely accessible. This has encouraged companies around the world, including the 
banking sector, to utilize online services for new business opportunities. Included in these 
new services were online banking services offered by banks. Online banking offered 
customers usable and accessible ways of doing banking from home or work. More recent 
technologies, such as 3G networks, have allowed customers to access their bank accounts 
and accomplish transaction requests using portable devices like PDAs, mobile phones, and 
notebooks. 
On the other hand, these technological advances, along with the rich and sensitive 
information exchanged between the clients and their service providers have attracted 
Internet users with other agendas, honing their skills and developing new techniques to 
compromise other customers’ accounts. Online banking services, as one of the targeted 
financial services, have implemented a number of different authentication mechanisms to 
withstand these attacks. The most recent authentication mechanisms utilize three basic 
authentication approaches: multilevel authentication, multi-channel authentication, and 
multi-factor authentication. None of these offers protection against more sophisticated 
attacks such as phishing and man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks. 
This study proposed a multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism that combines the 
strength of the three popular authentication approaches: multilevel, multi-channel, and 
multi-factor. These three authentication approaches were amalgamated to form an 
authentication mechanism that can better protect customers’ accounts against most known 
attacks including phishing and MITB. A prototype web-application using MCA was 
designed and implemented to support the evaluation of the first part of the thesis statement: 
“It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple channels to resist 
attacks more effectively than most commonly used mechanisms”. Different users were 
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asked to participate in the experiment to test the second part of the thesis statement: “Such 
a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to users in Oman.” 
The following hypotheses in Table 8-1 were tested: 
Hypotheses	  
Online	  banking	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H1a:	   Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	  H1b:	   Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	  H1c:	   Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	  H1d:	   Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	  H1e:	   Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	  H1f:	   Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	  H1g:	   Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	  H1h:	   Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	  
Multi-­‐channel	  Authentication	  is	  usable	  and	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H2a:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  effective	  H2b:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  efficient	  H2c:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  satisfactory	  H2d:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	  
Table 8-1:  Hypotheses tested in this study 
8.2 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The general research topic addressed by this thesis was whether security of online banking 
users’ accounts could be increased while maintaining or also increasing usability. The 
specific thesis statement was “It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that 
uses multiple channels to resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used 
mechanisms. Furthermore, such a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to 
users in Oman”. The main research objectives defined in this thesis were as follows: 
Objective 1. Review the most commonly used authentication classes, authentication 
mechanisms, and authentication attacks. 
Objective 2. Review the usability and acceptability aspects of authentication mechansims 
and the evaluation techniques used to assess them for new information 
technologies. 
Objective 3. With respect to online banking, discuss some of the currently used 
authentication mechanisms and identify their weaknesses, showing how 
 202 
 
they fail to protect customers’ accounts against different attacks identified 
in objective 1.  
Objective 4. Propose an authentication mechanism solution that addresses the security 
and usability problems identified and listed in objective 2. Theoretically 
evaluate the security of this solution and identify all features needed for 
implementation.  
Objective 5. Empirically evaluate the new proposed mechanism with respect to usability 
and acceptability.    
To meet the first objective, a thorough review of literature was undertaken. Six 
authentication classes were identified: knowledge-based, token-based, biometric-based, 
relationship-based, process-based, and location-based. These classes were compared to 
identify the advantages and disadvantages of each. They were then categorized with 
respect to implementation into four categories: single-factor, multi-factor, multilevel, and 
multilevel multi-channel authentication mechanisms. Finally, various attack methods that 
target these authentication mechanisms were discussed based on the communication 
component they target. These core communication components are the online service 
provider (OSP), the communication channel (CC), and the end user (EU).  
To address the second objective, the current status of online banking applications (OBAs) 
was discussed. These applications were categorized, according to the service types offered 
to customers, into three categories: informational, local-transactional, and transactional. 
Each category needs a different authentication mechanism setup depending on the risk 
associated with the services offered. In order to evaluate mechanisms implemented in these 
categories, three case studies were discussed based on real OBAs. Further discussions 
identified the points of failure. 
The third objective was met by proposing a new multilevel, multi-channel, and multi-factor 
authentication mechanism. Three design recommendations were suggested: user-defined 
secret keys, multi-language support, and key delivery encryption. These were intended to 
increase security and usability of the proposed solution. Security was evaluated based on 
threat-model analysis. Firstly, the attacks of the application were identified and categorized 
according to the STRIDE process by Microsoft into six categories: spoofing, tampering, 
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege, and DREAD. 
An attack tree for the identified threats was constructed and the threats were evaluated 
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using a scenario-based evaluation process. Finally, risk mitigation and security controls 
were identified. 
As part of the third objective, a prototype application was designed to test the proposed 
authentication mechanism empirically. This application simulated a real OBA and met the 
proposed solution guidelines. It further utilized an emergency authentication mechanism 
based on the relationship authentication class that can be triggered in case the secondary 
channel device (the mobile phone) is unavailable to complete the transaction. Finally, a list 
of other features and guidelines were included to complement and facilitate the actual 
implementation of the proposed multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism. 
To meet the fourth objective, the usability and acceptability of the proposed solution were 
evaluated empirically by inviting users to test the prototype application. Two sets of online 
questionnaires and an indirect observation survey technique were used to collect feedback 
from the participants. The users were asked to complete 5 different tasks that provided data 
to support analysis. These data were analyzed to identify the factors affecting the adoption 
of online banking in Oman and to measure the usability and acceptability of the proposed 
MCA mechanism. 
To conclude, the outcome of these analyses according to the hypotheses testing results are 
shown in Table 8-2: 
Hypotheses	   Results	  
Online	  banking	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H1a:	   Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1b:	   Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1c:	   Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online 
banking	   Supported	  H1d:	   Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1e:	   Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	   Supported	  H1f:	   Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   Supported	  H1g:	   Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   Supported	  H1h:	   Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	   Supported	  
Multi-­‐channel	  Authentication	  is	  usable	  and	  acceptable	  to	  users	  in	  Oman	  H2a:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  effective	   Supported	  H2b:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  efficient	   Supported	  H2c:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  satisfactory	   Supported	  H2d:	   Multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  is	  acceptable	  to	  users	   Supported	  
Table 8-2: Hypotheses testing results 
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8.3 Future Work 
This thesis has contributed to usable, improved security by contributing both knowledge 
and practical applications of a MCA mechanism for users’ authentication in online-
distributed systems, specifically the online banking systems.  However, it also raised new 
research directions. The following sections discuss these research opportunities in more 
detail. 
8.3.1 More Usable Channels 
Mobile devices have proved to be a usable complementary channel for online 
authentication. Other possible usable communication channels can also be used to support 
the MCA mechanism. These channels need to be tested for usability and security when 
used with other conventional authentication mechanisms. 
SMS messages, on the other hand, can also be substituted with other services currently 
supported by mobile phones. Chatting software, in particular, such as What’s Up for 
iPhones and BlackBerry’s messenger are among most popular live messaging software 
nowadays. People can be allowed to set preferences on which these services (or any future 
live contact services) they prefer to receive their OTPs. 
8.3.2 MCA for the Disabled 
Although MCA proved usable and acceptable by users in Oman, disabled users might find 
it difficult to utilize it for their day-to-day financial transactions. The proposed MCA 
mechanism added another layer (mobile channel) of interactivity between users and online 
banking. This layer, in the context of online banking, needs further investigation alone and 
when combined with web-channel to see how it can be improved to meet the requirements 
of different disabilities. In this study, only people without disabilities were involved in 
testing the MCA solution. 
8.3.3 MCA for Corporate Banking 
The study has shown the MCA mechanism to address many of the current shortcomings of 
online banking. MCA can be extended to offer better usability and security to corporate 
online banking as well. For instance, involving multiple OTPs from different users to 
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authorize one transaction. This area has rarely been covered in the literature and 
investigating it would provide novel authentication solutions. 
8.4 A Final Word 
This research proposed a multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism that improves 
security of online banking systems while maintaining usability. The threat-analysis testing 
showed how the proposed MCA could protect users’ accounts from most known attacks 
that other authentication mechanisms fail to address. A prototype online banking system 
using MCA was designed to test MCA's usability and acceptability. The majority of users 
who participated in the study felt that the MCA improved security. They also found the 
system usable and acceptable and indicated that they would use it and recommend it to 
others. These findings should be interesting to the banking sector if they want to improve 
their online banking systems. Too often banks focus on security while degrading usability. 
The guidelines and recommendations provided in this research will provide guidelines to 
banks wishing to offer more secure yet usable online banking. 
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Appendix A 
Web-application Codes/Scripts 
A1: PHP page to automate the process of calculating the time spent variable (TSn) 
<?php require_once('Connections/ev_conn.php'); ?> 
<?php 
if (!function_exists("GetSQLValueString")) { 
function GetSQLValueString($theValue, $theType, $theDefinedValue = "", 
$theNotDefinedValue = "")  
{ 
  if (PHP_VERSION < 6) { 
    $theValue = get_magic_quotes_gpc() ? stripslashes($theValue) : $theValue; 
  } 
 
  $theValue = function_exists("mysql_real_escape_string") ? 
mysql_real_escape_string($theValue) : mysql_escape_string($theValue); 
 
  switch ($theType) { 
    case "text": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break;     
    case "long": 
    case "int": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? intval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "double": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? doubleval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "date": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "defined": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theDefinedValue : $theNotDefinedValue; 
      break; 
  } 
  return $theValue; 
} 
} 
 
mysql_select_db($database_ev_conn, $ev_conn); 
$query_rsData = "SELECT users.username, logs.acctnum, logs.log_id, logs.ipaddress, 
logs.visit_time, logs.visit_page, logs.user_agent, logs.get_vars, logs.post_vars 
FROM users INNER JOIN logs ON users.username = logs.username WHERE (users.level=0) 
ORDER BY logs.username, logs.log_id;"; 
$rsData = mysql_query($query_rsData, $ev_conn) or die(mysql_error()); 
$row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData); 
$totalRows_rsData = mysql_num_rows($rsData); 
?> 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> 
<title>Data Analysis</title> 
</head> 
<body> 
<p><strong>Logs records - DATA</strong></p> 
<table width="100%" border="1"> 
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  <tr> 
    <th>#</th> 
    <th>Username</th> 
    <th>Acct</th> 
    <th>logid</th> 
    <th>ipaddress</th> 
    <th>page</th> 
    <th>visit_time</th> 
    <th>time_spent</th> 
    <th>user_agent</th> 
    <th>get_vars</th> 
    <th>post_vars</th> 
  </tr> 
  <?php $x = 0; ?> 
  <?php do { ?> 
  <?php $x++;  
    if($x > 1) { 
  ?> 
    <tr> 
      <td><?php echo $x; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $username; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $acctnum; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $log_id; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $ipaddress; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $visit_page; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $visit_time; ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($username == $row_rsData['username']) echo 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time); ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $user_agent; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $get_vars; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $post_vars; ?></td> 
    </tr> 
<?php 
  } 
  $username = $row_rsData['username']; 
  $acctnum = $row_rsData['acctnum']; 
  $log_id = $row_rsData['log_id']; 
  $ipaddress = $row_rsData['ipaddress']; 
  $visit_page = $row_rsData['visit_page']; 
  $visit_time = $row_rsData['visit_time']; 
  $user_agent = $row_rsData['user_agent']; 
  $get_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['get_vars']); 
  $post_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['post_vars']); 
?> 
<?php } while ($row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData)); ?> 
<tr> 
  <td>&nbsp;</td> 
  <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
  </tr> 
</table> 
</body> 
</html> 
<?php 
mysql_free_result($rsData); 
?> 
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A2: PHP page to automate the process of calculating the time spent variable (TSn) per 
each task 
<?php require_once('Connections/ev_conn.php'); ?> 
<?php 
if (!function_exists("GetSQLValueString")) { 
function GetSQLValueString($theValue, $theType, $theDefinedValue = "", 
$theNotDefinedValue = "")  
{ 
  if (PHP_VERSION < 6) { 
    $theValue = get_magic_quotes_gpc() ? stripslashes($theValue) : $theValue; 
  } 
 
  $theValue = function_exists("mysql_real_escape_string") ? 
mysql_real_escape_string($theValue) : mysql_escape_string($theValue); 
 
  switch ($theType) { 
    case "text": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break;     
    case "long": 
    case "int": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? intval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "double": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? doubleval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "date": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "defined": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theDefinedValue : $theNotDefinedValue; 
      break; 
  } 
  return $theValue; 
} 
} 
 
mysql_select_db($database_ev_conn, $ev_conn); 
$query_rsData = "SELECT users.username, logs.acctnum, logs.log_id, logs.ipaddress, 
logs.visit_time, logs.visit_page, logs.user_agent, logs.get_vars, logs.post_vars 
FROM users INNER JOIN logs ON users.username = logs.username WHERE (users.level=0) 
ORDER BY logs.username, logs.log_id"; 
$rsData = mysql_query($query_rsData, $ev_conn) or die(mysql_error()); 
$row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData); 
$totalRows_rsData = mysql_num_rows($rsData); 
?> 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> 
<title>Data Analysis</title> 
</head> 
 
<body> 
<p><strong>Logs records per tasks</strong></p> 
 
<p>&nbsp;</p> 
<table width="100%" border="1"> 
  <tr> 
    <th>#</th> 
    <th>Username</th> 
    <th>Last logid</th> 
    <th>Acct</th> 
    <th>Task 1</th> 
    <th>Task 2</th> 
    <th>Task 3</th> 
    <th>Task 4</th> 
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    <th>Task 5</th> 
    <th>Total</th> 
  </tr> 
  <?php $x = 0; $ts = 0; 
 
 $ts1start = false; $ts1finalize = false; $ts1done = false; 
   $ts2start = false; $ts2finalize = false; $ts2done = false; 
   $ts3start = false; $ts3finalize = false; $ts3done = false; 
   $ts4start = false; $ts4finalize = false; $ts4done = false; 
   $ts5start = false; $ts5finalize = false; $ts5check = false; $ts5done = 
false; 
  ?> 
  <?php do { ?> 
  <?php $x++;  
  if($x > 1) { 
     if($ts1finalize == true && $ts1done == false) $t1=($ts1 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
   if($ts2finalize == true && $ts2done == false) $t2=($ts2 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
   if($ts3finalize == true && $ts3done == false) $t3=($ts3 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
   if($ts4finalize == true && $ts4done == false) $t4=($ts4 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
   if($ts5finalize == true && $ts5done == false) $t5=($ts5 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
  ?> 
  <?php 
  } 
  $ts = $row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time; 
  // do the process of calculating the total time spent for each task 
   if($row_rsData['username'] == $username) { // make sure we are dealing with 
the same user 
  // do a check for task 5 (check the intermediary page) 
  if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer.php' && 
substr($row_rsData['get_vars'],0,17) == 'mode=alt_activate') {  
   $ts5check = true;  // trigger the task5 check intermediary 
page flag to true 
  }  
    // now we start with task 1 
  if($ts1done == false) { 
   if($ts1start == true) { 
    $ts1 = $ts1 + $ts;  // calculate task1 commulative TS 
   } 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/profile.php' && $ts1start == 
false && $ts1done == false) {  
     $ts1 = 0; 
     $ts1start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
   } 
   if($ts1finalize == true) { $ts1done = true; $ts1start = false; 
} 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/channels.php') { // if 
finish page is reached, set flag finalize to true 
    $ts=0; 
    $ts1finalize = true; 
   } 
  } 
   
   
    // we start with task 2 
  if($ts1done == true && $ts2done == false) { 
   if($ts2start == true && $ts2done == false) { 
    $ts2 = $ts2 + $ts;  // calculate task2 commulative TS 
   } 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/channels.php' && $ts2start 
== false && $ts2done == false) {  
     $ts2 = 0; 
     $ts2start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
   } 
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   if($ts2finalize == true) { $ts2done = true; $ts2start = false; 
} 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/account.php') { // if finish 
page is reached, set flag finish to true 
    $ts=0; 
    $ts2finalize = true; 
   } 
  } 
   
   
   // we start with task 3 
  if($ts2done == true && $ts3done == false) { 
   if(($ts3start == true && $ts3done == false) && $ts2done == 
true) { 
    $ts3 = $ts3 + $ts;  // calculate task3 commulative TS 
   } 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/addbeneficiary.php' && 
$ts3start == false && $ts3done == false) {  
     $ts3 = 0; 
     $ts3start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
   } 
   if($ts3finalize == true) { $ts3done = true; $ts3start = false; 
} 
   if(($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer.php' && 
$row_rsData['get_vars'] == 'activate=true') || ($row_rsData['visit_page'] == 
'/scripts/checksms.php' && $row_rsData['get_vars'] == 'chktype=1') ) { // if 
finish page is reached, set flag finish to true 
    $ts=0; 
    $ts3finalize = true; 
   } 
  } 
 
 
    // we start with task 4 
  if($ts3done == true && $ts4done == false) { 
   if($ts4start == true && $ts4done == false) { 
    $ts4 = $ts4 + $ts;  // calculate task4 commulative TS 
   } 
   if(($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer_page.php' && 
substr($row_rsData['get_vars'],0,6) == 'bn_id=') && $ts4start == false && $ts4done 
== false) {  
     $ts4 = 0; 
     $ts4start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
   } 
   if($ts4finalize == true) { $ts4done = true; $ts4start = false; 
} 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/account.php' && 
substr($row_rsData['get_vars'],0,7) == 'acc_no=') { // if finish page is reached, 
set flag finish to true 
    $ts=0; 
    $ts4finalize = true; 
   } 
  } 
 
 
    // we start with task 5 ONLY IF all previous tasks are DONE 
  if($ts1done == true && $ts2done == true && $ts3done == true && 
$ts4done == true && $ts5done == false) { 
   if($ts5start == true) { 
    $ts5 = $ts5 + $ts;  // calculate task5 commulative TS 
   } 
   if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/addbeneficiary.php' && 
$ts5start == false && $ts5done == false && $ts4done == true) {  
     $ts5 = 0; 
     $ts5start = true;  // trigger the task5 start 
flag to true 
   } 
   if($ts5check == true) { 
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    if($ts5finalize == true) { $ts5done = true; $ts5start = 
false; } 
    if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer.php' && 
$row_rsData['get_vars'] == 'activate=true') { // if finish page is reached, set 
flag finish to true 
     $ts=0; 
     $ts5finalize = true; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } else { 
 // if username is changed, reset all variables for a new cycle 
   $ts1start = false; $ts1finalize = false; $ts1done = false; 
   $ts2start = false; $ts2finalize = false; $ts2done = false; 
   $ts3start = false; $ts3finalize = false; $ts3done = false; 
   $ts4start = false; $ts4finalize = false; $ts4done = false; 
   $ts5start = false; $ts5finalize = false; $ts5check = false; $ts5done = 
false; 
 $tsout = ''; 
 } 
?> 
<?php  
// output the results before moving to a new user 
if($username != $row_rsData['username']) { ?> 
     <tr> 
      <td><?php echo $x; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $username; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $log_id; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $acctnum; ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t1==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t1.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t1; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t2==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t2.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t2; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t3==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t3.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t3; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t4==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t4.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t4; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t5==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t5.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t5; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo ($t1+$t2+$t3+$t4+$t5); $t1=0; $t2=0; $t3=0; $t4=0; $t5=0; 
?></td> 
    </tr> 
<?php } ?> 
<? 
  $username = $row_rsData['username']; 
  $acctnum = $row_rsData['acctnum']; 
  $log_id = $row_rsData['log_id']; 
  $ipaddress = $row_rsData['ipaddress']; 
  $visit_page = $row_rsData['visit_page']; 
  $visit_time = $row_rsData['visit_time']; 
  $user_agent = $row_rsData['user_agent']; 
  $get_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['get_vars']); 
  $post_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['post_vars']); 
?> 
    <?php } while ($row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData)); ?> 
</table> 
</body> 
</html> 
<?php 
mysql_free_result($rsData); 
?> 
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Appendix B 
Online Questionnaires 
B1: Pre-questionnaire – Section A (English) 
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B2: Pre-questionnaire – Section B (English) 
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B3: Pre-questionnaire – Section C (English) 
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B4: Post-questionnaire – Section A (English) 
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B5: Post-questionnaire – Section B (English) 
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B6: Pre-questionnaire – Section A (Arabic) 
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B7: Pre-questionnaire – Section B (Arabic) 
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B8: Pre-questionnaire – Section C (Arabic) 
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B9: Post-questionnaire – Section A (Arabic) 
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B10: Post-questionnaire – Section B (Arabic) 
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Appendix C 
Data Screening Results 
C1: Pre-questionnaire data frequency and missing details (all participants) 
Variables	   N	  =	  188	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  Do	  you	  make	  use	  of	  Internet	  banking	  facility?	   185 3 1.6 0.54 0 1 Please	  state	  your	  gender	   186 2 1.1 0.67 0 1 
Based on two options (0 and 1) 
Variables	   N	  =	  188	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  How	  frequently	  do	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  from	  Home?	   182 6 3.2 1.55 1 4 How	  frequently	  do	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  from	  Work?	   181 7 3.7 1.73 1 4 How	  frequently	  do	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  from	  School?	   159 29 15.4 3.16 1 4 How	  frequently	  do	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  from	  Public?	   166 22 11.7 3.36 1 4 How	  frequently	  do	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  from	  Mobile?	   173 15 8.0 2.55 1 4 How	  frequently	  do	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  from	  other	  places?	   85 103 54.8 3.81 1 4 What	  is	  your	  marital	  status?	   182 6 3.2 1.59 1 2 
Based on four options (1 to 4) 
Variables	   N	  =	  188	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  How	  often	  do	  you	  make	  use	  of	  Internet	  banking	  service?	   119 69 36.7 3.39 1 6 Please	  indicate	  your	  age	  group	  (in	  years)	   182 6 3.2 1.70 1 4 
Based on six options (1 to 6) 
Variables	   N	  =	  188	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  What	  type	  of	  business	  area	  best	  describes	  your	  organization?	   164 24 12.8 4.98 1 9 
Based on nine options (1 to 9) 
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Variables	   N	  =	  188	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  If	  you	  access	  the	  Internet	  daily,	  how	  many	  minutes/hours	  in	  total	  do	  you	  usually	  spend	  on	  it	  each	  day?	   181 7 3.7 3.36 1 5 With	  how	  many	  banks	  do	  you	  do	  your	  Internet	  banking	  services?	   114 74 39.4 1.65 1 5 To	  which	  monthly	  income	  group	  you	  belong	  (in	  OMR)?	   172 16 8.5 2.33 1 5 Which	  is	  your	  highest	  level	  of	  education?	   154 34 18.1 3.17 2 5 Accessibility:	  convenience	  to	  access	  the	  service	   181 7 3.7 3.95 1 5 Accessibility:	  connection	  speed	   182 6 3.2 3.94 1 5 T&R*:	  reliability	  of	  your	  banker	   179 9 4.8 3.99 1 5 T&R*:	  bank	  response	  rate	  to	  queries	   183 5 2.7 3.67 1 5 T&R*:	  Ethical	  and	  professional	  conduct	   179 9 4.8 3.89 1 5 T&R*:	  bank’s	  policy	  to	  compensate	  for	  losses	   178 10 5.3 3.62 1 5 Reluctance:	  the	  bank	  willingness	  to	  adopt	  technology	   181 7 3.7 3.89 1 5 Reluctance:	  the	  bank	  level	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  Internet	  banking	  service	   177 11 5.9 3.99 1 5 Security:	  clear	  and	  understandable	  instructions	   182 6 3.2 4.12 1 5 Security:	  security	  of	  Internet	  transaction	   179 9 4.8 4.04 1 5 Security:	  length	  of	  Internet	  experience	   179 9 4.8 3.72 1 5 Convenience:	  range	  of	  electronic	  services	  offered	   180 8 4.3 3.77 1 5 Convenience:	  convenient	  way	  of	  doing	  bank	  transactions	   180 8 4.3 3.84 1 5 Convenience:	  time	  saving	   179 9 4.8 4.16 1 5 Ease	  of	  use:	  user	  friendly	  web	  site	   182 6 3.2 4.03 1 5 Ease	  of	  use:	  ease	  of	  performing	  e-­‐transaction	   180 8 4.3 4.07 1 5 
*	  Trust	  and	  relationship 
Based on five options (1 to 5) 
Variables	   N	  =	  188	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  What	  is	  your	  current	  occupation?	   178 10 5.3 3.66 1 10 
Based on ten options (1 to 10) 
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C2: Post-questionnaire data frequency and missing details (participants who 
completed all tasks) 
Variables	   N	  =	  90	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  
Current	  Systems	  Payments:	  Do	  inter	  account	  funds	  transfer	   88 2 2.2 3.3 1 5 Payments:	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  personal	  account	   89 1 1.1 2.84 1 5 Payments:	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  local	  bank	  acct.	   89 1 1.1 2.94 1 5 Payments:	  Transfer	  funds	  to	  credit	  card	  account	   88 2 2.2 3.16 1 5 Payments:	  Do	  foreign	  transfer:	  draft	  or	  SWIFT	   87 3 3.3 2.47 1 5 Payments:	  Top-­‐up	  mobile	  phones	   87 3 3.3 2.61 1 5 Requests:	  Order	  cheque	  books	   89 1 1.1 3.3 1 5 Requests:	  Stop	  lost	  ATM	  cards	   89 1 1.1 3.35 1 5 Requests:	  Stop	  lost	  credit	  cards	   88 2 2.2 3.32 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  a	  credit	  card	  limit	  change	   88 2 2.2 2.98 1 5 Requests:	   Request	   the	   issue	   of	   a	   current	   account	  statement	   89 1 1.1 3.73 1 5 Requests:	  Setup	  standing	  order	  transactions	   86 4 4.4 2.93 1 5 Requests:	  Setup	  new	  account	   90 0 0 2.84 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  foreign	  currency	  accounts	   87 3 3.3 2.95 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  debit/credit	  card	   87 3 3.3 2.86 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  a	  loan	   86 4 4.4 2.63 1 5 Requests:	  Request	  telephone	  banking	   87 3 3.3 2.84 1 5 
Multichannel	  Authentication	  (MCA)	  Payments:	  Do	  inter	  account	  funds	  transfer	   88 2 2.2 4.1 1 5 Payments:	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  personal	  account	   87 3 3.3 4.22 1 5 Payments:	  Make	  payment	  to	  other	  local	  bank	  acct.	   88 2 2.2 4.24 1 5 Payments:	  Transfer	  funds	  to	  credit	  card	  account	   89 1 1.1 4.07 1 5 Payments:	  Do	  foreign	  transfer:	  draft	  or	  SWIFT	   87 3 3.3 3.8 1 5 Payments:	  Top-­‐up	  mobile	  phones	   87 3 3.3 4.08 1 5 Requests:	  Order	  cheque	  books	   88 2 2.2 3.78 1 5 Requests:	  Stop	  lost	  ATM	  cards	   89 1 1.1 4.04 1 5 Requests:	  Stop	  lost	  credit	  cards	   87 3 3.3 4 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  a	  credit	  card	  limit	  change	   89 1 1.1 3.85 1 5 Requests:	   Request	   the	   issue	   of	   a	   current	   account	  statement	   87 3 3.3 4.43 1 5 Requests:	  Setup	  standing	  order	  transactions	   86 4 4.4 4.05 1 5 Requests:	  Setup	  new	  account	   88 2 2.2 3.77 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  foreign	  currency	  accounts	   86 4 4.4 3.59 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  debit/credit	  card	   88 2 2.2 3.91 1 5 Requests:	  Apply	  for	  a	  loan	   89 1 1.1 3.43 1 5 Requests:	  Request	  telephone	  banking	   89 1 1.1 3.93 1 5 
Post-questionnaire: section A questions 
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Variables	   N	  =	  90	   Mean	   Min.	   Max.	  Valid	   Missing	   %	  
Question	  1	  Amount	  of	  SMS	  communication	  with	  the	  site	   89 1 1.1 4.26 2 5 Ease	  of	  performing	  transactions	   89 1 1.1 4.31 2 5 Level	  of	  security	  measures	  implemented	   89 1 1.1 4.28 1 5 
Question	  2	  If	  multi-­‐channel	  authentication	  (MCA)	  service	  is	  implemented	  by	  your	  bank,	  I	  would	  recommend	  it	  to	  others	   89 1 1.1 4.36 3 5 I	  found	  MCA	  easy	  to	  use	  overall	   89 1 1.1 4.3 2 5 I	  expected	  the	  MCA	  to	  work	  the	  way	  it	  did	   89 1 1.1 4.16 3 5 I	  trust	  that	  MCA	  would	  protect	  me	  from	  Internet	  fraud	  and	  attacks	   88 2 2.2 4.03 1 5 I	  feel	  that	  MCA	  has	  just	  made	  things	  complicated	  and	  time-­‐consuming	   89 1 1.1 2.28 1 5 With	  MCA,	  I	  am	  not	  worried	  about	  using	  public	  computers	  for	  Internet	  banking	  services	   88 2 2.2 3.59 1 5 I	  would	  imagine	  that	  most	  people	  would	  learn	  to	  use	  this	  system	  very	  quickly	   89 1 1.1 3.84 1 5 I	  found	  the	  alternative	  channel	  feature	  convenient	  when	  (in	  case)	  my	  primary	  channel	  (for	  example	  your	  mobile	  phone)	  is	  unavailable	   87 3 3.3 4.28 1 5 I	  would	  prefer	  to	  use	  the	  alternative	  channel	  option	  than	  making	  a	  call-­‐center/help-­‐desk	  call	   88 2 2.2 4.19 1 5 
Post-questionnaire: section B questions 
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Appendix D 
Demographics Characteristics 
D1: Relationship between Demographic Profile of Participants and Dropout Rates 
Gender	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
0.605** 1 .437 2 Female	   Count	   34 28 62 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Gender	   54.8% 45.2% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   36.6% 30.1% 33.3% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   18.3% 15.1% 33.3% 	   	   	   	   Male	   Count	   59 65 124 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Gender	   47.6% 52.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   63.4% 69.9% 66.7% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   31.7% 34.9% 66.7% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   93 93 186 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Gender	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
**	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Relationship between Gender and Dropout Rates 
 
Marital	  Status	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
.023** 1 .880 6 Single	   Count	   36 38 74 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  M.	  Status	   48.6% 51.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   39.6% 41.8% 40.7% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   19.8% 20.9% 40.7% 	   	   	   	   Married	   Count	   55 53 108 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  M.	  Status	   50.9% 49.1% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   60.4% 58.2% 59.3% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   30.2% 29.1% 59.3% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   91 91 182 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  M.	  Status	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
**	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Relationship between Marital Status and Dropout Rates 
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Education	  Level	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
19.607* 3 .000 34 Technical	  /	  
Professional	  
Training	  
Count	   19 4 23 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   82.6% 17.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   24.1% 5.3% 14.9% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   12.3% 2.6% 14.9% 	   	   	   	   College	  grad.	  
(4	  years)	  
Count	   43 44 87 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   49.4% 50.6% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   54.4% 58.7% 56.5% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   27.9% 28.6% 56.5% 	   	   	   	   Master	  deg.	  
or	  equivalent	  
Count	   17 22 39 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   43.6% 56.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   21.5% 29.3% 25.3% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   11.0% 14.3% 25.3% 	   	   	   	   Postgraduate	  
degree	  
Count	   0 5 5 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   0% 6.7% 3.2% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   0% 3.2% 3.2% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   79 75 154 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   51.3% 48.7% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   51.3% 48.7% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
**	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Relationship between Education Level and Dropout Rates 
 
Education	  Level	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
9.928* 2 .007 39 Technical	  /	  
Professional	  
Training	  
Count	   19 4 23 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   82.6% 17.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   24.1% 5.7% 15.4% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   12.8% 2.7% 15.4% 	   	   	   	   College	  grad.	  
(4	  years)	  
Count	   43 44 87 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   49.4% 50.6% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   54.4% 62.9% 58.4% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   28.9% 29.5% 58.4% 	   	   	   	   Master	  deg.	  
or	  equivalent	  
Count	   17 22 39 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   43.6% 56.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   21.5% 31.4% 26.2% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   11.4% 14.8% 26.2% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   79 70 149 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   53.0% 47.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   53.0% 47.0% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
**	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Relationship between Education Level and Dropout Rates (without the postgraduate degree group) 
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Age	  Group	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
2.131* 3 .546 6 18	  to	  27	   Count	   39 36 75 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   52.0% 48.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   42.9% 39.6% 41.2% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   21.4% 19.8% 41.2% 	   	   	   	   28	  to	  37	   Count	   44 45 89 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   49.4% 50.6% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   48.4% 49.5% 48.9% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   24.2% 24.7% 48.9% 	   	   	   	   38	  to	  47	   Count	   8 8 16 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   8.8% 8.8% 8.8% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   4.4% 4.4% 8.8% 	   	   	   	   48	  to	  57	   Count	   0 2 2 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   0.0% 2.2% 1.1% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   91 91 182 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
Relationship between Age Group and Dropout Rates 
 
Monthly	  Income	  Group	  (in	  OMR)	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
5.080* 4 .279 16 Less	  than	  500	   Count	   15 18 33 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Income	  Grp.	   45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   18.1% 20.2% 19.2% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   8.7% 10.5% 19.2% 	   	   	   	   500	  –	  1,000	   Count	   43 41 84 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Income	  Grp.	   51.2% 48.8% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   51.8% 46.1% 48.8% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   25.0% 23.8% 48.8% 	   	   	   	   1,001	  –	  1,500	   Count	   11 20 31 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Income	  Grp.	   35.5% 64.5% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   13.3% 22.5% 18.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   6.4% 11.6% 18.0% 	   	   	   	   1,501	  –	  2,000	   Count	   6 7 13 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Income	  Grp.	   46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   7.2% 7.9% 7.6% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   3.5% 4.1% 7.6% 	   	   	   	   More	  than	  
2,001	  
Count	   8 3 11 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Income	  Grp.	   72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   9.6% 3.4% 6.4% 	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   4.7% 1.7% 6.4% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   83 89 172 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Income	  Grp.	   48.3% 51.7% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   48.3% 51.7% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	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Relationship between Monthly Income and Dropout Rates 
 
Social	  Relationship	  and	  Completed	  Crosstabulations	   Completed?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
33.142* 1 .000 0 Others	   Count	   84 11 95 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed	  the	  requirements?	   88.4% 11.6% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Is	  Friend?	   65.1% 18.6% 50.5% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   44.7% 5.9% 50.5% 	   	   	   	   Friends	  &	  Colleagues	   Count	   45 48 93 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed	  the	  requirements?	   48.4% 51.6% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Is	  Friend?	   34.9% 81.4% 49.5% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   23.9% 25.5% 49.5% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   129 59 188 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Completed	  the	  requirements?	   68.6% 31.4% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Is	  Friend?	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   68.6% 31.4% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Relationship between Social Relationship and Dropout Rates 
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D2: Relationship between Demographic Profile of Participants and Online Banking 
Experience 
Have	  used	  online	  banking	  before?	   Completed?	  
Total	  Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	  (%)	   Yes	  (%)	  
5.293* 1 .021 3 No	   52 (60.5%) 34 (39.5%) 86 	   Yes	   42 (42.4%) 57 (57.6%) 99 
Total	   94 (50.8%) 91 (49.2%) 185 
*	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table) 
Relationship between Tasks Completion and Online Banking Experience  
Education	  Level	  and	  OB	  Experience	  Crosstabulations	   OB	  User?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
18.406* 2 .000 2 Technical	  /	  
Professional	  
Training	  
Count	   14	   8	   22	  	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   64%	   36%	   100%	  	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   22%	   9%	   15%	  	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   9%	   5%	   15%	  	   	   	   	   College	  grad.	  
(4	  years)	  
Count	   44	   44	   88	  	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   50%	   50%	   100%	  	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   69%	   51%	   59%	  	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   29%	   29%	   59%	  	   	   	   	   Master	  deg.	  
or	  equivalent	  
Count	   6	   34	   40	  	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   15%	   85%	   100%	  	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   9%	   40%	   27%	  	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   4%	   23%	   27%	  	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   64	   86	   150	  	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Edu.	  Level	   43%	   57%	   100%	  	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   100%	   100%	   100%	  	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   43%	   57%	   100%	  
*	  based	  on	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  
Relationship between Education Level and OB Experience (without postgraduate degree group) 
Age	  Group	  and	  Online	  Banking	  Experience	  Crosstabulations	   OB	  User?	   	  
Value	   df	   Sig.	   Missing	   	   No	   Yes	   Total	  
10.956* 1 .001 3 18	  to	  27	   Count	   44 28 72 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   61.1% 38.9% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   59.5% 32.2% 44.7% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   27.3% 17.4% 44.7% 	   	   	   	   28	  to	  37	   Count	   30 59 89 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   33.7% 66.3% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   40.5% 67.8% 55.3% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   18.6% 36.6% 55.3% 	   	   	   	   Total	   Count	   74 87 161 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  Age	  Group	   46.0% 54.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  within	  OB	  User	   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 	   	   	   	   	   %	  of	  Total	   46.0% 54.0% 100.0% 
*	  based	  on	  Continuity	  Correction	  (computed	  only	  for	  a	  2x2	  table)	  
Relationship between Age Group and Online Banking Experience (without age groups 38 to 47 and 
48 to 57) 
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D3: Factor Analysis – Component Matrix and Screeplot 
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D4: Independent-Sample T-Test – External Variables 
	   Online	  
banking	  user?	   N	   Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	   Std.	  Error	  Mean	  
Trust	  and	  Relationship	   No	   88 3.50 .916 .098 
Yes	   100 4.02 .792 .079 
Accessibility	   No	   88 3.65 1.281 .137 
Yes	   100 4.21 .998 .100 
Security	   No	   88 3.70 1.054 .112 
Yes	   100 4.10 .792 .079 
Perceived	  ease	  of	  use	   No	   88 3.70 1.076 .115 
Yes	   100 4.18 .794 .079 
Group Statistics 
 
Factors	  
Levene's	  Test	  
for	  Equality	  of	  
Variances	  
t-­‐test	  for	  Equality	  of	  Means	  
F	   Sig.	   t	   df	  
Sig.	  
(2-­‐
tailed)	  
M	  
Diff.	  
S.	  Err.	  
Diff.	  
95%	  Conf.	  Inter.	  
of	  the	  Diff.	  
Lower	   Upper	  
Trust	  and	  relationship	  
Equal	  variances	  assumed	   4.323 .039 -4.198 186 .000 -.523 .125 -.769 -.277 
Equal	  var.	  not	  assumed	     -4.160 173.185 .000 -.523 .126 -.771 -.275 
Accessibility	  
Equal	  variances	  assumed	   8.413 .004 -3.314 186 .001 -.552 .166 -.880 -.223 
Equal	  var.	  not	  assumed	     -3.262 163.715 .001 -.552 .169 -.885 -.218 
Security	  
Equal	  variances	  assumed	   11.033 .001 -2.943 186 .004 -.398 .135 -.664 -.131 
Equal	  var.	  not	  assumed	     -2.891 160.227 .004 -.398 .138 -.669 -.126 
Perceived	  ease	  of	  use	  
Equal	  variances	  assumed	   12.230 .001 -3.495 186 .001 -.478 .137 -.748 -.208 
Equal	  var.	  not	  assumed	     -3.430 158.377 .001 -.478 .139 -.754 -.203 
Independent Samples Test 
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D4: Paried-Sample T-Test – Online Users’ Preferences on Services Usage between 
Online Banking Systems with MCA and without MCA 
	   Mean	   N	   Std.	  Deviation	   Std.	  Error	  Mean	  
Q	  1	  
With	   4.18 62 1.064 .135 
Without	   3.37 62 1.149 .146 
Q	  2	   With	   4.21 61 1.002 .128 Without	   2.79 61 1.318 .169 
Q	  3	   With	   4.26 62 .974 .124 Without	   2.82 62 1.248 .159 
Q	  4	   With	   4.10 61 .961 .123 Without	   3.25 61 1.234 .158 
Q	  5	   With	   3.70 60 1.253 .162 Without	   2.33 60 1.311 .169 
Q	  6	   With	   4.05 60 1.171 .151 Without	   2.60 60 1.210 .156 
Q	  7	   With	   3.75 61 1.337 .171 Without	   3.34 61 1.250 .160 
Q	  8	   With	   3.95 62 1.247 .158 Without	   3.44 62 1.288 .164 
Q	  9	   With	   3.95 61 1.217 .156 Without	   3.38 61 1.319 .169 
Q	  10	   With	   3.79 61 1.280 .164 Without	   2.97 61 1.224 .157 
Q	  11	   With	   4.36 61 1.065 .136 Without	   3.80 61 1.093 .140 
Q	  12	   With	   4.11 61 1.142 .146 Without	   2.89 61 1.185 .152 
Q	  13	   With	   3.68 62 1.352 .172 Without	   2.73 62 1.405 .178 
Q	  14	   With	   3.41 59 1.403 .183 Without	   2.98 59 1.383 .180 
Q	  15	   With	   3.89 61 1.199 .153 Without	   2.93 61 1.340 .172 
Q	  16	   With	   3.36 59 1.336 .174 Without	   2.59 59 1.301 .169 
Q	  17	  
With	   3.77 60 1.320 .170 
Without	   2.87 60 1.268 .164 Paired	  Samples	  Statistics 
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   Paired	  Differences	   t	   df	   Sig.	  (2-­‐tailed)	  Mean	   Std.	  Deviation	   Std.	  Error	  Mean	   95%	  Confidence	  Interval	  of	  the	  Difference	  
Lower	   Upper	  
Q	  1	   .806 1.491 .189 .428 1.185 4.258 61 .000 
Q	  2	   1.426 1.500 .192 1.042 1.810 7.428 60 .000 
Q	  3	   1.435 1.543 .196 1.044 1.827 7.325 61 .000 
Q	  4	   .852 1.314 .168 .516 1.189 5.065 60 .000 
Q	  5	   1.367 1.775 .229 .908 1.825 5.963 59 .000 
Q	  6	   1.450 1.466 .189 1.071 1.829 7.660 59 .000 
Q	  7	   .410 1.564 .200 .009 .810 2.047 60 .045 
Q	  8	   .516 1.734 .220 .076 .957 2.343 61 .022 
Q	  9	   .574 1.756 .225 .124 1.023 2.553 60 .013 
Q	  
10	   .820 1.607 .206 .408 1.231 3.983 60 .000 
Q	  
11	   .557 1.467 .188 .182 .933 2.968 60 .004 
Q	  
12	   1.230 1.359 .174 .881 1.578 7.067 60 .000 
Q	  
13	   .952 1.928 .245 .462 1.441 3.886 61 .000 
Q	  
14	   .424 1.868 .243 -.063 .911 1.742 58 .087 
Q	  
15	   .951 1.755 .225 .501 1.400 4.231 60 .000 
Q	  
16	   .763 1.794 .234 .295 1.230 3.266 58 .002 
Q	  
17	   .900 1.674 .216 .467 1.333 4.164 59 .000 Paired	  Samples	  Test 
  
